【直擊東熹苑車位問題】
日期︰2017 年 12 月 22 日
有很多筲箕灣東熹苑的居民向葉太投訴，自從領展將屋苑停車場售予獨立投資者後，新業主將車位拆售予部分非屋苑居民，導至租金急升。由原來的二千多元，上升至三千多，甚至比太古城還要貴。於是，昨日她便與陳家珮議員到東熹苑實地視察情況。
她們發現，停車場位於屋苑的中心位置，私家車要駛入停車場，便要經過屋苑的私家路。過去，因停車位須租予該屋苑的居民，自然沒有問題。可是，自從車位被拆售後，經小業主租用停車位的租客，便可能不再是屋苑居民，這便大有問題了。
翻查政府當初批發給房委會興建東熹苑的地契，上面清楚列明停車場的使用者須是屋苑居民及「bona fide（真正的訪客）」，但現在因車位被拆售了，便再沒有機制去確定車位租客的身分。由此可見，領展出售停車場，很有可能涉及違反契約條款。故此，待下月立法會會期重開，葉太必會向新成立的「公屋及居屋商場、街市及停車場事宜小組委員會」反映，為居民爭取應有的權利。
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政府非金融資產 如何更積極管理好
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4月10日的立法會大會上，黃英豪議員提出「更積極地管理好政府的非金融資產」議案，指出特區政府財政儲備下降，「預計由2022年逾9,400億港元減少至2024年3月底約為7,300億港元，財政狀況令人擔憂」，因此應該「採取多元化的財政策略，更積極地管理好政府的非金融資產」、「盤活旗下資產的營運利益，以穩定本港財政」；邱達根議員則提出修正議案，指應該「考慮將特區政府現時持股公司或機構的資產撥歸香港投資管理有限公司（港投公司）管理，以提升相關資產的營運與資本效益」。
黃英豪議員在會議上發言，舉出了港鐵私有化的例子，建議特區政府研究水務私有化、把郵政署發展成物流速配中心。邱達根議員則以淡馬錫為例，建議把特區政府有持股的港鐵公司、數碼港、科學園等納入港投公司管理，將之發展成淡馬錫的規模。
很感謝兩位議員提出的建議，我認為值得討論一下，這些建議是否可行？
郵政和水務一樣，都是民生服務，不能為了盈利隨便加價。1995年，政府根據《營運基金條例》（《香港法例》第430章）設立郵政署營運基金（Post Office Trading Fund），注資30億港元，自此香港郵政需自負盈虧。
這些年來，隨着電腦網絡、電子郵件盛行，傳統郵件的郵遞需求持續下跌，加上面對商業物流派遞公司的猛烈競爭，即使香港郵政積極開源節流，增加收費項目，近年仍是虧的多盈的少。根據香港郵政年報，疫情前2018/2019年度錄得2.24億港元營運虧損，疫情後的2022/2023年度，虧損更增至3.05億港元，表現並不理想。
即使如此，香港郵政於2021年向立法會申請撥款，要求注資46億1,130萬元予郵政署營運基金，資助香港郵政空郵中心重建計劃，以應付蓬勃發展的電子商貿行業對跨境電子商貿郵遞服務的需求。新的香港郵政空郵中心預料於2027年落成。記得當時立法會討論撥款申請時，已有議員質疑以公務員運作的香港郵政，服務的快捷度及靈活性，哪能與商業派遞公司媲美。
最近因為DSE文憑試開考但是「監考易」、「報到易」兩大系統都甩轆而「紅」了一把的香港考試及評核局（考評局），是另一個表現不濟，年年虧損的例子。
考評局是根據《香港法例》第261章《香港考試及評核局條例》，於1977年成立為獨立法定機構，財政上自負盈虧。考評局的主要收入來源是考試費，包括文憑試、教師語文能力評核，以及各類國際專業考試等等。不過，由於新高中學制由以往兩個公開試變成一個公開試、文憑試的考生總數每年下跌、每位考生的報考科目減少，加上新冠疫情，連帶其他考試也停辦或減少次數，考評局的收入持續下跌。
考評局自2014/2015年度以來，幾乎年年虧損，2021/2022年度錄得4,170萬元虧損，2022/2023年度則虧損2,300萬元。多年來，考評局已多次向立法會申請撥款注資來維持運作，單是2018年立法會便通過向考評局注資3.6億元。此外，政府連續6年代DSE考生繳交考試費，其實是變相增加對考評局的資助。
水務、郵政及考評的例子反映，不是每個政府部門都適合私有化或公司化，即使部門以商業模式運作，也不見得能如黃議員的議案所說的「盤活旗下資產的營運利益」，反而需要政府反覆注資。那麼，另一條路又如何？政府出售資產是否利多於弊？
由此可見，港投公司是由特區政府主導投資去向，主要目標是投資科技企業落戶香港，推動產業發展，而不是透過海外投資擴大香港的影響力，在投資目標及實際操上均與淡馬錫有本質上的分別。
再者，港投公司手持620億港元，資金規模與淡馬錫相比簡直小巫見大巫；首任行政總裁陳家齊女士在2023年10月才上任，我在1月31日立法會會議上向財經事務及庫務局局長許正宇查詢港投公司的投資進展，得到的回覆只是「港投公司正加大力度推進工作，預計上半年會落實若干投資項目」，即是究竟會作哪些投資仍是未知數。相比已營運50年的淡馬錫，港投公司與嬰兒無異，要做到邱議員所說的淡馬錫規模，談何容易。
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中美學界的斷交危機 / The Crisis of Severing Ties between Chinese and American Academia
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自中美兩國於1979年建立外交關係，兩國之間的學術交流合作愈趨頻繁。過往10年，前往美國就學的中國留學生數目由2011/12學年約20萬急升至2019/20學年約37萬；而前往中國留學的美國學生數目高峰時亦有約1.5萬。
但隨着在特朗普2016年上台，美國的對華立場出現重大改變，中美關係轉趨緊張。特朗普在任期間，以保護美國學界的研究成果為由，推出一系列政策窒礙中美學界的正常交流，包括限制「與軍方有聯繫」的研究生及訪問學者入境；要求辦學機構公開與孔子學院或孔子課堂的任何合約、合作關係或資金往來。單是2020年的幾個月內，美方就撤銷了約1000個中國公民的簽證。
特朗普下台後，拜登政府延續強硬的對華政策，繼續維持對中國留學生及訪問學者的入境限制。《華盛頓郵報》上月一篇報道指出，近年有不少中國留學生在入境美國時遇到非常嚴厲的審查。有不少學生指出，美方管制人員輕則會盤問他們、搜查他們的隨身物品，重則會拘留他們，甚至把他們即時驅逐出境。美國學術界受政治壓力驅使，主動減少與中國學界的聯繫。多所美國大學主動終止在內地的課程計劃，或將計劃改在台灣舉辦，所有受當地政府資助的孔子學院亦縮減了中國語文課程的規模。
美方各種不友善舉措大大打擊中國留學生前往深造的意欲。美國國務院轄下教育及文化事務局（Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs）的數據顯示，中國留學生的數目已由2019/20學年高峰的372,532跌至2022/23學年的289,526；而2021/22學年前往中國的美國留學生更只剩下211人！
長遠而言，中美學術交流的斷絕會進一步窒礙兩國的正常交流，對雙方都是弊多於利。下期將展開詳述。
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in 1979, academic exchanges and cooperation between the two countries have become increasingly frequent. In the past decade, the number of Chinese students studying in the United States increased sharply from about 200,000 in the 2011/12 academic year to about 370,000 in the 2019/20 academic year; while the peak number of American students studying in China was also around 15,000.
However, with the significant change in the US's policy toward China since Trump took office in 2016, relations between China and the US have become more strained. During Trump's term, under the pretext of protecting US academic achievements, a series of policies were introduced to hamper normal exchanges between Chinese and American academia, including restrictions on graduate students and visiting scholars related to the military from entering the country; requiring educational institutions to publicly disclose any contracts, cooperative relationships or financial dealings with Confucius Institutes or Confucius Classrooms. Just in 2020, the US revoked visas of about 1,000 Chinese citizens.
After Trump left office, the Biden administration continued the hardline policy toward China and maintained restrictions on Chinese international students and visiting scholars entering the country. A Washington Post report last month pointed out that in recent years, many Chinese students have encountered very strict inspections when entering the US. Many students said US immigration officials would interrogate them, search their personal belongings, detain them, or even deport them immediately. Under political pressure, the US academic circle proactively reduced contacts with Chinese academia. Many US universities unilaterally terminated courses in China or moved programs to Taiwan. All Confucius Institutes subsidized by the local government also downsized Chinese language courses.
The unfriendly moves by the US greatly dampened Chinese students' willingness to pursue advanced studies abroad. Data from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs under the US State Department shows that the number of Chinese students has dropped from a peak of 372,532 in the 2019/20 academic year to 289,526 in the 2022/23 academic year; while in the 2021/22 academic year, there were only 211 American students studying in China!
In the long run, the severing of academic exchanges between China and the US will further hinder normal communication between the two countries, which is detrimental to both sides. More details will be discussed in the next issue.
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Hong Kong must turn Greater Bay Area integration challenges into opportunities / 香港必須將粵港澳大灣區一體化的挑戰轉化為機遇
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The tireless efforts the government is making to reboot Hong Kong’s economy will be futile if the city’s leaders fail to grasp the challenge of integration within the Greater Bay Area and come up with strategies to turn the challenges into opportunities.
A framework agreement for deepening cooperation between Guangdong province, Hong Kong and Macau was signed on July 1, 2017. Almost seven years on, development in the bay area plan is bringing about profound changes to Hongkongers’ lifestyle and the economy.
Soon after the reopening of mainland China early last year, Hongkongers discovered that cities in the Greater Bay Area have made giant strides in urban planning and the service economy. As a result, they have been flocking to the bay area to spend their consumption dollars.
Between March 28 and April 8, which includes the extended Easter weekend and Ching Ming Festival, a staggering 3.6 million Hong Kong residents went north via land control points, compared to about 860,000 mainland residents who visited Hong Kong.
Other cities in the Greater Bay Area have become Hongkongers’ go-to playground in the same way that mainland residents poured into Hong Kong after the Individual Visit Scheme was launched 21 years ago.
The economic impact of this reversed travel pattern being felt across the Greater Bay Area. Last year, Shenzhen authorities announced that “social consumption and retail spending” rose by 7.8 per cent while its gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6 per cent, exceeding Hong Kong’s and other first-tier cities on the mainland.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
The northbound trend is set to increase as more convenient transport links with the mainland develop as part of the Northern Metropolis project, an ambitious plan to develop Hong Kong’s northern districts into a technology hub that will accommodate 2.5 million people. As that happens, more Hongkongers may well choose to live on the mainland, and commute daily to work in Hong Kong, or simply work in other mainland cities.
A fundamental problem with Greater Bay Area development is that it is far from being a single market, even though integration is one of the objectives of the 2017 framework agreement.
Under the “one country, two systems” arrangement, there is no free movement of people, goods, services and data between the mainland and Hong Kong. As separate custom and immigration areas, both sides have instituted controls that make market integration a slow and difficult process.
In the short term, Hong Kong needs to overcome the asymmetry of movement and spending by urging the central authorities to allow residents of more remote mainland cities to visit, as well as approve multiple-visit permits and increase the duty-free allowance for mainland residents returning from Hong Kong.
In the long term, the government must develop a strategy for mainland cities and Hong Kong to complement each other. Officials must work out how to make use of the abundant resources mainland cities have to offer to remedy our shortages.
As more Hongkongers choose to live in nearby mainland cities, why can’t we build our residential care homes in those cities? Cross-border transport is now far more convenient. After all, our residential care homes depend heavily on the import of workers from Guangdong and Guangxi.
Instead of spending billions to reclaim a small area of land, why don’t we buy good-quality housing that’s readily available in nearby mainland cities, to provide more options for those who live in the northern districts? Now is a good time to buy on the cheap.
We should also take more vigorous measures to phase out hindrances for mainland professionals to work in Hong Kong, bring in more talent and import more mainland labour.
Only by leveraging the mainland’s resources, and combining our strengths with theirs, can we turn the process of Greater Bay Area integration into a win-win formula. The government ought to remould Hong Kong into a metropolis like London or New York, with some of its population dispersing into nearby suburbs.
The Hong Kong diaspora on the mainland will make Hong Kong more influential while relieving the pressure of the cost of living in this city. The government needs to think outside the box and move fast.
如果特區政府未能抓住粵港澳大灣區一體化的機遇制定相關策略，即使政府不斷為重振香港經濟而作出努力，將會是徒勞的。
2017年7月1日，廣東省、香港和澳門簽署了深化合作框架協議。快將七年過去，粵港澳大灣區規劃帶來深遠影響，不僅改變了香港人的生活方式，也改變了經濟環境。
去年年初內地開關不久，香港人就發現粵港澳大灣區內城市，無論在城市規劃和服務業方面已迅速進展。結果，香港人踴往大灣區消費了。
今年3月28日至4月8日期間，包括復活節及清明節長假期周末，有多達360萬香港居民通過陸路口岸北上，來香港的內地居民約有86萬人。
這充分反映香港人越來越喜歡離港到鄰近城市消費購物，享受當地便利的生活設施。香港或已無法滿足消費需求，內地城市的競爭力正不斷增強，吸引香港市民。
特區政府和企業如果不想失去這批消費客源，就必須積極參與和引導粵港澳一體化，做好產業對接，協同發展香港與內地市場。
其他粵港澳大灣區城市已經成為香港人新的休閑場所，就像21年前開放個人遊後內地居民湧進香港一樣。
這種反向旅遊模式帶來的經濟影響正蔓延整個大灣區。去年，深圳官方表示“社會消費和零售開支”增長7.8%，GDP增長6%，超過了香港及其他一線內地城市。
相比之下，來港旅遊人數未能恢復疫情前水平，消費力也較弱，加上香港消費流向內地「漏走」，導致我們的經濟復蘇僅從2022年低位爬升到去年的3.2%。如果香港不想失去這批消費客，必須主動參與大灣區一體化，與內地城市合作開拓市場，推動相關產業發展。否則經濟難實現真正復蘇。
餐館與商店的關閉迫使政府發起「香港夜繽紛」活動來刺激本地消費。但這一下滑趨勢很可能會持續，除非香港餐飲與零售服務能達到粵港澳大灣區的質量標准。
如果將所有責任歸咎於我們的服務供應商，值得說的是宏觀經濟力量在這個下滑趨勢中也起到很大作用。香港幣與美元掛鉤，使香港物價對日本、韓國和內地旅客來說極為昂貴。
我們需要借此機會，檢討自身的服務水平與競爭力，並主動學習粵港澳區域內其他城市在人才培訓、科技應用等領域的優良經驗，跟上時代步伐。只有這樣，香港的旅遊業和經濟才有望持續健康發展。
鑒於港幣實力強勁，香港理應貶值。但薪資水平受勞工短缺影響較通貨膨脹更甚的「粘滯性」，使香港很難實現通縮。盡管商業房租有所下降，但香港高薪和房地產成本使其在價格上競爭力近乎無限。
隨著北部都會區計劃落實，香港北區極其宜居的交通網絡將日益完善，這一規劃將該地區打造成可容納250萬人的科技中心。這使更多香港人可能選擇定居內地，每日通勤至港工作，或直接在內地其他城市工作。北上的趨勢將進一步增強。
粵港澳大灣區發展的一個核心問題是，一體化是2017框架協議的目標之一，但區域內市場分化仍很明顯，遠未真正形成單一市場。
根據「一國兩制」，內地與香港在人員、貨物、服務和數據並沒有自由流動。作為單獨的海關和出入境管理區，雙方設立了管理，使市場一體化變成緩慢艱難的過程。
短期來看，香港需要解決來往和消費不對等問題。這可以建議中央允許更多內地較遙遠城市的居民來港，批出更多「一簽多行」通行證，提高港人赴內消費免稅額度。
長遠來看，政府必須制定內地城市與香港互補發展的戰略，官員應研究如何充分利用內地城市豐富資源彌補香港短板。只有內地與香港在人員、貨物與資金流通等各個層面進行全面聯通，粵港澳大灣區市場一體化才能真正實現，使香港經濟獲得更大活力。
隨著香港人選擇定居鄰近內地城市人數增多，我們為什麼不可以在那些城市建設養老院？跨境交通比以往方便得多，而養老院目前已高度依賴從廣東和廣西輸入護理員。
相比花費數千億進行小範圍的填海造地，不如利用鄰近內地城市豐富的高質量房產資源，提供更多選擇給居住在北區的人，現在正是內地房價低廉的好機會。如此一來不僅可以最大限度優化資源配置，還可以緊密結合大灣區內人才與服務資源。離港的年長香港人也可以享受更優質的安老環境，政府值得重視這個可行性高的優化方案。
我們也應采取更積極的措施，逐步消除內地專業人士來港工作的障礙，吸引更多人才，增加從內地輸入勞工。
唯有利用內地資源，結合我們各自的優勢，才能將粵港澳大灣區一體化進程變成雙贏的局面。政府應該把香港打造成類似倫敦或紐約這樣的都會，部分人口分布在周邊郊區。內地的香港人口會使香港的影響力更大，同時緩解生活成本在本地的壓力，政府需要脫離舊式思維，迅速行動。
如果及早把握大灣區機遇，香港定能在新的發展格局中繼續發揮重要作用。
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4月10日的立法會大會上，黃英豪議員提出「更積極地管理好政府的非金融資產」議案，指出特區政府財政儲備下降，「預計由2022年逾9,400億港元減少至2024年3月底約為7,300億港元，財政狀況令人擔憂」，因此應該「採取多元化的財政策略，更積極地管理好政府的非金融資產」、「盤活旗下資產的營運利益，以穩定本港財政」；邱達根議員則提出修正議案，指應該「考慮將特區政府現時持股公司或機構的資產撥歸香港投資管理有限公司（港投公司）管理，以提升相關資產的營運與資本效益」。
黃英豪議員在會議上發言，舉出了港鐵私有化的例子，建議特區政府研究水務私有化、把郵政署發展成物流速配中心。邱達根議員則以淡馬錫為例，建議把特區政府有持股的港鐵公司、數碼港、科學園等納入港投公司管理，將之發展成淡馬錫的規模。
很感謝兩位議員提出的建議，我認為值得討論一下，這些建議是否可行？
郵政和水務一樣，都是民生服務，不能為了盈利隨便加價。1995年，政府根據《營運基金條例》（《香港法例》第430章）設立郵政署營運基金（Post Office Trading Fund），注資30億港元，自此香港郵政需自負盈虧。
這些年來，隨着電腦網絡、電子郵件盛行，傳統郵件的郵遞需求持續下跌，加上面對商業物流派遞公司的猛烈競爭，即使香港郵政積極開源節流，增加收費項目，近年仍是虧的多盈的少。根據香港郵政年報，疫情前2018/2019年度錄得2.24億港元營運虧損，疫情後的2022/2023年度，虧損更增至3.05億港元，表現並不理想。
即使如此，香港郵政於2021年向立法會申請撥款，要求注資46億1,130萬元予郵政署營運基金，資助香港郵政空郵中心重建計劃，以應付蓬勃發展的電子商貿行業對跨境電子商貿郵遞服務的需求。新的香港郵政空郵中心預料於2027年落成。記得當時立法會討論撥款申請時，已有議員質疑以公務員運作的香港郵政，服務的快捷度及靈活性，哪能與商業派遞公司媲美。
最近因為DSE文憑試開考但是「監考易」、「報到易」兩大系統都甩轆而「紅」了一把的香港考試及評核局（考評局），是另一個表現不濟，年年虧損的例子。
考評局是根據《香港法例》第261章《香港考試及評核局條例》，於1977年成立為獨立法定機構，財政上自負盈虧。考評局的主要收入來源是考試費，包括文憑試、教師語文能力評核，以及各類國際專業考試等等。不過，由於新高中學制由以往兩個公開試變成一個公開試、文憑試的考生總數每年下跌、每位考生的報考科目減少，加上新冠疫情，連帶其他考試也停辦或減少次數，考評局的收入持續下跌。
考評局自2014/2015年度以來，幾乎年年虧損，2021/2022年度錄得4,170萬元虧損，2022/2023年度則虧損2,300萬元。多年來，考評局已多次向立法會申請撥款注資來維持運作，單是2018年立法會便通過向考評局注資3.6億元。此外，政府連續6年代DSE考生繳交考試費，其實是變相增加對考評局的資助。
水務、郵政及考評的例子反映，不是每個政府部門都適合私有化或公司化，即使部門以商業模式運作，也不見得能如黃議員的議案所說的「盤活旗下資產的營運利益」，反而需要政府反覆注資。那麼，另一條路又如何？政府出售資產是否利多於弊？
由此可見，港投公司是由特區政府主導投資去向，主要目標是投資科技企業落戶香港，推動產業發展，而不是透過海外投資擴大香港的影響力，在投資目標及實際操上均與淡馬錫有本質上的分別。
再者，港投公司手持620億港元，資金規模與淡馬錫相比簡直小巫見大巫；首任行政總裁陳家齊女士在2023年10月才上任，我在1月31日立法會會議上向財經事務及庫務局局長許正宇查詢港投公司的投資進展，得到的回覆只是「港投公司正加大力度推進工作，預計上半年會落實若干投資項目」，即是究竟會作哪些投資仍是未知數。相比已營運50年的淡馬錫，港投公司與嬰兒無異，要做到邱議員所說的淡馬錫規模，談何容易。
自中美兩國於1979年建立外交關係，兩國之間的學術交流合作愈趨頻繁。過往10年，前往美國就學的中國留學生數目由2011/12學年約20萬急升至2019/20學年約37萬；而前往中國留學的美國學生數目高峰時亦有約1.5萬。
但隨着在特朗普2016年上台，美國的對華立場出現重大改變，中美關係轉趨緊張。特朗普在任期間，以保護美國學界的研究成果為由，推出一系列政策窒礙中美學界的正常交流，包括限制「與軍方有聯繫」的研究生及訪問學者入境；要求辦學機構公開與孔子學院或孔子課堂的任何合約、合作關係或資金往來。單是2020年的幾個月內，美方就撤銷了約1000個中國公民的簽證。
特朗普下台後，拜登政府延續強硬的對華政策，繼續維持對中國留學生及訪問學者的入境限制。《華盛頓郵報》上月一篇報道指出，近年有不少中國留學生在入境美國時遇到非常嚴厲的審查。有不少學生指出，美方管制人員輕則會盤問他們、搜查他們的隨身物品，重則會拘留他們，甚至把他們即時驅逐出境。美國學術界受政治壓力驅使，主動減少與中國學界的聯繫。多所美國大學主動終止在內地的課程計劃，或將計劃改在台灣舉辦，所有受當地政府資助的孔子學院亦縮減了中國語文課程的規模。
美方各種不友善舉措大大打擊中國留學生前往深造的意欲。美國國務院轄下教育及文化事務局（Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs）的數據顯示，中國留學生的數目已由2019/20學年高峰的372,532跌至2022/23學年的289,526；而2021/22學年前往中國的美國留學生更只剩下211人！
長遠而言，中美學術交流的斷絕會進一步窒礙兩國的正常交流，對雙方都是弊多於利。下期將展開詳述。
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in 1979, academic exchanges and cooperation between the two countries have become increasingly frequent. In the past decade, the number of Chinese students studying in the United States increased sharply from about 200,000 in the 2011/12 academic year to about 370,000 in the 2019/20 academic year; while the peak number of American students studying in China was also around 15,000.
However, with the significant change in the US's policy toward China since Trump took office in 2016, relations between China and the US have become more strained. During Trump's term, under the pretext of protecting US academic achievements, a series of policies were introduced to hamper normal exchanges between Chinese and American academia, including restrictions on graduate students and visiting scholars related to the military from entering the country; requiring educational institutions to publicly disclose any contracts, cooperative relationships or financial dealings with Confucius Institutes or Confucius Classrooms. Just in 2020, the US revoked visas of about 1,000 Chinese citizens.
After Trump left office, the Biden administration continued the hardline policy toward China and maintained restrictions on Chinese international students and visiting scholars entering the country. A Washington Post report last month pointed out that in recent years, many Chinese students have encountered very strict inspections when entering the US. Many students said US immigration officials would interrogate them, search their personal belongings, detain them, or even deport them immediately. Under political pressure, the US academic circle proactively reduced contacts with Chinese academia. Many US universities unilaterally terminated courses in China or moved programs to Taiwan. All Confucius Institutes subsidized by the local government also downsized Chinese language courses.
The unfriendly moves by the US greatly dampened Chinese students' willingness to pursue advanced studies abroad. Data from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs under the US State Department shows that the number of Chinese students has dropped from a peak of 372,532 in the 2019/20 academic year to 289,526 in the 2022/23 academic year; while in the 2021/22 academic year, there were only 211 American students studying in China!
In the long run, the severing of academic exchanges between China and the US will further hinder normal communication between the two countries, which is detrimental to both sides. More details will be discussed in the next issue.
The tireless efforts the government is making to reboot Hong Kong’s economy will be futile if the city’s leaders fail to grasp the challenge of integration within the Greater Bay Area and come up with strategies to turn the challenges into opportunities.
A framework agreement for deepening cooperation between Guangdong province, Hong Kong and Macau was signed on July 1, 2017. Almost seven years on, development in the bay area plan is bringing about profound changes to Hongkongers’ lifestyle and the economy.
Soon after the reopening of mainland China early last year, Hongkongers discovered that cities in the Greater Bay Area have made giant strides in urban planning and the service economy. As a result, they have been flocking to the bay area to spend their consumption dollars.
Between March 28 and April 8, which includes the extended Easter weekend and Ching Ming Festival, a staggering 3.6 million Hong Kong residents went north via land control points, compared to about 860,000 mainland residents who visited Hong Kong.
Other cities in the Greater Bay Area have become Hongkongers’ go-to playground in the same way that mainland residents poured into Hong Kong after the Individual Visit Scheme was launched 21 years ago.
The economic impact of this reversed travel pattern being felt across the Greater Bay Area. Last year, Shenzhen authorities announced that “social consumption and retail spending” rose by 7.8 per cent while its gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6 per cent, exceeding Hong Kong’s and other first-tier cities on the mainland.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
The northbound trend is set to increase as more convenient transport links with the mainland develop as part of the Northern Metropolis project, an ambitious plan to develop Hong Kong’s northern districts into a technology hub that will accommodate 2.5 million people. As that happens, more Hongkongers may well choose to live on the mainland, and commute daily to work in Hong Kong, or simply work in other mainland cities.
A fundamental problem with Greater Bay Area development is that it is far from being a single market, even though integration is one of the objectives of the 2017 framework agreement.
Under the “one country, two systems” arrangement, there is no free movement of people, goods, services and data between the mainland and Hong Kong. As separate custom and immigration areas, both sides have instituted controls that make market integration a slow and difficult process.
In the short term, Hong Kong needs to overcome the asymmetry of movement and spending by urging the central authorities to allow residents of more remote mainland cities to visit, as well as approve multiple-visit permits and increase the duty-free allowance for mainland residents returning from Hong Kong.
In the long term, the government must develop a strategy for mainland cities and Hong Kong to complement each other. Officials must work out how to make use of the abundant resources mainland cities have to offer to remedy our shortages.
As more Hongkongers choose to live in nearby mainland cities, why can’t we build our residential care homes in those cities? Cross-border transport is now far more convenient. After all, our residential care homes depend heavily on the import of workers from Guangdong and Guangxi.
Instead of spending billions to reclaim a small area of land, why don’t we buy good-quality housing that’s readily available in nearby mainland cities, to provide more options for those who live in the northern districts? Now is a good time to buy on the cheap.
We should also take more vigorous measures to phase out hindrances for mainland professionals to work in Hong Kong, bring in more talent and import more mainland labour.
Only by leveraging the mainland’s resources, and combining our strengths with theirs, can we turn the process of Greater Bay Area integration into a win-win formula. The government ought to remould Hong Kong into a metropolis like London or New York, with some of its population dispersing into nearby suburbs.
The Hong Kong diaspora on the mainland will make Hong Kong more influential while relieving the pressure of the cost of living in this city. The government needs to think outside the box and move fast.
如果特區政府未能抓住粵港澳大灣區一體化的機遇制定相關策略，即使政府不斷為重振香港經濟而作出努力，將會是徒勞的。
2017年7月1日，廣東省、香港和澳門簽署了深化合作框架協議。快將七年過去，粵港澳大灣區規劃帶來深遠影響，不僅改變了香港人的生活方式，也改變了經濟環境。
去年年初內地開關不久，香港人就發現粵港澳大灣區內城市，無論在城市規劃和服務業方面已迅速進展。結果，香港人踴往大灣區消費了。
今年3月28日至4月8日期間，包括復活節及清明節長假期周末，有多達360萬香港居民通過陸路口岸北上，來香港的內地居民約有86萬人。
這充分反映香港人越來越喜歡離港到鄰近城市消費購物，享受當地便利的生活設施。香港或已無法滿足消費需求，內地城市的競爭力正不斷增強，吸引香港市民。
特區政府和企業如果不想失去這批消費客源，就必須積極參與和引導粵港澳一體化，做好產業對接，協同發展香港與內地市場。
其他粵港澳大灣區城市已經成為香港人新的休閑場所，就像21年前開放個人遊後內地居民湧進香港一樣。
這種反向旅遊模式帶來的經濟影響正蔓延整個大灣區。去年，深圳官方表示“社會消費和零售開支”增長7.8%，GDP增長6%，超過了香港及其他一線內地城市。
相比之下，來港旅遊人數未能恢復疫情前水平，消費力也較弱，加上香港消費流向內地「漏走」，導致我們的經濟復蘇僅從2022年低位爬升到去年的3.2%。如果香港不想失去這批消費客，必須主動參與大灣區一體化，與內地城市合作開拓市場，推動相關產業發展。否則經濟難實現真正復蘇。
餐館與商店的關閉迫使政府發起「香港夜繽紛」活動來刺激本地消費。但這一下滑趨勢很可能會持續，除非香港餐飲與零售服務能達到粵港澳大灣區的質量標准。
如果將所有責任歸咎於我們的服務供應商，值得說的是宏觀經濟力量在這個下滑趨勢中也起到很大作用。香港幣與美元掛鉤，使香港物價對日本、韓國和內地旅客來說極為昂貴。
我們需要借此機會，檢討自身的服務水平與競爭力，並主動學習粵港澳區域內其他城市在人才培訓、科技應用等領域的優良經驗，跟上時代步伐。只有這樣，香港的旅遊業和經濟才有望持續健康發展。
鑒於港幣實力強勁，香港理應貶值。但薪資水平受勞工短缺影響較通貨膨脹更甚的「粘滯性」，使香港很難實現通縮。盡管商業房租有所下降，但香港高薪和房地產成本使其在價格上競爭力近乎無限。
隨著北部都會區計劃落實，香港北區極其宜居的交通網絡將日益完善，這一規劃將該地區打造成可容納250萬人的科技中心。這使更多香港人可能選擇定居內地，每日通勤至港工作，或直接在內地其他城市工作。北上的趨勢將進一步增強。
粵港澳大灣區發展的一個核心問題是，一體化是2017框架協議的目標之一，但區域內市場分化仍很明顯，遠未真正形成單一市場。
根據「一國兩制」，內地與香港在人員、貨物、服務和數據並沒有自由流動。作為單獨的海關和出入境管理區，雙方設立了管理，使市場一體化變成緩慢艱難的過程。
短期來看，香港需要解決來往和消費不對等問題。這可以建議中央允許更多內地較遙遠城市的居民來港，批出更多「一簽多行」通行證，提高港人赴內消費免稅額度。
長遠來看，政府必須制定內地城市與香港互補發展的戰略，官員應研究如何充分利用內地城市豐富資源彌補香港短板。只有內地與香港在人員、貨物與資金流通等各個層面進行全面聯通，粵港澳大灣區市場一體化才能真正實現，使香港經濟獲得更大活力。
隨著香港人選擇定居鄰近內地城市人數增多，我們為什麼不可以在那些城市建設養老院？跨境交通比以往方便得多，而養老院目前已高度依賴從廣東和廣西輸入護理員。
相比花費數千億進行小範圍的填海造地，不如利用鄰近內地城市豐富的高質量房產資源，提供更多選擇給居住在北區的人，現在正是內地房價低廉的好機會。如此一來不僅可以最大限度優化資源配置，還可以緊密結合大灣區內人才與服務資源。離港的年長香港人也可以享受更優質的安老環境，政府值得重視這個可行性高的優化方案。
我們也應采取更積極的措施，逐步消除內地專業人士來港工作的障礙，吸引更多人才，增加從內地輸入勞工。
唯有利用內地資源，結合我們各自的優勢，才能將粵港澳大灣區一體化進程變成雙贏的局面。政府應該把香港打造成類似倫敦或紐約這樣的都會，部分人口分布在周邊郊區。內地的香港人口會使香港的影響力更大，同時緩解生活成本在本地的壓力，政府需要脫離舊式思維，迅速行動。
如果及早把握大灣區機遇，香港定能在新的發展格局中繼續發揮重要作用。
