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Hong Kong must turn Greater Bay Area integration challenges into opportunities / 香港必須將粵港澳大灣區一體化的挑戰轉化為機遇
文章
2024 年 4 月 21 日
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The tireless efforts the government is making to reboot Hong Kong’s economy will be futile if the city’s leaders fail to grasp the challenge of integration within the Greater Bay Area and come up with strategies to turn the challenges into opportunities.
A framework agreement for deepening cooperation between Guangdong province, Hong Kong and Macau was signed on July 1, 2017. Almost seven years on, development in the bay area plan is bringing about profound changes to Hongkongers’ lifestyle and the economy.
Soon after the reopening of mainland China early last year, Hongkongers discovered that cities in the Greater Bay Area have made giant strides in urban planning and the service economy. As a result, they have been flocking to the bay area to spend their consumption dollars.
Between March 28 and April 8, which includes the extended Easter weekend and Ching Ming Festival, a staggering 3.6 million Hong Kong residents went north via land control points, compared to about 860,000 mainland residents who visited Hong Kong.
Other cities in the Greater Bay Area have become Hongkongers’ go-to playground in the same way that mainland residents poured into Hong Kong after the Individual Visit Scheme was launched 21 years ago.
The economic impact of this reversed travel pattern being felt across the Greater Bay Area. Last year, Shenzhen authorities announced that “social consumption and retail spending” rose by 7.8 per cent while its gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6 per cent, exceeding Hong Kong’s and other first-tier cities on the mainland.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
The northbound trend is set to increase as more convenient transport links with the mainland develop as part of the Northern Metropolis project, an ambitious plan to develop Hong Kong’s northern districts into a technology hub that will accommodate 2.5 million people. As that happens, more Hongkongers may well choose to live on the mainland, and commute daily to work in Hong Kong, or simply work in other mainland cities.
A fundamental problem with Greater Bay Area development is that it is far from being a single market, even though integration is one of the objectives of the 2017 framework agreement.
Under the “one country, two systems” arrangement, there is no free movement of people, goods, services and data between the mainland and Hong Kong. As separate custom and immigration areas, both sides have instituted controls that make market integration a slow and difficult process.
In the short term, Hong Kong needs to overcome the asymmetry of movement and spending by urging the central authorities to allow residents of more remote mainland cities to visit, as well as approve multiple-visit permits and increase the duty-free allowance for mainland residents returning from Hong Kong.
In the long term, the government must develop a strategy for mainland cities and Hong Kong to complement each other. Officials must work out how to make use of the abundant resources mainland cities have to offer to remedy our shortages.
As more Hongkongers choose to live in nearby mainland cities, why can’t we build our residential care homes in those cities? Cross-border transport is now far more convenient. After all, our residential care homes depend heavily on the import of workers from Guangdong and Guangxi.
Instead of spending billions to reclaim a small area of land, why don’t we buy good-quality housing that’s readily available in nearby mainland cities, to provide more options for those who live in the northern districts? Now is a good time to buy on the cheap.
We should also take more vigorous measures to phase out hindrances for mainland professionals to work in Hong Kong, bring in more talent and import more mainland labour.
Only by leveraging the mainland’s resources, and combining our strengths with theirs, can we turn the process of Greater Bay Area integration into a win-win formula. The government ought to remould Hong Kong into a metropolis like London or New York, with some of its population dispersing into nearby suburbs.
The Hong Kong diaspora on the mainland will make Hong Kong more influential while relieving the pressure of the cost of living in this city. The government needs to think outside the box and move fast.
如果特區政府未能抓住粵港澳大灣區一體化的機遇制定相關策略，即使政府不斷為重振香港經濟而作出努力，將會是徒勞的。
2017年7月1日，廣東省、香港和澳門簽署了深化合作框架協議。快將七年過去，粵港澳大灣區規劃帶來深遠影響，不僅改變了香港人的生活方式，也改變了經濟環境。
去年年初內地開關不久，香港人就發現粵港澳大灣區內城市，無論在城市規劃和服務業方面已迅速進展。結果，香港人踴往大灣區消費了。
今年3月28日至4月8日期間，包括復活節及清明節長假期周末，有多達360萬香港居民通過陸路口岸北上，來香港的內地居民約有86萬人。
這充分反映香港人越來越喜歡離港到鄰近城市消費購物，享受當地便利的生活設施。香港或已無法滿足消費需求，內地城市的競爭力正不斷增強，吸引香港市民。
特區政府和企業如果不想失去這批消費客源，就必須積極參與和引導粵港澳一體化，做好產業對接，協同發展香港與內地市場。
其他粵港澳大灣區城市已經成為香港人新的休閑場所，就像21年前開放個人遊後內地居民湧進香港一樣。
這種反向旅遊模式帶來的經濟影響正蔓延整個大灣區。去年，深圳官方表示“社會消費和零售開支”增長7.8%，GDP增長6%，超過了香港及其他一線內地城市。
相比之下，來港旅遊人數未能恢復疫情前水平，消費力也較弱，加上香港消費流向內地「漏走」，導致我們的經濟復蘇僅從2022年低位爬升到去年的3.2%。如果香港不想失去這批消費客，必須主動參與大灣區一體化，與內地城市合作開拓市場，推動相關產業發展。否則經濟難實現真正復蘇。
餐館與商店的關閉迫使政府發起「香港夜繽紛」活動來刺激本地消費。但這一下滑趨勢很可能會持續，除非香港餐飲與零售服務能達到粵港澳大灣區的質量標准。
如果將所有責任歸咎於我們的服務供應商，值得說的是宏觀經濟力量在這個下滑趨勢中也起到很大作用。香港幣與美元掛鉤，使香港物價對日本、韓國和內地旅客來說極為昂貴。
我們需要借此機會，檢討自身的服務水平與競爭力，並主動學習粵港澳區域內其他城市在人才培訓、科技應用等領域的優良經驗，跟上時代步伐。只有這樣，香港的旅遊業和經濟才有望持續健康發展。
鑒於港幣實力強勁，香港理應貶值。但薪資水平受勞工短缺影響較通貨膨脹更甚的「粘滯性」，使香港很難實現通縮。盡管商業房租有所下降，但香港高薪和房地產成本使其在價格上競爭力近乎無限。
隨著北部都會區計劃落實，香港北區極其宜居的交通網絡將日益完善，這一規劃將該地區打造成可容納250萬人的科技中心。這使更多香港人可能選擇定居內地，每日通勤至港工作，或直接在內地其他城市工作。北上的趨勢將進一步增強。
粵港澳大灣區發展的一個核心問題是，一體化是2017框架協議的目標之一，但區域內市場分化仍很明顯，遠未真正形成單一市場。
根據「一國兩制」，內地與香港在人員、貨物、服務和數據並沒有自由流動。作為單獨的海關和出入境管理區，雙方設立了管理，使市場一體化變成緩慢艱難的過程。
短期來看，香港需要解決來往和消費不對等問題。這可以建議中央允許更多內地較遙遠城市的居民來港，批出更多「一簽多行」通行證，提高港人赴內消費免稅額度。
長遠來看，政府必須制定內地城市與香港互補發展的戰略，官員應研究如何充分利用內地城市豐富資源彌補香港短板。只有內地與香港在人員、貨物與資金流通等各個層面進行全面聯通，粵港澳大灣區市場一體化才能真正實現，使香港經濟獲得更大活力。
隨著香港人選擇定居鄰近內地城市人數增多，我們為什麼不可以在那些城市建設養老院？跨境交通比以往方便得多，而養老院目前已高度依賴從廣東和廣西輸入護理員。
相比花費數千億進行小範圍的填海造地，不如利用鄰近內地城市豐富的高質量房產資源，提供更多選擇給居住在北區的人，現在正是內地房價低廉的好機會。如此一來不僅可以最大限度優化資源配置，還可以緊密結合大灣區內人才與服務資源。離港的年長香港人也可以享受更優質的安老環境，政府值得重視這個可行性高的優化方案。
我們也應采取更積極的措施，逐步消除內地專業人士來港工作的障礙，吸引更多人才，增加從內地輸入勞工。
唯有利用內地資源，結合我們各自的優勢，才能將粵港澳大灣區一體化進程變成雙贏的局面。政府應該把香港打造成類似倫敦或紐約這樣的都會，部分人口分布在周邊郊區。內地的香港人口會使香港的影響力更大，同時緩解生活成本在本地的壓力，政府需要脫離舊式思維，迅速行動。
如果及早把握大灣區機遇，香港定能在新的發展格局中繼續發揮重要作用。
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4月10日的立法會大會上，黃英豪議員提出「更積極地管理好政府的非金融資產」議案，指出特區政府財政儲備下降，「預計由2022年逾9,400億港元減少至2024年3月底約為7,300億港元，財政狀況令人擔憂」，因此應該「採取多元化的財政策略，更積極地管理好政府的非金融資產」、「盤活旗下資產的營運利益，以穩定本港財政」；邱達根議員則提出修正議案，指應該「考慮將特區政府現時持股公司或機構的資產撥歸香港投資管理有限公司（港投公司）管理，以提升相關資產的營運與資本效益」。
黃英豪議員在會議上發言，舉出了港鐵私有化的例子，建議特區政府研究水務私有化、把郵政署發展成物流速配中心。邱達根議員則以淡馬錫為例，建議把特區政府有持股的港鐵公司、數碼港、科學園等納入港投公司管理，將之發展成淡馬錫的規模。
很感謝兩位議員提出的建議，我認為值得討論一下，這些建議是否可行？
郵政和水務一樣，都是民生服務，不能為了盈利隨便加價。1995年，政府根據《營運基金條例》（《香港法例》第430章）設立郵政署營運基金（Post Office Trading Fund），注資30億港元，自此香港郵政需自負盈虧。
這些年來，隨着電腦網絡、電子郵件盛行，傳統郵件的郵遞需求持續下跌，加上面對商業物流派遞公司的猛烈競爭，即使香港郵政積極開源節流，增加收費項目，近年仍是虧的多盈的少。根據香港郵政年報，疫情前2018/2019年度錄得2.24億港元營運虧損，疫情後的2022/2023年度，虧損更增至3.05億港元，表現並不理想。
即使如此，香港郵政於2021年向立法會申請撥款，要求注資46億1,130萬元予郵政署營運基金，資助香港郵政空郵中心重建計劃，以應付蓬勃發展的電子商貿行業對跨境電子商貿郵遞服務的需求。新的香港郵政空郵中心預料於2027年落成。記得當時立法會討論撥款申請時，已有議員質疑以公務員運作的香港郵政，服務的快捷度及靈活性，哪能與商業派遞公司媲美。
最近因為DSE文憑試開考但是「監考易」、「報到易」兩大系統都甩轆而「紅」了一把的香港考試及評核局（考評局），是另一個表現不濟，年年虧損的例子。
考評局是根據《香港法例》第261章《香港考試及評核局條例》，於1977年成立為獨立法定機構，財政上自負盈虧。考評局的主要收入來源是考試費，包括文憑試、教師語文能力評核，以及各類國際專業考試等等。不過，由於新高中學制由以往兩個公開試變成一個公開試、文憑試的考生總數每年下跌、每位考生的報考科目減少，加上新冠疫情，連帶其他考試也停辦或減少次數，考評局的收入持續下跌。
考評局自2014/2015年度以來，幾乎年年虧損，2021/2022年度錄得4,170萬元虧損，2022/2023年度則虧損2,300萬元。多年來，考評局已多次向立法會申請撥款注資來維持運作，單是2018年立法會便通過向考評局注資3.6億元。此外，政府連續6年代DSE考生繳交考試費，其實是變相增加對考評局的資助。
水務、郵政及考評的例子反映，不是每個政府部門都適合私有化或公司化，即使部門以商業模式運作，也不見得能如黃議員的議案所說的「盤活旗下資產的營運利益」，反而需要政府反覆注資。那麼，另一條路又如何？政府出售資產是否利多於弊？
由此可見，港投公司是由特區政府主導投資去向，主要目標是投資科技企業落戶香港，推動產業發展，而不是透過海外投資擴大香港的影響力，在投資目標及實際操上均與淡馬錫有本質上的分別。
再者，港投公司手持620億港元，資金規模與淡馬錫相比簡直小巫見大巫；首任行政總裁陳家齊女士在2023年10月才上任，我在1月31日立法會會議上向財經事務及庫務局局長許正宇查詢港投公司的投資進展，得到的回覆只是「港投公司正加大力度推進工作，預計上半年會落實若干投資項目」，即是究竟會作哪些投資仍是未知數。相比已營運50年的淡馬錫，港投公司與嬰兒無異，要做到邱議員所說的淡馬錫規模，談何容易。
自中美兩國於1979年建立外交關係，兩國之間的學術交流合作愈趨頻繁。過往10年，前往美國就學的中國留學生數目由2011/12學年約20萬急升至2019/20學年約37萬；而前往中國留學的美國學生數目高峰時亦有約1.5萬。
但隨着在特朗普2016年上台，美國的對華立場出現重大改變，中美關係轉趨緊張。特朗普在任期間，以保護美國學界的研究成果為由，推出一系列政策窒礙中美學界的正常交流，包括限制「與軍方有聯繫」的研究生及訪問學者入境；要求辦學機構公開與孔子學院或孔子課堂的任何合約、合作關係或資金往來。單是2020年的幾個月內，美方就撤銷了約1000個中國公民的簽證。
特朗普下台後，拜登政府延續強硬的對華政策，繼續維持對中國留學生及訪問學者的入境限制。《華盛頓郵報》上月一篇報道指出，近年有不少中國留學生在入境美國時遇到非常嚴厲的審查。有不少學生指出，美方管制人員輕則會盤問他們、搜查他們的隨身物品，重則會拘留他們，甚至把他們即時驅逐出境。美國學術界受政治壓力驅使，主動減少與中國學界的聯繫。多所美國大學主動終止在內地的課程計劃，或將計劃改在台灣舉辦，所有受當地政府資助的孔子學院亦縮減了中國語文課程的規模。
美方各種不友善舉措大大打擊中國留學生前往深造的意欲。美國國務院轄下教育及文化事務局（Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs）的數據顯示，中國留學生的數目已由2019/20學年高峰的372,532跌至2022/23學年的289,526；而2021/22學年前往中國的美國留學生更只剩下211人！
長遠而言，中美學術交流的斷絕會進一步窒礙兩國的正常交流，對雙方都是弊多於利。下期將展開詳述。
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in 1979, academic exchanges and cooperation between the two countries have become increasingly frequent. In the past decade, the number of Chinese students studying in the United States increased sharply from about 200,000 in the 2011/12 academic year to about 370,000 in the 2019/20 academic year; while the peak number of American students studying in China was also around 15,000.
However, with the significant change in the US's policy toward China since Trump took office in 2016, relations between China and the US have become more strained. During Trump's term, under the pretext of protecting US academic achievements, a series of policies were introduced to hamper normal exchanges between Chinese and American academia, including restrictions on graduate students and visiting scholars related to the military from entering the country; requiring educational institutions to publicly disclose any contracts, cooperative relationships or financial dealings with Confucius Institutes or Confucius Classrooms. Just in 2020, the US revoked visas of about 1,000 Chinese citizens.
After Trump left office, the Biden administration continued the hardline policy toward China and maintained restrictions on Chinese international students and visiting scholars entering the country. A Washington Post report last month pointed out that in recent years, many Chinese students have encountered very strict inspections when entering the US. Many students said US immigration officials would interrogate them, search their personal belongings, detain them, or even deport them immediately. Under political pressure, the US academic circle proactively reduced contacts with Chinese academia. Many US universities unilaterally terminated courses in China or moved programs to Taiwan. All Confucius Institutes subsidized by the local government also downsized Chinese language courses.
The unfriendly moves by the US greatly dampened Chinese students' willingness to pursue advanced studies abroad. Data from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs under the US State Department shows that the number of Chinese students has dropped from a peak of 372,532 in the 2019/20 academic year to 289,526 in the 2022/23 academic year; while in the 2021/22 academic year, there were only 211 American students studying in China!
In the long run, the severing of academic exchanges between China and the US will further hinder normal communication between the two countries, which is detrimental to both sides. More details will be discussed in the next issue.
The tireless efforts the government is making to reboot Hong Kong’s economy will be futile if the city’s leaders fail to grasp the challenge of integration within the Greater Bay Area and come up with strategies to turn the challenges into opportunities.
A framework agreement for deepening cooperation between Guangdong province, Hong Kong and Macau was signed on July 1, 2017. Almost seven years on, development in the bay area plan is bringing about profound changes to Hongkongers’ lifestyle and the economy.
Soon after the reopening of mainland China early last year, Hongkongers discovered that cities in the Greater Bay Area have made giant strides in urban planning and the service economy. As a result, they have been flocking to the bay area to spend their consumption dollars.
Between March 28 and April 8, which includes the extended Easter weekend and Ching Ming Festival, a staggering 3.6 million Hong Kong residents went north via land control points, compared to about 860,000 mainland residents who visited Hong Kong.
Other cities in the Greater Bay Area have become Hongkongers’ go-to playground in the same way that mainland residents poured into Hong Kong after the Individual Visit Scheme was launched 21 years ago.
The economic impact of this reversed travel pattern being felt across the Greater Bay Area. Last year, Shenzhen authorities announced that “social consumption and retail spending” rose by 7.8 per cent while its gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6 per cent, exceeding Hong Kong’s and other first-tier cities on the mainland.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
The northbound trend is set to increase as more convenient transport links with the mainland develop as part of the Northern Metropolis project, an ambitious plan to develop Hong Kong’s northern districts into a technology hub that will accommodate 2.5 million people. As that happens, more Hongkongers may well choose to live on the mainland, and commute daily to work in Hong Kong, or simply work in other mainland cities.
A fundamental problem with Greater Bay Area development is that it is far from being a single market, even though integration is one of the objectives of the 2017 framework agreement.
Under the “one country, two systems” arrangement, there is no free movement of people, goods, services and data between the mainland and Hong Kong. As separate custom and immigration areas, both sides have instituted controls that make market integration a slow and difficult process.
In the short term, Hong Kong needs to overcome the asymmetry of movement and spending by urging the central authorities to allow residents of more remote mainland cities to visit, as well as approve multiple-visit permits and increase the duty-free allowance for mainland residents returning from Hong Kong.
In the long term, the government must develop a strategy for mainland cities and Hong Kong to complement each other. Officials must work out how to make use of the abundant resources mainland cities have to offer to remedy our shortages.
As more Hongkongers choose to live in nearby mainland cities, why can’t we build our residential care homes in those cities? Cross-border transport is now far more convenient. After all, our residential care homes depend heavily on the import of workers from Guangdong and Guangxi.
Instead of spending billions to reclaim a small area of land, why don’t we buy good-quality housing that’s readily available in nearby mainland cities, to provide more options for those who live in the northern districts? Now is a good time to buy on the cheap.
We should also take more vigorous measures to phase out hindrances for mainland professionals to work in Hong Kong, bring in more talent and import more mainland labour.
Only by leveraging the mainland’s resources, and combining our strengths with theirs, can we turn the process of Greater Bay Area integration into a win-win formula. The government ought to remould Hong Kong into a metropolis like London or New York, with some of its population dispersing into nearby suburbs.
The Hong Kong diaspora on the mainland will make Hong Kong more influential while relieving the pressure of the cost of living in this city. The government needs to think outside the box and move fast.
如果特區政府未能抓住粵港澳大灣區一體化的機遇制定相關策略，即使政府不斷為重振香港經濟而作出努力，將會是徒勞的。
2017年7月1日，廣東省、香港和澳門簽署了深化合作框架協議。快將七年過去，粵港澳大灣區規劃帶來深遠影響，不僅改變了香港人的生活方式，也改變了經濟環境。
去年年初內地開關不久，香港人就發現粵港澳大灣區內城市，無論在城市規劃和服務業方面已迅速進展。結果，香港人踴往大灣區消費了。
今年3月28日至4月8日期間，包括復活節及清明節長假期周末，有多達360萬香港居民通過陸路口岸北上，來香港的內地居民約有86萬人。
這充分反映香港人越來越喜歡離港到鄰近城市消費購物，享受當地便利的生活設施。香港或已無法滿足消費需求，內地城市的競爭力正不斷增強，吸引香港市民。
特區政府和企業如果不想失去這批消費客源，就必須積極參與和引導粵港澳一體化，做好產業對接，協同發展香港與內地市場。
其他粵港澳大灣區城市已經成為香港人新的休閑場所，就像21年前開放個人遊後內地居民湧進香港一樣。
這種反向旅遊模式帶來的經濟影響正蔓延整個大灣區。去年，深圳官方表示“社會消費和零售開支”增長7.8%，GDP增長6%，超過了香港及其他一線內地城市。
相比之下，來港旅遊人數未能恢復疫情前水平，消費力也較弱，加上香港消費流向內地「漏走」，導致我們的經濟復蘇僅從2022年低位爬升到去年的3.2%。如果香港不想失去這批消費客，必須主動參與大灣區一體化，與內地城市合作開拓市場，推動相關產業發展。否則經濟難實現真正復蘇。
餐館與商店的關閉迫使政府發起「香港夜繽紛」活動來刺激本地消費。但這一下滑趨勢很可能會持續，除非香港餐飲與零售服務能達到粵港澳大灣區的質量標准。
如果將所有責任歸咎於我們的服務供應商，值得說的是宏觀經濟力量在這個下滑趨勢中也起到很大作用。香港幣與美元掛鉤，使香港物價對日本、韓國和內地旅客來說極為昂貴。
我們需要借此機會，檢討自身的服務水平與競爭力，並主動學習粵港澳區域內其他城市在人才培訓、科技應用等領域的優良經驗，跟上時代步伐。只有這樣，香港的旅遊業和經濟才有望持續健康發展。
鑒於港幣實力強勁，香港理應貶值。但薪資水平受勞工短缺影響較通貨膨脹更甚的「粘滯性」，使香港很難實現通縮。盡管商業房租有所下降，但香港高薪和房地產成本使其在價格上競爭力近乎無限。
隨著北部都會區計劃落實，香港北區極其宜居的交通網絡將日益完善，這一規劃將該地區打造成可容納250萬人的科技中心。這使更多香港人可能選擇定居內地，每日通勤至港工作，或直接在內地其他城市工作。北上的趨勢將進一步增強。
粵港澳大灣區發展的一個核心問題是，一體化是2017框架協議的目標之一，但區域內市場分化仍很明顯，遠未真正形成單一市場。
根據「一國兩制」，內地與香港在人員、貨物、服務和數據並沒有自由流動。作為單獨的海關和出入境管理區，雙方設立了管理，使市場一體化變成緩慢艱難的過程。
短期來看，香港需要解決來往和消費不對等問題。這可以建議中央允許更多內地較遙遠城市的居民來港，批出更多「一簽多行」通行證，提高港人赴內消費免稅額度。
長遠來看，政府必須制定內地城市與香港互補發展的戰略，官員應研究如何充分利用內地城市豐富資源彌補香港短板。只有內地與香港在人員、貨物與資金流通等各個層面進行全面聯通，粵港澳大灣區市場一體化才能真正實現，使香港經濟獲得更大活力。
隨著香港人選擇定居鄰近內地城市人數增多，我們為什麼不可以在那些城市建設養老院？跨境交通比以往方便得多，而養老院目前已高度依賴從廣東和廣西輸入護理員。
相比花費數千億進行小範圍的填海造地，不如利用鄰近內地城市豐富的高質量房產資源，提供更多選擇給居住在北區的人，現在正是內地房價低廉的好機會。如此一來不僅可以最大限度優化資源配置，還可以緊密結合大灣區內人才與服務資源。離港的年長香港人也可以享受更優質的安老環境，政府值得重視這個可行性高的優化方案。
我們也應采取更積極的措施，逐步消除內地專業人士來港工作的障礙，吸引更多人才，增加從內地輸入勞工。
唯有利用內地資源，結合我們各自的優勢，才能將粵港澳大灣區一體化進程變成雙贏的局面。政府應該把香港打造成類似倫敦或紐約這樣的都會，部分人口分布在周邊郊區。內地的香港人口會使香港的影響力更大，同時緩解生活成本在本地的壓力，政府需要脫離舊式思維，迅速行動。
如果及早把握大灣區機遇，香港定能在新的發展格局中繼續發揮重要作用。
自《維護國家安全條例》於3月19日獲立法會全票通過後，社會上不少人士都關注美國政府會否採取大規模制裁措施，制裁有關官員及議員。
就目前情况而言，美國當局的反應遠較想像中克制。除國務卿布林肯於3月22日發表聲明，對香港的高度自治、民主體制和自由權利表示關注外，華府僅宣布對數名港府官員實施簽證限制，措施力度遠輕於美國2020年就《香港國安法》實施後的制裁。
全國人大常委會2020年6月30日通過《香港國安法》後，美國迅速於7月14日通過《香港自治法》授權美國聯邦政府廣泛制裁實施《香港國安法》的中華人民共和國與香港特別行政區政府官員。時任總統特朗普即時簽署行政命令，引述包括《香港人權與民主法》及《香港自治法》在內的多項法例，宣布制裁多名中央及港府官員。
我認為，華府是次應對如此克制的主要原因是不希望再次損害暫趨穩定的中美關係。去年11月，國家主席習近平與拜登在三藩市會面時達成多項共識，包括兩軍高層恢復恆常溝通及合作加強打擊毒品販運。加上美國近日將有多名內閣級官員訪華，相信華府當局並不樂見兩國關係在此刻因香港問題再生枝節。《維護國家安全條例》是經香港本地自行立法，符合普通法程序，加上內容參考了不少西方國家的國安法例，有理有節，並不存在所謂對公民社會、媒體及異見聲音的壓抑。
最重要的是，與2019年黑暴動亂時相比，香港在美國媒體及政界的關注度已下降。由於黑暴打破了外界對香港社會和平有序的印象，因此受到國際媒體的廣泛關注及報道。受此影響，當時有不少美國國會議員都爭相走訪香港，與暴徒合照，表示支持香港的「民主運動」。但現在西方媒體對香港的報道篇幅已不及從前，《維護國家安全條例》的通過亦未在美國國內引起太大迴響。
除此以外，美國國會現時內部一片混亂，我相信國會議員此刻尚未能分神對香港採取制裁行動。
Since the passage of the National Security Law for Hong Kong by the Legislative Council with unanimous consent on March 19, many in society have been concerned about whether the US government will impose large-scale sanctions or penalties against relevant officials and legislators.
So far, the US response has been much more restrained than imagined. In addition to Secretary of State Blinken's statement on March 22 expressing concerns about Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, democratic system and freedoms, Washington only announced visa restrictions on a few Hong Kong government officials, with measures far lighter than US sanctions after implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law in 2020.
After the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress passed the Hong Kong National Security Law on June 30, 2020, the US swiftly passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act on July 14, authorizing wide-ranging sanctions by the US federal government against officials of the People's Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government who implemented the Hong Kong National Security Law. Then-President Trump immediately signed an executive order citing multiple laws including the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act to announce sanctions against several central and Hong Kong government officials.
I believe the key reason for Washington's restraint this time is not wanting to further damage Sino-US relations which have regained some stability. In November last year, President Xi Jinping and Biden reached multiple consensuses in San Francisco, including resumption of regular communication and cooperation between military leaders as well as strengthening joint efforts against drug trafficking. Coupled with upcoming visits to China by several senior US Cabinet officials, it's believed Washington does not welcome further complications in bilateral relations over the Hong Kong issue at this time. The National Security Law for Hong Kong was legislated locally through Hong Kong's own processes according to common law procedures, drawing on many Western countries' national security laws, with sound logic and reason and devoid of so-called suppression of civil society, media and dissenting voices.
Most importantly, Hong Kong now attracts less attention from the US media and political circles compared to the black riots in 2019. The black riots shattered the international impression of Hong Kong as a society of peace and order, receiving widespread international media coverage and reports. Influenced by this, many US Congress members at the time competed to visit Hong Kong and pose for photos with rioters expressing support for Hong Kong's "democratic movement." But now Western media coverage of Hong Kong is less than before, and the passage of the National Security Law for Hong Kong did not stir up major reverberations domestically in the US.
Additionally, the US Congress is currently in disarray, and I believe Congress members do not have the bandwidth at this time to take sanctions action against Hong Kong.
早前，我就香港投資管理有限公司的營運事宜，在立法會向財經事務及庫務局就香港投資管理有限公司（港投公司）作書面質詢，要求政府交代公司的營運開支、人手編制、決定其行政總裁薪酬水平的條件及來年預算等資料。
財經事務及庫務局回覆指，由公司的架構、管治、人員以及行政等安排和相關開支預算以及員工薪酬及福利政策會由薪酬委員會審閱及作出建議並由董事會審批，董事會稍後會為公司制訂合適的披露安排，現時不便披露有關資料。
在日前（4月16日）的特別財委會上，我和多名議員都對局方的回答表示不滿。香港投資管理有限公司是一家公帑成立的公司，市民大眾有權利知道特區政府的公帑是否用得其所，政府不應該用港投公司的薪酬委員會及董事會做擋箭牌。我難以理解公司有何難言之隱，需要千方百計隱藏有關資料，希望局方及港投公司能以公眾利益為依歸，盡快向立法會提交補充資料，交代有關詳情。
近年來，隨着內地資訊科技行業發展步伐加快，美國為首的西方國家開始臆想中國會利用網絡平台進行情報收集活動。由字節跳動公司創辦並營運的 TikTok 就被美國政府指控，向中國政府提供用戶的個人信息，危害美國的國家安全。
TikTok在美國深受年輕一代的歡迎。在2017 年5 月進入海外市場後，僅以1年5 個月的時間就成為美國月度下載量及安裝量最高的手機應用程式。然而，公司業務擴張的驚人速度引來了美國政府的猜忌。
2019 年末，美國海軍以TikTok 應用構成網路安全威脅為由，禁止在政府的行動裝置上使用TikTok；美國陸軍則在2020 年初加入抵制TikTok 的行列。當時，特朗普政府曾嘗試透過行政命令，全面封殺TikTok，奈何有關命令最終被法院推翻。
近日，美國眾議院通過一項法案要求字節跳動公司在6 個月內剝離旗下短片分享平台TikTok，否則將在全國範圍內禁用TikTok。總統拜登已表明，假若法案獲兩院通過，他會簽署並頒布落實。
匪夷所思的是，此前一直支持封殺 TikTok 的特朗普卻改變立場，反對禁用TikTok。據美國媒體報道，特朗普「轉軚」的原因有二。第一，他認為假若法案通過，facebook 可能會借機吞併TikTok，從中獲利。特朗普堅信 facebook 母公司Meta 的行政總裁朱克伯格在2020 年大選中協助拜登贏得選舉，因此對其懷有私怨，不希望他因此獲益。
但更重要的原因是，共和黨金主傑夫．亞斯（Jeff Yass）旗下一間公司現時擁有字節跳動15% 股份，市場估值約400 億美元。由於亞斯在本屆大選中向特朗普提供了巨額的財政援助，促使特朗普的立場出現重大轉變。
In recent years, as China's information technology industry development pace accelerates, Western countries led by the United States began conjecturing that China would use online platforms for intelligence collection activities. TikTok, created and operated by ByteDance, has been accused by the US government of providing users' personal information to the Chinese government, posing a threat to US national security.
TikTok is hugely popular among young people in the US. After entering overseas markets in May 2017, it became the mobile app with the highest monthly downloads and installations in the US in just one year and five months. However, the company's astonishing business expansion speed aroused suspicion from the US government.
In late 2019, the US Navy banned the use of TikTok on government mobile devices, citing security risks posed by the app. The US Army also joined the boycott of TikTok in early 2020. At the time, the Trump administration attempted to completely ban TikTok through executive orders, but the relevant orders were ultimately overturned by the courts.
Recently, the US House of Representatives passed a bill requiring ByteDance to divest its short video sharing platform TikTok within six months, or TikTok will be banned nationwide in the US. President Biden has indicated that he will sign and enforce it if the bill passes both chambers.
Strangely, Trump, who had long supported banning TikTok, changed his stance to oppose banning it. According to US media reports, Trump "changed course" for two reasons. First, he believes if the bill passes, Facebook may take advantage to acquire TikTok and profit from it. Trump firmly believes Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg assisted Biden in winning the 2020 election, so he harbors personal resentment and does not want him to benefit from this.
But the more important reason is that a company owned by Republican megadonor Jeff Yass currently holds 15% of ByteDance shares worth an estimated $40 billion in market value. Given Yass' huge financial support for Trump in this election, it prompted a major shift in Trump's position.
競選資金在選舉中的作用向來舉足輕重，在美國總統大選更甚。美國總統大選的總開支近年一路飈升，由1996 年約66 億美元升至2020 年約140 億美元。而候選人的籌款能力愈強，贏面就愈高。
2020 年上屆大選，拜登破紀錄籌得超過10 億美元，而特朗普則籌得約7.7 億美元。由於特朗普在選舉衝刺階段時出現資金短缺，不得不減少在多個關鍵州份的廣告投放量，導致特朗普在上屆大選中丟掉了3 個關鍵州份，間接令他輸掉選舉。
來到今屆選舉，由於特朗普有多宗官非纏身，需要動用競選資金支付相關法律費用，導致競選團隊一度出現財政危機。早前，特朗普在紐約州的一宗民事訴訟中敗訴並被判罰款。雖然他有意提出上訴，但須先繳付高達1.75 億美元的保證金方可繼續進行訴訟。外界一度關注他有沒有足夠資金去支付天價保證金，更有傳他可能會因為無法支付保證金而被法庭拍賣旗下的名貴物業。
近日，特朗普得到一名金主慷慨解囊，在限期前支付保證金，得以繼續上訴。根據美國當地傳媒報道，該名金主是靠銷售次級汽車貸款服務（Subprime auto loan）起家的加州富豪漢基（Don Hankey）。漢基是特朗普及共和黨的忠實支持者，過往一直有向共和黨捐款。單是2016 年8 月，他就分別捐款予共和黨全國委員會（Republican National Committee） 及懷俄明州共和黨競選委員會（Republican Party of Wyoming PAC）。
雖然今次特朗普覓得金主贊助，但在籌集競選資金方面仍然落後拜登。民主黨現時已籌得超過1 億9000 萬美元，仍然領先特朗普團隊。因此，我認為特朗普團隊現時最迫切的任務是盡快確保競選資金來源，避免因「缺水」而失票。
Campaign funding has always played an important role in elections, even more so in the US presidential election. The total spending on US presidential elections has been soaring in recent years, from about $6.6 billion in 1996 to about $14 billion in 2020. And the stronger a candidate's fundraising ability, the higher the chances of winning.
In the last election in 2020, Biden broke records by raising over $1 billion, while Trump raised about $770 million. Due to a cash crunch during the final stage of the election, Trump had to reduce advertising spending in multiple key states, leading to his loss of three key states and indirectly losing the election.
In this year's election, Trump has been embroiled in multiple scandals and needs to use campaign funds to pay legal fees, resulting in a temporary financial crisis for his campaign team. Previously, Trump lost a civil lawsuit in New York and was ordered to pay fines. Although he intends to appeal, he needs to post a hefty bond of $175 million first before the lawsuit can continue. There were concerns about whether he had enough money to pay the exorbitant bond, and rumors that he may have his valuable properties auctioned off by the court if unable to pay.
Recently, Trump found a generous benefactor who paid the bond before the deadline, allowing him to continue appealing. According to local media reports, the benefactor is Don Hankey, a billionaire from California who made his fortune through subprime auto loans. Hankey is a loyal supporter of Trump and the Republican Party, having donated to them in the past. Just in August 2016, he separately donated to the Republican National Committee and the Republican Party of Wyoming PAC.
While Trump has found a sponsor this time, he is still lagging behind Biden in fundraising. The Democrats have already raised over $189 million, still leading Trump's team. Therefore, I believe the most urgent task for Trump's team now is to ensure sources of campaign funds as soon as possible to avoid losing votes due to "running out of water."
我：我感謝黃英豪議員提的議案和邱達根議員提的修正案，讓我們可以就政府的金融資產管理作一個有趣的辯論，黃議員提的措施例如把政府的非金融資產，例如廠房設備等不動產，讓他們上市或證券化並非是新措施。但我對於這個議案和修正案很有保留，所以新民黨將會棄權。
例如，用基建設施發債並非新事物。2004 年，政府成立、香港五隧一橋有限公司（Hong Kong Link 2004 Limited）集資了 60 億用以支付興建五隧一橋的開支。至今，政府亦在進行，立法會很快便會開始辯論財政司的議案，把發債上限加至 5000 億來支付基建開支。當年亦有市場人士以及外資詢問我或政府為什麼不把三條隧道打包上市呢？其實這三條隧道，特別西隧剛回歸政府，數據顯示收入不多，預計上市盈利也不會很高。其實不是把所有公共設施私有化就能賺錢，政府過往都曾將資產私有化，市場化，但產生了很多後遺症。
代理主席，我相信您也記得考評局這個例子。考評局不是一個營運基金（Trading Fund），而是當作一間獨立於政府的公司來運作。因為學生人數下降，考評局開發考試也需要成本。主席，您也知道考評局預算不足，學生亦經常說考試費高，並希望政府補貼考試費，並且多次借錢給考評局。直至現在，考評局的財政問題至今仍未解決。
另外，政府把貴重的資產，當年把屋邨的商場全部賣給「領匯」（後來改為領展），結果產生的後遺症至今仍在討論。我和鄧家彪議員最近仍有就有關領展的投訴在立法會申訴部接見市民。領展把盈利低的小商場賣散，而新業主對商場的日常營運管理置之不理，例如在天馬苑開發了高級食肆，導致附近現了很多違例拍車和衛生問題，我所以把公共資產市場化，商業化是有很多後遺症的。
至今，我仍然接到市民就政府資產私有化所作的投訴。例如，不時有市場人士問港交所為什麼要上市？有人指控港交所以謀利為先，由於主管收入是根據它的盈利而定，所以只喜歡吃「大茶飯」，不理中小企，改革緩慢，又有角色衝突等等。副局長，您也知道，我們多次與財經副務局反應這些市場憂慮。
因此市場化和商業化不一定符合最大的公眾利益。至於淡馬錫，我們也不要輕言把這 2022 年成立的投資管理公司變為港版淡馬錫，因為根據行政長官 2022 年的第一份施政報告，這個港投公司主要幫本地的科技企業發展。但有關工作進展緩慢，政府與 2022 年向公司撥款 620 億，到 2023 年 10 月才委任了陳家齊女士擔任總裁，至今仍不知投資了什麼。但我並不是怪責總裁，因為她用公帑投資要額外謹慎。我們亦不要以為淡馬錫每個投資項目都賺錢。根據路透社 23 年 5 月的一則報道，淡馬錫投資美國的加密貨幣投資平台FTX，虧損了接近 3 億美元。淡馬錫因此宣佈要撇帳並且要包負責投資的人員扣除薪金。所以，我們不應假設將政府資產放到私人市場投資就一定會成功，或者把公共資產商業化市場化就一定符合公眾利益，在適當的時候政府應該用市場的方法迅速提高效率和籌集資金。把公共資產市場化要非常小心，基於這些憂慮，新民黨會棄權。
總體國家安全觀，創新引領十周年──今年是國家主席習近平提出總體國家安全觀的十周年，今天（15日）是全民國家安全教育日，《維護國家安全條例》刊憲實施後的第二十三日，也是條例生效後的第一個全民國家安全教育日，新民黨認為具有里程碑意義，值得深思。
習主席提出的總體國家安全觀，作為維護國家安全的重大戰略思想，創新而全面地把國家安全的概念整全至傳統及非傳統的範疇，讓全國人民、特別是港人明白到，國家安全，人人有責，香港特別行政區必須擔起歷史責任，成為國家的安全屏障。
新民黨非常認同中央港澳工作辦公室主任、國務院港澳事務辦公室主任夏寶龍今日致辭所說，「今天的香港告別了動盪不安的局面，徹底終結了維護國家安全不設防的歷史」，隨著《香港國安法》及《維護國家安全條例》先後實施，兩條法例有機互補，將為香港及國家實現高水平安全保障，從今日起，香港得以站在「零起點」，奮力前進，拼經濟，謀發展。
夏主任說，「今日的中國，已非昨日的中國」，新民黨同時認為，今日的香港，已非昨日的香港。中央政府已為香港掃平障礙，踏平崎嶇，在築起安全屏障後，香港得以在「一國兩制」這堅定國策下，長治久安，「香港資本主義制度長期不變，生活方式長期不變，普通法制度長期不變，香港的自由港地位、簡單低稅制、資金自由流動、與國際接軌的監管制度、國際化、法制化、市場化等不僅不會消弱，還會大放異彩」，特別是在人才、科技、創新等方面，香港必須達致新質生產力發展，「有選擇地推動新產業、新模式、新動能發展，構築香港競爭的新優勢」，建設有利的營商環境，把「一國兩制」的紅利最大化。
習主席在3月27日在北京人民大會堂會見美國工商界及戰略學術界代表時，明確指出，「中國經濟是健康、可持續的」，「過去沒有因為中國崩潰論而潰論，現在也不會因為中國見頂論而見頂」，而國家是香港最大的靠山，「香港有求，祖國必應」，夏主任說「更多挺港惠港措施陸續有來」，新民黨感謝國家時刻對香港的關愛，同時認為，香港必須把握及發揮好自身獨特優勢，奮力鞏固其國際地位，使「香港」這個金字招牌更加閃亮。
由於特朗普及拜登二人作為總統的表現未能讓選民滿意，呼籲票投第三方的呼聲在本屆總統選舉中尤為高漲。雖然多數獨立候選人在民調上的支持度都及不上特、拜二人，但外界普遍認為來自甘迺迪家族的小羅拔甘迺迪（Robert Kennedy Jr.）可能對選舉的最終結果產生重要影響。
甘迺迪家族在美國政壇名聲顯赫，多個家族成員都曾出任政府要職。小羅拔甘迺迪是已故總統甘迺迪的侄子，父親則是前司法部部長及前參議員，本應是競選總統的熱門人選。但民主黨希望將選票導向拜登，以抗衡特朗普，因此未有給予甘迺迪「祝福」。
但我認為，縱使甘迺迪出選挑戰拜登，亦未必會嚴重分割民主黨內的票源。皆因甘迺迪本人的政治主張十分激進，極左及極右的議題都有涉足，與民主黨中間偏左的立場相距甚遠，相信無法取得大部分民主黨人的支持。但甘迺迪的新競選搭檔或能協助爭取更多提名，提高他「入閘」的機會。
據美國政經網站Politico報道，甘迺迪早前宣布科技律師及企業家妮可沙娜罕（Nicole Shanahan）為他的競選搭檔。他稱讚對方為傑出的律師、科學家、技術專家及堅強的母親。
沙娜罕是中美混血兒及移民後代，亦是Google其中一名創辦人Sergey Brin的前妻。兩人於2022年離婚時，沙娜罕按照結婚時簽署的婚前協議，分得約10億美元財產。沙娜罕與甘迺迪同為律師，在環保政策及反疫苗陰謀論的立場相近，她亦主張利用創新科技去打擊政府機構的腐敗行為。
不難看出，甘迺迪和沙娜罕所代表的是民主黨內以「矽谷精英」為主的精英階層利益。雖然沙娜罕的雄厚財力或能協助甘迺迪取得更多提名，但相信無助他當選總統。不過，他們的部分激進主張或可吸引共和、民主兩黨的邊緣化選民支持，分割特、拜二人的票源。
What are Robert F. Kennedy Jr.'s chances?
As the performances of both Trump and Biden as president have failed to satisfy voters, there are increasingly loud calls this election for voting third-party. While most independent candidates still lag Trump and Biden in polls, most observers believe Robert F. Kennedy Jr., from the famed Kennedy family, could significantly impact the final election result.
The Kennedy family has a prominent reputation in American politics, with many family members having held high government positions. RFK Jr. is the nephew of former president John F. Kennedy, and his father was a former Attorney General and senator, making him a natural candidate for president. However, the Democratic Party hoped to direct votes toward Biden to counter Trump, so did not give RFK Jr. their "blessing."
However, I believe even if RFK Jr. challenged Biden, it would unlikely severely split the Democratic vote base. This is because RFK Jr.'s own political stances are quite radical, touching on both far-left and far-right issues, far from the Democratic Party's center-left position, and he likely cannot gain support from most Democrats. But RFK Jr.'s new running mate could help attract more nominations and increase his chances of "making the cut."
According to a report by the American political and economic website Politico, RFK Jr. recently announced technology lawyer and entrepreneur Nicole Shanahan as his running mate. He praised her as an outstanding lawyer, scientist, tech expert and strong mother.
Shanahan is of Chinese-American descent and an immigrant offspring. She is also the former wife of Google co-founder Sergey Brin. When they divorced in 2022, Shanahan got around $1 billion in assets according to their prenuptial agreement. Shanahan and RFK Jr. share a similar stance as lawyers on environmental policy and anti-vaccine conspiracy theories. She also advocates using innovative technology to combat corruption in government agencies.
It's not difficult to see that RFK Jr. and Shanahan represent the interests of the elite class in the Democratic Party comprising mainly of "Silicon Valley elites." While Shanahan's formidable wealth could help RFK Jr. get more nominations, it's unlikely to help him win the presidency. However, some of their radical stances may attract support from marginalized voters of both Republican and Democratic parties, splitting votes from Trump and Biden.