Fugitive surrender: Rights and responsibilities
文章
2019 年 6 月 14 日
Editor’s note: At a Tuesday forum titled “Extradition law and human rights: Does the Hong Kong government’s bill provide sufficient safeguard for our rights?”, Grenville Cross, honorary professor of law at the University of Hong Kong and the city’s former director of public prosecutions, shares his insights into the proposed amendments to Hong Kong’s extradition law.
Grenville Cross, honorary professor of law at the University of Hong Kong and previously the director of public prosecutions of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, addresses the Tuesday forum on extradition law and human rights. (ROY LIU / CHINA DAILY)
Good afternoon.
I am most grateful to have been invited to today’s conference, and to have the opportunity to discuss the surrender of fugitives, in the context of rights and responsibilities.
The Security Bureau’s proposed amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance are designed to promote effective criminal justice, and to redress an intolerable situation. They will enable Hong Kong to return fugitives, on a case-by-case basis, to other parts of China, as well as to over 170 countries with which it currently has no extradition agreements. Such case-based approaches are used in other jurisdictions, and are of obvious utility where long-term surrender arrangements are not yet in place. Given the existing vacuum, many fugitives from other places have obtained sanctuary in Hong Kong, some from elsewhere in China, others from around the globe.
We know that over 300 fugitives from other parts of China are currently enjoying safe haven in Hong Kong, including at least one alleged murderer, as well as businessmen already convicted of corruption and money laundering. However, because of the weakness of our laws, they are able to avoid their just deserts, and cannot be returned to face justice. Apart from China, no other country, not the United Kingdom, not the Russian Federation, and certainly not the United States, tolerates a situation in which a suspect can simply evade justice by moving from one part of the country to another, and it is incumbent upon Hong Kong to break the impasse. Although we cannot know for sure how many fugitives from around the world are also evading justice by coming here, the Security Bureau’s proposals will, hopefully, have given them a rude awakening, and put them on notice that their time is up.
In the debate over the Security Bureau’s proposals, the whole focus has been on the rights of suspects, and what Hong Kong should do to protect their interests. Although their interests are obviously important, there is, I believe, another side to the equation, which is often downplayed. “No man is an island”, said John Donne, and Hong Kong has wide responsibilities to other places, as well as to the victims of crime, and these cannot forever be shirked, on one pretext or another. Those who think Hong Kong can simply evade its responsibilities, by isolating itself and refusing to help other jurisdictions to pursue criminal suspects, are doing it no favors at all, not least because it will result in a breakdown of trust.
Hong Kong, therefore, is not only letting itself down, but also its criminal justice partners around the world, and the time has come for it to shed its image as China’s criminal sanctuary. I firmly believe that, 22 years after reunification, the situation in which someone can, for example, rob a bank in Beijing, commit a rape in Shanghai, or traffic drugs in Nanjing, and then claim safe haven in Hong Kong, cries out for redress. Although some people have described this state of affairs as a “firewall”, it is, in reality, a criminal’s charter, which undermines effective law enforcement throughout the country, and beyond. The Secretary for Security, John Lee Ka-chiu, clearly recognizes this, and his bureau’s proposals offer a sensible means by which Hong Kong’s responsibilities to others can finally be honored.
There is, however, a great difference between creating a mechanism which enables a person to be extradited, and actually extraditing someone, and hopefully, people appreciate this. The United Kingdom, for example, has extradition agreements with dictatorships, failed states, and states riven by civil war, but, in reality, it would never extradite someone to one of those places, and I have no doubt that it would be the same here. Even with countries not in those categories, extradition is by no means a given. Whereas, for example, the UK has an extradition treaty with the Russian Federation, it rejected 63 of the 67 requests for extradition made by Russia over the past 17 years. Likewise, the creation of a mechanism for returning fugitives to other parts of China certainly does not mean that this will happen whenever a request is made, as there are numerous hurdles to be overcome.
The Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Section 5) contains internationally recognized safeguards for suspects, and these are replicated in Hong Kong’s 20 existing fugitive surrender agreements. Because fears have been expressed that people might be at risk for political reasons, the proposals emphasize that there will be no surrender for offenses of a political character, and no surrender where the purpose of the request is to punish the wanted person on account of his political opinions (or his race, religion, or nationality). Of course, there is no political dimension to most offenses, and, other things being equal, there should be no particular difficulties when cases of, say, burglary, kidnap or rape are considered for surrender, or when they are ultimately tried. No surrender, however, will be made if the suspect might be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty because of his political opinions, race, religion or nationality. A fugitive will also not be returned if he will face the death penalty, if the crime is not an offense in both places, if extra charges might be brought, or if the double jeopardy principle will be breached. This is a formidable battery of protections, and the government, to allay concerns, has explained that they can be supplemented.
Another fascinating development concerns people’s assessors, who are not dissimilar to Hong Kong’s own jurors. Although they were originally introduced in the 1950s, to give the public a voice in the judicial process, the People’s Assessors Law, enacted in 2018, gives them equal rights with judges in trials, unless the law specifically provides otherwise. The idea is “to achieve judicial democracy”, and, although they normally sit on three-person collegiate benches, they are also eligible, in graver cases, to participate in seven-person panels, usually comprising three judges and four assessors. Although assessors cannot vote on legal questions, they can still discuss them, but they vote jointly with the judges on factual issues, which are decided by the “principle of majority rule”. As an aside, when one asks critics of the Security Bureau’s proposals if they are any way reassured by the increased role for people’s assessors in criminal trials, their faces invariably glaze over, and it is a pity that ignorance of how the mainland’s criminal justice system is actually developing informs so much of the debate.
There has, moreover, been a significant improvement in judicial standards in recent times. Although, until about 20 years ago, judges had little legal training, this has now changed, and anyone who aspires to be a judge (or a prosecutor or a lawyer) must pass the difficult National Unified Legal Professional Qualification, together with the separate judge’s test, and this has raised judicial standards enormously. Many of this new breed of judges, prosecutors and lawyers have also studied law elsewhere, often in the UK, Germany or the US, but also in Hong Kong, and they are familiar with Western notions of criminal justice, and this has undoubtedly impacted upon their work.
Some people have suggested that, once a fugitive is returned to the mainland, any guarantees given may be disregarded. I take the view, however, that the mainland courts, aware of the interest in the case, will actually go the extra mile and do all they can to ensure that the fugitive is appropriately treated on return, and the precedents support this view. After all, the mainland, like other jurisdictions, understands full well that if fugitives do not receive justice, as promised, it will forfeit the trust of others, and its future requests will be imperiled.
Moreover, 55 places have now signed extradition agreements with China, of which about 40 are now in force. They include nine EU member states, among whom Bulgaria (in the case of Yao Jinqi, wanted for corruption), France (in the case of Chen Wenhua, wanted for embezzlement), Italy (in the case of the fugitive named Zhang, wanted for theft) and Spain (in the case of the 218 Taiwan telecom fraud suspects, 94 of whom were returned to Beijing just last week, following two years of judicial proceedings) have recently returned fugitives to China without problem, which makes the EU’s professed concerns over the Security Bureau’s proposals all the more extraordinary. Even in the absence of such agreements, the US (in the cases of Yu Zhendong, wanted for fraud, and Yang Yinjun, wanted for bribery, and the fugitive named Zhu, intercepted on an Interpol Red Notice alert for violation of personal rights) and Canada (in the case of Lai Changxing, wanted for smuggling) have also recently returned fugitives, albeit subject to assurances as to future treatment. In all these instances, China has honored the guarantees requested of it, and fair-minded observers would be entitled to conclude that it will also do likewise in respect of any fugitives returned from Hong Kong.
In conclusion, the Basic Law’s “50 years unchanged” provision for Hong Kong’s capitalist system and way of life (Art 5) reaches its conclusion in 2047, and nobody knows for sure what will happen after that. There will undoubtedly be some people in Beijing who will take the view that “one country, two systems” has run its course, and should not be continued. I imagine, however, that everyone here hopes that our current arrangements will survive beyond 2047, but the chances of this happening will be far greater if Hong Kong shows itself to be a responsible part of the nation, willing to shoulder its responsibilities in the combat of crime.
Thank you.
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上文提到美國《財富》雜誌亞洲編輯Clay Chandler 近日發表評論文章，引述《南華早報》一篇報道指，不少參與6 月9 日反修訂《逃犯條例》遊行的市民懂得巧妙地隱迹潛蹤，以免遭警方透過科技追蹤手法識別他們的身分。除了上文提及的以現金購買港鐵單程車票，及戴上頭盔、口罩和眼罩以圖避開「天眼」監視外，該報道還指不少遊行人士本來使用社交網絡平台Twitter 發布遊行當日的影片，後來因為參與遊行的人數眾多，無線網絡信號不穩定令直播畫面中斷，市民隨即「見招拆招」轉用較為電動和電競玩家熟悉的直播平台Twitch，繼續直播遊行情况，可見香港市民懂得活用科技，即時發布遊行的最新消息。
此外，該篇《南華早報》報道更指不少市民在遊行期間，關掉iPhone 的人臉（Face ID） 和指紋（Touch ID） 解鎖功能， 並使用Telegram、WhatsApp和Signal等具備端對端加密功能的手機通訊軟件，以免暴露行蹤。不過這些通訊軟件仍存在不少保安漏洞，Telegram 創辦人Pavel Durov 日前就指，Telegram 在6 月12 日遭強力的分散式阻斷服務（Distributed Denial ofService，DDoS）攻擊，令系統一度癱瘓。另一邊廂，香港警方網絡安全及科技罪案調查科於6 月11 日，拘捕一名涉嫌「串謀公眾妨擾罪」的Telegram群組管理人，該名男子其後在受訪時表示警方要求他解鎖手機，並匯出群組成員名單及信息內容，令Telegram 等手機通訊軟件的用戶私隱保障功能受質疑。
政府於6月15日宣布暫緩修訂《逃犯條例》後，上星期五 （6月21日）的政府新聞稿亦一再強調「政府已完全停止《逃犯條例》的修訂工作，本屆立法會會期明年7月結束，條例草案屆時將自動失效。」我亦認為政府已無政治能量重推修例。不過，這段期間，我們的地區同事屢遭反修例人士辱罵，我理解市民及地區同事的憂慮，於是邀請了湯家驊大律師向地區同事講解《逃犯條例》的內容，也以本文和讀者分享，希望大家明白《逃犯條例》的本質。
湯大狀指出，國際間之所以有引渡安排，是基於1990年聯合國通過了決議案，要求各國互相訂定引渡（Extradition）協議，共識以快速有效的方法，緝拿逃犯，打擊跨境罪行。自此國與國之間便根據聯合國訂定的範本，多國互相達成雙邊協議。由於香港並不是國家，因此並不適用「引渡」（Extradition）一詞，而是採用「移交」（Rendition）這字眼。
在1997年前，香港是按照適用於香港的英國法例移交逃犯，香港本身並沒有相關條例。接近回歸，港英政府將一些英國法例本地化，其中包括移交逃犯條例，訂定了香港的《逃犯條例》，並於1997年4月通過。當時，基於香港及內地的法制差異，條例訂明香港不會向中國移交逃犯。至於將來如何處理，當時只餘幾個月壽命的港英政府可謂無能為力，惟有留待回歸後的特區政府處理。
回歸後，香港先後與20個國家簽訂了長期移交協議，其中包括菲律賓及印尼這些司法制度與香港有差異、在國際法治排名相對低的國家。但我們仍然與他們達成協議，因為雙方都認同有必要合作打擊跨境罪行。例如近年在本港時有所聞的電話騙案，干犯者可能身在印尼，因此這些跨境合作是有必要的，以打擊跨境嚴重罪行，特別是運毒、洗黑錢、向恐怖分子提供資金、偷運人蛇、網上及電話騙案等。而中國亦與大約60個國家簽訂了引渡協議，其中包括四個歐盟國家：意大利、西班牙、法國及比利時。最近西班牙便引渡了94名涉嫌干犯電話騙案的台灣人到中國。
何謂移交逃犯？
湯大狀指出了移交逃犯安排的要點：
1﹒該逃犯所干犯的罪行並不在香港發生。如果干犯者在香港犯案，他會在香港受審，因此「港人港罪港審」只適用於香港人在香港犯案，或大部分罪行在香港干犯。典型的例子就是陳同佳，他干犯的謀殺案不在香港發生，香港法庭只能檢控他洗黑錢，不能檢控他謀殺或誤殺，可見「港人港審」是不可行的。
2﹒為何需要移交逃犯？因為逃犯在犯罪後離開了犯罪的地方，若不把他緝拿歸案，他便逍遙法外。例如1998年我處理過的張子強案，當年他涉嫌綁架及囤積軍火，但是香港這邊沒人報警指他綁架，只是後來他知悉警方揭破他囤積軍火，他逃到內地，卻被內地逮捕。由於香港與內地並沒有移交逃犯協議，所以沒能把他移回香港受審，最終在內地遭處決。當時的立法會促請特區政府與中央政府商討移交協議，讓這些逃離香港司法管轄區的逃犯得以移回香港接受審訊。
3﹒逃犯是指在其他地方犯案但逃到香港的人，與及觸犯了香港法例後逃到其他地方的人。自從1997年初香港通過《逃犯條例》後，香港與20個國家簽訂了長期移交協議。22年來，成功移交的逃犯數目有109人，最多的是美國，香港向美國移交了68人，而美國向香港移交了18人。換句話說，每年成功移交的逃犯數目只有4至5人，而且均是干犯了嚴重罪行的人士，其影響面十分狹窄，亦不影響絕大部分普通市民。
法庭擁有移交逃犯的最終決定權
湯大狀亦強調，特首是沒有權決定是否移交逃犯的，因為條例包括了所有聯合國要求的人權保障，包括：
1﹒一定要「雙重犯罪」，即是所干犯的罪行在香港及請求方均屬罪行；
2﹒所干犯的罪行不是政治性質；
3﹒如因為一個人的宗教信仰、政治意見、國籍及種族等理由而作出檢控，亦不可以移交。
現行法例至少有10項有關人權保障的條文。而且在《香港法例》第503章《逃犯條例》第12條表明，當這名逃犯被交付到裁判司署的時候，裁判司要向該逃犯表明，他有權申請人身保護令；另外，行政長官作出的任何行政決定，例如引用《逃犯條例》將一名嫌疑犯移交，都是可以被司法覆核的。因此，最終的決定權在法庭。
最近國際傳媒報道了兩宗引渡個案，正好反映移交逃犯的司法程序十分冗長，而且法庭有最終決定權。該兩宗個案最終法庭也是否決移交的。一宗是台灣要求蘇格蘭引渡一名名叫Zain Dean的英國人，他涉嫌於十年前在台灣醉駕撞死一名送報紙員，犯案後逃到蘇格蘭。當時，因應台灣政府就此個案的要求，英國與台灣於是簽訂備忘錄（MOU），台灣要求英國把Zain Dean引渡到台灣接受審訊。
由於Mr Dean擔心回到台灣後會受到欺凌，台灣當局提出了多項人權保障，為他作出特別安排，包括保證他會有獨立囚室及浴室，他只會和外國人囚禁在一起，以保障他的人生安全等等。但在6月初，蘇格蘭法庭仍然不相信台灣當局會做到有關安排，否決了台灣的移交要求。
另一宗案件，是近日新西蘭法庭否決了中國的引渡要求，拒絕將涉嫌在上海殺死一名性工作者的韓裔美國人Mr Kim引渡到中國受審。中國與新西蘭兩國之間沒有引渡協議，但就這件個案磋商，新西蘭的司法部長願意單項引渡，在2015年同意將Mr Kim引渡到中國。然而，有關決定近日被新西蘭上訴法庭推翻，並要求司法部長重新考慮引渡安排，因為新西蘭上訴法庭不相信Mr Kim在中國受審會有公平審訊。
上述兩宗個案均反映法庭可以嚴格把關，最終移交與否的決定權在於法庭。而根據《普通法》，司法覆核一直可以抗辯到終審法院。香港的終審法院擁有大量優秀法官，包括海外的頂尖法官，他們是由行政長官委任，經立法會批准，而他們的薪酬是由香港人支付的，他們的任命並不受到北京控制，因此他們不需要擔心會受到北京的壓力。再者，法官需要公開判詞交待裁決，所以北京是不能夠影響他們的。
最後，湯大狀向我們的地區同事重申，也希望廣大市民明白三點：
一、特首沒權決定是否移交逃犯；
二、移交逃犯需要經過法庭冗長的審訊；
三、我們要相信香港的法制及法官。
上回提到，我和一群中學畢業生一起去西安考察，參觀了人工智能企業外，其他行程也讓我和同學們印象難忘。
我們從西安市出發，去參觀位於山西省吉縣和陝西省宜川縣之間的壺口瀑布。壺口瀑布是中國三大瀑布之一，瀑布寬30米，深約50米。我近距離親眼看到黃河水滾滾而下，氣勢磅礡，實在震撼，也引證了簡介資料裡指，《尚書》〈禹貢〉所言「蓋河漩渦，如一壺然」。
而抵達壺口瀑布前的三小時車程，全程走高架天橋上的高速公路，兩旁是長滿排列整齊的樹木和蘋果園。期間在中途休息站稍作停留。休息站二樓是旅館，我們不是夜車不用留宿，卻在食店醫肚，在便利店買小食飲品，繼而「光顧」洗手間。想不到洗手間頗為乾淨而且氣味清新呢。這三小時旅程讓我們了解到，中國的公路建設及配套設施，發展已趨完善。
此外，我們來到了延安南泥灣。當年，毛澤東在南泥灣提出「自己動手，豐衣足食」的口號，推動「大生產運動」，是相當具歷史意義的地方。不過，讓我們難以忘懷的，並非「南泥灣大生產展覽館」，而是展覽館旁邊的洗手間！這個洗手間，外表和公路休息站的洗手間無異，入內一看才發現，竟然是旱廁！
年紀較大的讀者當然知道旱廁是甚麼一回事，但對於活在大城市香港的同學而言，對旱廁可謂全無概念，所以有同學不願入內，有同學快進快出，表情彆扭。我則當然要仔細參觀，但見內裡並沒沖水設備，而是挖了一個個洞來「吸收」排泄物，較意外的是氣味並不濃烈。有同學問為甚麼今時今日仍設旱廁？我告訴他們，這當然是為了反映以前當地人民的艱苦生活面貌，藉以讓遊客好好體會。所謂讀萬卷書不如走萬里路，就是這個意思了。
英國是聯合王國，由英格蘭、蘇格蘭、威爾斯和北愛爾蘭四個構成國(Constituent Country)組成，他們各有自己的傳統、議會和一定程度的自治。蘇格蘭自1707年與英格蘭簽訂《聯合條約》(Acts of Union 1707)，正式結合為聯合王國，不過蘇格蘭在過去幾百年來獨立的呼聲未曾中斷，最終在2014年舉行獨立公投。雖然最後因55.3%選民反對而告吹，不過其「脫英」之心一直存在。在脫歐公投上，蘇格蘭以大比數62%反對英國脫歐，蘇格蘭首席部長施雅晴(Nicola Sturgeon)已表明，若蘇格蘭必須脫離歐盟，將推動在2021年5月前進行第二次獨立公投。事實上，在脫歐公投後，蘇格蘭獨立的呼聲已越來越強。
現時，首相熱門候選人之一的前外相約翰遜(Boris Johnson)曾說他會為無協議脫歐做好準備，並承諾最遲會在10月31日脫歐。不過《經濟學人》(The Economist)曾發文指出，選舉約翰遜將是一場危險賭博，甚至引述《每日電訊報》(Daily
Telegraph)前編輯Sir Max Hasting形容，約翰遜是個鍍金的自大狂 (Gold – plated
egomaniac)。《經濟學人》亦指約翰遜喜歡扭曲事實，不可能為英國爭取更好的脫歐協議，約翰遜拜相將增加無協議脫歐的機會。此外，約翰遜是一個忠實的脫歐支持者，與蘇格蘭利益相違背，難與當地維持良好關係，長遠對維持領土完整不利。
歐盟成員國本受《歐洲聯盟基本權利憲章》(European Charter of Fundamental Rights)保障，英國脫歐後自動脫離《憲章》，即使繼續受《權利法案》(Bill of Rights)保障，其人權保障已然減少。
可見脫歐公投不但沖擊英國的憲制，分化國民甚至威脅英國領土完整和人權的保障，加上下一任首相有可能是個浮誇且不尊重政治傳統的領導人，令英國前途變得暗淡。
6月9日香港出現繼2003 年反對《國安法》草案（《基本法》第23條）七一遊行後另一場大規模和平遊行示威，抗議特區政府修訂《逃犯條例》。我認為參與2003年七一遊行的示威者普遍自發性較高，市民的訴求與經濟、民生議題息息相關。
猶記得2003年3月初「沙士」襲港，4月初全港各區接連出現感染個案，疫情一發不可收拾。香港在「沙士」疫情陰霾籠罩下儼如一個悲情城市，市面百業蕭條，股市、樓價大跌，令民怨沸騰。世界衛生組職在6月23日正式將香港從疫區名單除名，市民遂在7月1日自發走上街頭發泄怨氣，從當日示威人士手持的橫額可見，他們除了抗議港府就《基本法》第23條立法外，也希望藉機表達林林總總的訴求。
相反，今次反對修訂《逃犯條例》遊行的組織性似乎較2003 年高，全球各地多個城市近乎同時出現聲援行動，遊行人士的訴求亦明顯較以往集中。
美國《財富》雜誌亞洲編輯ClayChandler 近日發表評論文章，引述《南華早報》一篇報道指，觀察到參與6月9日遊行的市民大多深諳警方可能使用的科技追蹤手法，懂得有組織且巧妙地隱藏行蹤。例如在遊行期間，多個港鐵車站的自助售票機出現長長人龍，大批乘客「不約而同」改以現金購買單程車票，而非使用存有個人資料的八達通卡入閘乘車，以免行蹤被掌握。
其次，不少示威者均「有備而來」，紛紛戴上口罩、眼罩和頭盔等裝備，以防警方透過翻查「天眼」鏡頭錄影片段識別他們的身分。
中美貿易戰談判處於破裂邊沿，美國猛加關稅之餘，更對華為以國安為由加以封殺。追蹤國際政經消息的網站HeisenbergReport 有一文章名Suddenly, There's NotA Lot To Like，當中就指出美國市場對事態發展感到悲觀。文章劈頭就指市場氣氛"hastaken a decisive turn for the worst"。To takea turn for the worse 是一句英文諺語，解作事情轉壞。作者特意將worse（更差）變成worst（最差），就是要強調事態嚴重。目前中國經濟是否out of thewoods，實屬未知之數。Out of the woods 即是脫離險境，由於置身森林容易迷路，林中有不少猛禽野獸，危機四伏，總是危險且帶�荅垢窗C如今談判發展不明朗，更加muddy the waters（英文諺語，解作「令水變得渾濁」），讓人無法看清實�G。另一邊廂，意大利有政客趁�蚍甯w議會選舉，提出off the rails的言論（英文諺語，指失控、離譜或是不可接受的行為），抗議歐盟干預意大利預算，難怪國際市場對經濟發展抱悲觀態度。
面對美國惡意圍堵，北京嚴陣以待。「嚴陣以待」在英文可以To circle the wagons 表達，這句諺語出自美國昔日開發西部的歷史背景。當時的西部地區屬荒蕪之地，無法律可言。拓荒者和商人為了保護自己，若遇盜匪攻擊，會把馬車圍圈防守，並在馬車之間的狹縫向外開槍。Beijing is circling the wagons 就是以北京借代中國，指國家已經團結一致，為了共同利益抵禦外敵。
該文作者指出美國封殺華為，實際是crossing theRubicon。Rubicon river（魯比干河）是古羅馬共和國北邊的邊界。公元前49 年，羅馬元老院見凱撒的權力過大，趁其在外打仗，要求交出軍權，不得班師回國，否則屬叛國。但凱撒抗命，帶兵過河，向元老院奪政，自封羅馬的獨裁者，令羅馬共和國離帝制近了一大步，最後被元老院議員刺殺。據說凱撒過河時曾說"alea iacta est"（拉丁文，解作「骰子已擲」），Crossing the Rubicon在英文成為了諺語，解作事情已經發生， 越過這一界線， 就無法挽回。
上文提到，英國沒有明文憲法處理公投，因此在脫歐時缺乏細則討論，令選民因情緒主導而作出災難性決定。文翠珊因未能在脫歐方案上取得共識最終辭去黨魁職位，留任看守首相。日前宣布參選保守黨黨魁的人超過10 位。
英國首相並不是一人一票選出來的，而是由執政黨國會議員選出，英國國會是以簡單多數選舉制（first-past-thepost）產生議員，如有一個政黨在下議院獲得多數議席，該黨領袖則會成為首相，並籌組政府。若沒有任何政黨取得多數議席，就會出現懸峙議會（hung parliament），政黨需要協商籌組聯合政府，一般慣例是由最大黨黨魁成為首相。
文翠珊辭去黨魁後，選舉將先由執政保守黨國會議員投票，篩選出兩名候選人，最後交由12 萬名黨員選出新首相。《經濟學人》（The Economist ）指出，有投票權的黨員大部分都是已屆退休年齡的白人，且有三分二是男性，所以並不能代表英國6600 萬的國民。相比香港，我認為英國保守黨選舉黨魁的制度比行政長官選委會多元性低，行政長官選委組成包括四大界別下共38 個組別。
在2011 年之前，首相可以決定解散國會及舉行大選的時間，換言之首相可以利用制度上的空間，在對黨有利的時候舉行大選，以確保其執政地位。在2011 年國會通過《英國定期國會法》（Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 ），規定選舉日期，除非得到國會以三分之二的絕對多數票同意，或國會過半數議員對首相動議不信任投票，否則不能提前大選。不過要推翻首相並不容易，因為多數議員一般不會冒「失業」的風險而提出不信任動議。
文翠珊宣布辭去保守黨黨魁後，將繼續留任看守首相，直至保守黨選出新黨魁繼任首相。對英國政制有深刻了解的《經濟學人》（The Economist）表示對英國的政制發展有憂慮，當中原因值得深思。
與其他西方國家例如德國和美國不同，英國沒有明文憲法，「憲法」是以政治傳統、慣例與先例和不同的法例來體現，換言之英國的憲制比其他有明文憲法的國家脆弱，所以有一位有政治智慧的首相掌舵對維持憲制穩定非常重要。
《經濟學人》指出，英國脫歐公投違背了英國議會至上（Parliamentary Supremacy）的概念，議會至上是指議案或法案一旦獲議會通過，具有無上的權威，所以重大的決定應透過代議士在國會辯論通過。可是公投就以「直接民主」，讓選民透過一人一票，表達立場，而缺乏細則的討論。英國脫歐公投的結果顯示，支持脫歐的選民佔51.9%，反映英國人對脫歐立場兩極，而公投後國會對脫歐的形式難以達成共識，造成憲制的亂局，把國家帶到災難的邊緣。
由於英國奉行代議政制，所以歷史上舉行的公投不多，1975年對英國歐共體成員身分公投是英國歷史上首次全國性公投，結果67%選民支持留在歐共體。隨後就是2011年英國選擇公投以決定是否在國會選舉導入排序複選制（Alternative Vote）以取代現行的多數制（First Pastthe Post），結果有67.9%選民反對。
《經濟學人》指出，在處理公投方面鄰國愛爾蘭比英國好得多，愛爾蘭是在法案獲得國會通過後才公投，讓公眾能在有執行細節的情况下討論，以避免選民立場因情緒主宰而作出錯誤決定，影響國家前途。