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Hong Kong financial secretary’s hands were tied – but he got at least one thing right
文章
2024 年 3 月 4 日
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Financial Secretary Paul Mo-po Chan had few palatable options before him when he drew up the 2024-25 budget.
The government has been running a fiscal deficit almost every financial year since 2019, and the forecast deficit for 2023-24 would have widened to HK$173 billion (US$22.1 million) but for a bond issue of HK$72.5 billion. Measures to balance the budget, whether cutting back on welfare expenditure or raising taxes, are sure to generate a substantial backlash from a public accustomed to low taxation and generous handouts.
To raise revenue, the government had toyed with the idea of introducing new taxes, but backed off given the adverse market reaction. Even after Chan ruled out introducing a capital gains tax on January 17, the Hang Seng Index still experienced a steep decline that day as his clarification was seen as being not categorical enough.
Raising government fees and charges on a “user-pays” basis had also been floated. Water and sewage charges, and more, are indeed long overdue for an increase. But any such increase is bound to hit the grass roots hardest, and raise business costs at a time when the economic recovery is fragile.
Chan trod extremely carefully and he confined tax increases to limited items – a modest increase in business registration fees by HK$200, a 1 per cent increase in salary tax for an estimated 12,000 taxpayers whose net income exceeds HK$5 million, a progressive rating system for domestic premises from the fourth quarter of 2024-25, and resumed collection of the hotel accommodation tax, at a rate of 3 per cent, effective next year.
Altogether they are estimated to generate no more than HK$3.16 billion in the coming year, a pittance compared to the forecast deficit of HK$143 billion before bond issuance. Chan cannot be faulted for reckless tax hikes that could rock the boat.
Chan’s hands are tied when it comes to boosting the economy, given that most of the negative factors weighing on the economy – high interest rates, the strong US dollar, ongoing geopolitical tensions – are out of his control. Despite these constraints, Chan got one key policy right: the scrapping of all “demand management” property transaction stamp duties that had been introduced since 2010 to rein in skyrocketing home prices.
The debate over these stamp duties – Special Stamp Duty to curb speculation, Buyer’s Stamp Duty to dampen external demand, and the New Residential Stamp Duty to counter market exuberance – tells a poignant story about how the government battled rising angst about runaway home prices through fiscal intervention. The stamp duties brought the government a windfall of land revenue, and the buoyant property market led many to believe that the sun would never set on the property sector.
To address deep-rooted discontent about the concentration of wealth among homeowners and young people’s inability to own their own homes, the government doubled down on its efforts to step up land and housing supply.
As the result of the government’s determined efforts, Chan was able to announce in the budget that it had identified land for meeting the supply target of 308,000 public housing units in the next decade, and would be able to achieve completion of 19,000 private residential units in the next five years, a 15 per cent increase over the annual average of the past five years.
The unexpected economic downturn resulting from the pandemic, the rapid ratcheting up of interest rates and abundant supply coming on stream sent the property market into a nosedive. Louis Chan Wing-kit, vice-chairman of Centaline, one of Hong Kong’s largest property agencies, said last month that compared to the market peak in September 2021, second-hand home prices had plunged nearly 24 per cent in less than two-and-a-half years. Chan estimated that the value of Hong Kong’s property market had dropped below HK$10 trillion, representing an evaporation of wealth equivalent to HK$2.6 trillion.
The negative wealth effect of such a sharp fall in property values sent ripples across the economy, depressing consumption and investment, creating drags on the economy that the financial secretary had to address. With the property sector having been a key driver of Hong Kong’s growth for decades, the government had no choice but to eliminate the stamp duties. Otherwise, continuing pessimism could have led to a collapse of confidence.
Soon after the announcement, there were reports of homeowners asking for higher prices, and brisker transactions returned. With weak growth, it is unlikely that there will be a surge in demand in the near future, but the abolition of the stamp duties will ensure property prices don’t end up in a free fall.
The government is determined to broaden Hong Kong’s economic structure by making a belated move to promote “high-quality growth” through scientific innovation and technology. In recent years, the government has poured billions into building the infrastructure for technological development, making land available for tech parks and funds for tech investment.
Substantially enlarged science parks in the planned Northern Metropolis at the border with Shenzhen are intended to be flagship developments that will jump-start Hong Kong’s tech-based industries. Hong Kong started late, and it will be a while before investments generate the desired returns.
In the absence of near-term gains from its tech investments, the property sector and tourism remain Hong Kong’s chief engines of growth. It is to Chan’s credit that he managed to steer clear of controversies that would raise the political decibel levels at a time when the government’s top priority is to ensure the passing of national security legislation in accordance with Hong Kong’s constitutional obligation under Article 23 of the Basic Law. There is no promise of immediate economic turnaround, but Chan’s cautious navigation should ensure a soft landing.
Hong Kong financial secretary’s hands were tied – but he got at least one thing right
財政司司長陳茂波擬訂2024-25年財政預算時，面臨的可取之策非常少。
香港政府自2019年財政年度起，幾乎每年都錄得赤字。2023-24年財政赤字，若非發債725億元，赤字將會擴大至1,730億港元。不管是削減福利開支，抑或增加稅項，政府的任何平衡預算措施，都很可能引發低稅高福利的市民強烈不滿。
為增加收入，政府考慮引入新稅項，但鑒於市場反應不佳而收回。盡管陳茂波1月17日表明不會增設資本增值稅，恆生指數當天仍急挫，表明其說法未能令人信服。
提高各種政府收費也經考慮，但「用者自付」原則下增加水費、排污費等久遠未改的費用，必定重挫基層，且在經濟復蘇時期增加企業成本。
陳茂波在增加稅項上非常小心，他擬定2024-25年財政預算時，在增加稅項方面非常謹慎。他只對少數項目作有限增長，如商業登記費略加200港元;預計1.2萬納稅人裡年收入超過500萬港元者，薪金稅率提高1個百分點;從2024-25財年第四季開始實施房產分階梯征收模式;並從明年恢復酒店住宿稅，稅率定為3%。
這些措施估計明年僅可增加收入31.6億港元，對預期1,730億元赤字來說相當微不足道。陳茂波沒有亂增稅項干擾市場，這一點無法責難。
至於振興經濟，陳茂波之手也難為情，因為利率高企、美元強勢及地緣政治張力等負面因素，均非他能控制。盡管面臨限制，但陳茂波有一項關鍵政策判斷正確，即廢除自2010年實施以來所有“需求管理”房地產印花稅，以遏抑房價飆升。
這些建議稅引發熱議，反映政府如何通過財政干預應對房價上漲引發的民怨。但房地產市場繁榮，也使人相信牛市會延續。
為應對房東財富集中和年輕人買不起房的深層次不滿，政府加大力度增加土地和房屋供應。
由於政府的堅定行動，陳茂波在財政預算案中宣布，已確定可滿足未來十年30.8萬套公屋供應目標的土地，並且將在未來五年內完成1.9萬套私人住宅，比過去五年每年平均漲幅15%。
新冠疫情帶來的經濟下行、利率持續飆升以及房地產供應傾瀉，令房地產市場急劇下挫。中原地產亞太區副主席兼住宅部總裁陳永傑上月表示，相比2021年9月樓市高峰，全港房價在不足兩年半時間內已縮水近24%。他估算香港房地產市值跌破十萬億港元，相當於流失的財富為26,000億港元。
房產價格這樣劇烈下跌所造成的負面財富效應，給整體經濟造成衝擊，壓抑消費和投資，增加了財政司必須應對的經濟阻力。鑒於房地產多年來一直是推動香港增長的關鍵驅動力，政府別無選擇只能取消印花稅。否則，悲觀情緒持續可能會導致信心崩潰。
政策宣布後，市場隨即有賣家提高賣價的報導，交易量也回升。但在經濟增長疲弱的情況下，短期內難見需求大漲，但廢除印花稅將確保房價免於失控下跌。
政府決意通過推動延遲但重視的“高質量增長”，將香港經濟結構拓寬，以科技創新為重。近年，政府已投入數以億計的資源，建設科技發展基礎設施，提供科技園地和科技投資基金。位於深圳邊境的北部都會規劃中大幅擴建的科技園，旨在帶動香港科技產業起飛。但香港起步較遲，投入需時間帶來預期回報。
在短期內未能從科技投資獲得回報的情況下，房地產業和旅遊業依舊是香港經濟增長的主要動力。財政司司長陳茂波成功避免了涉及爭議性事件，從而避免在政府首要任務是根據基本法第二十三條通過國家安全立法時增加政治爭議程度。短期內難實現經濟迅速轉好，但陳茂波慎重地指導應能保證經濟軟著陸。
在科技投資未能帶來近期利好的情況下，房地產業和旅遊業仍然是香港主要的經濟增長動力。值得稱贊的是，在政府首要任務是按基本法第二十三條通過國家安全立法的這一重要時期，陳茂波成功地避免涉及爭議的事件，從而不會增加政治爭議的聲量。雖然短期內經濟難迅速轉好，但陳茂波之慎重工作風格，應該可以保證經濟軟著陸。
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承接上文，社會上有聲音指，Taylor Swift不在香港舉辦世界巡迴演唱會，反映香港沒有足夠吸引力讓國際盛事落戶。我認為上述憂慮低估了香港這個亞洲國際之都的影響力。
事實上，香港每年所舉辦的國際盛事多不勝數，這些活動大多集中於會議展覽及獎勵旅遊（MICE）領域，普羅市民或者較少留意。撇除早前宣布延期的 DiorFall2024時裝展，單是今年上半年，香港就計劃舉辦86場體育賽事、大型展覽、高峰會議等不同類型的盛事。
香港地理位置優越，加上交通方便，會展服務業相當發達，每年都會舉行數以百計的會議展覽。例如每年3月和9月舉辦的香港國際珠寶展及香港珠寶首飾展覽會，都是亞洲區罕見的大型珠寶展覽。後者更是全球最大型的珠寶商貿展覽，今年設有約40個主題攤位，預計吸引超過3000個參展商來港。
除此之外，貿易發展局舉辦的香港玩具展亦是會展業的年度盛事之一。香港的玩具出口商現時主要為海外玩具品牌提供外判生產業務，向來以供應優質玩具見稱。得益於此，香港玩具展每年都吸引上千個參展商自全球各地慕名而來，尋找商機，是亞洲最大規模的玩具展之一。
香港今年亦爭取到多個具影響力的國際級盛事，包括首度來港舉辦的國際級高爾夫球賽LIV Golf以及國際潮流盛事 ComplexCon。
LIVGolf獲沙特阿拉伯主權財富基金贊助，總獎金折合約1.95億港元，是香港史上最高獎金的大賽之一。據報道，過去一周，主辦單位、球手、他們親友以及工作人員等，已預訂超過600間酒店房間，預計對本港酒店餐飲、旅遊業帶來相當高的經濟效益。ComplexCon更是首次在美國以外的地區舉辦，集結超過200名HipHop歌手、潮流藝術家及創作者，預計可吸引超過3萬名旅客來港。
由此可見，香港對盛事主辦商仍然具有相當吸引力，香港亦有能力搞好大型盛事，市民毋須妄自菲薄。
Hong Kong Has Abundant Major Events
Following the previous article, some voices argued that Taylor Swift not holding her world tour concert in Hong Kong reflected the city's insufficient appeal to host international events. I think this concern underestimates Hong Kong's influence as an Asian global city.
In fact, Hong Kong hosts countless international events every year, mostly concentrated in meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions (MICE) sectors, which may receive less attention from the general public. Apart from the previously postponed DiorFall2024 fashion show, just in the first half of this year, Hong Kong has planned 86 sporting events, major exhibitions and conferences of various types.
With its geographical advantage and convenient transportation, Hong Kong's exhibition services industry is highly developed, hosting hundreds of conferences and exhibitions annually. For example, the Hong Kong International Jewellery Show in March and September, and the Hong Kong Jewellery and Jade Show are among Asia's largest jewellery exhibitions. The latter is also the world's largest jewellery trade fair, with around 40 thematic pavilions this year, expected to attract over 3,000 exhibitors.
In addition, Hong Kong Toy Fair organized by the Trade Development Council, is also a major annual event in the exhibition industry. Hong Kong toy exporters currently mainly provide OEM production services to overseas toy brands, known for quality toys. Thanks to this, the Toy Fair attracts thousands of exhibitors from around the world each year seeking business opportunities, being one of the largest toy exhibitions in Asia.
This year Hong Kong has also succeeded in attracting many influential international events, including the debut LIVGolf international elite golf tournament and the international trend event ComplexCon.
Hosted for the first time in a non-US location, ComplexCon is expected to attract over 30,000 visitors to the city, featuring more than 200 hip hop artists, fashion icons and creators.
This shows event organizers still view Hong Kong as highly appealing. The city is capable of hosting large-scale events well. Local residents need not underestimate themselves.
財政司司長陳茂波剛於2月28日宣讀今年度《財政預算案》，提到「預計2023/24年度綜合赤字為1016億元」（第205段），然而，若計及發債725億元，實際綜合赤字應該有1741億元之鉅。
在這樣嚴峻的財政狀況下，特區政府的投資策略顯得特別重要，高效率高回報的投資策略，可改善特區政府的財政狀況。我認為，特區政府是時候積極檢討及改善其一貫投資策略。
特區政府近年設立大量不同用途的基金，主要以種子基金的模式運作，即是不動用本金，靠投資回報所得，來支持該基金的特定用途。這個模式無可厚非，但特區政府就「香港特別行政區政府獎學基金」（下稱「政府獎學基金」）提供的資料，便顯示特區政府就這類種子基金的投資策略有很多問題。
特區政府於2008年設立10億元的「政府獎學基金」，最初是向本港的傑出學生提供「卓越表現獎學金」。期後在2011年、2012年、2013年及2018年，分別獲得四次注資，獎學金的範疇也擴展至「才藝發展獎學金」、「外展體驗獎」、「展毅表現獎」等等。至於今次的注資主角「一帶一路獎學金」，則是於2016年新增的範疇，屬於「特定地區獎學金」旗下。
「政府獎學基金」以種子基金模式運作，即是在不動用本金的原則下，以投資回報來支付各個獎學金項目。補充文件指截至2024年1月下旬，「政府獎學基金」的本金為30億7000萬元，淨盈餘則有1億1000萬元。教育局認為這款項不足以支付未來的各項獎學金金額，於是要求第五度注資，並且要求10億元。
此外，當我查閱這五間投資管理公司的資料時，竟發現當中有四間是美國公司、一間是德國公司，卻沒有一間是香港「本地薑」，這點讓我相當不滿。眾所周知，在地緣政治及美西方資金撤出香港的情況下，本地基金經理經營困難，為甚麼特區政府不聘用本地基金經理？究竟是誰及以甚麼準則決定聘用哪些基金經理？是覺得外國的月亮特別圓？還是看不起「本地薑」？
最後，教育局指「政府獎學基金」的投資回報率以維持在4厘為目標，獲注資10億元後，預計每年可賺取的投資收入約4000萬元，扣除投資管理公司管理費等支出後，便可用作「一帶一路獎學金」新增名額的所需資金。然而，近年的實際回報率平均只是2厘，期間有年份是虧損的。環顧最新的投資市況，若購買特區政府的綠色債券，已可鎖定三年保底息率4.75厘。如果投資一些在港上市、風險低而回報高的公司，回報更高，這是普通市民也懂的投資常識。那麼，為甚麼還要把那麼細金額的本金，分拆給五間投資公司管理，付上高昂的管理費，換來再注資10億元的要求？還有，那筆本金當中，有多少是存於香港金融管理局賺取利息的？回報如何？
對於上述這些問題，教育局通通未能回答。不過，為免發出立法會議員不支持「一帶一路」的錯誤信息，會議當日我有舉手支持撥款。但是作為立法會議員，我必定會繼續跟進。
旅客的消費模式在疫後出現顯著改變，青睞着重體驗的沉浸式旅遊，購物消費則退而其次，過往以消費購物為主的香港旅遊業受到一定影響。有鑑於此，特區政府正推動發展文化、藝術及體育相結合的盛事經濟，希望藉此帶旺旅遊業，振興本地市道。
但坊間有意見認為，特區政府在爭取大型盛事來港舉辦方面，面對不少困難。有聲音指，美國樂壇天后Taylor Swift的時代巡迴演唱會（The Eras Tour）沒有選擇香港而將新加坡定作東南亞唯一目的地，或反映香港在主辦團體當中缺乏吸引力，導致天后決定「捨港取星」。
然而，上述的觀點相當錯誤。事實是，特區政府根本沒有邀請Taylor Swift來港舉辦演唱會。據傳媒報道， Taylor Swift團隊之所以答應新加坡政府將星城定為東南亞唯一一站，除因為對方斥至少200萬至300萬美元巨資補貼外，主要是看中新加坡國家體育場這一個可容納5.5萬名觀眾的戶外表演場地。
香港現時未有一個戶外表演場地能夠媲美新加坡國家體育場，加上特區政府重視審慎理財，不會仿效新加坡花費大量金錢補貼。雖然特區政府素有如「M」品牌計劃及「文化藝術盛事基金」等措施支援各項文化藝術及體育盛事在香港舉行，但我認為香港過往一直由市場驅動，牽頭籌辦盛事活動的方針正確，特區政府毋須將所有工作「攬上身」。再者，考慮到庫房已連續5年「見紅」，耗費數以千萬計公帑資助歌星舉行演唱會的做法更需三思。
Taylor Swift不來舉辦演唱會，固然可惜，但這並不意味香港缺乏舉辦大型盛事的能力。相反，其實每年也有不同的國際盛事在港舉辦，下期將展開詳述。
A Concert is Not Necessary for Event-driven Economy
The consumption patterns of visitors have undergone significant changes post-pandemic, with an increasing preference for immersive experience-focused tourism over shopping. This has impacted Hong Kong's tourism industry which previously relied heavily on shopping consumption. In view of this, the HKSAR government is promoting the development of an event-driven economy integrating culture, arts and sports, hoping to boost tourism and stimulate the local market through this.
However, some opinions believe the HKSAR government faces many difficulties in attracting large-scale events to Hong Kong. Some commented that pop diva Taylor Swift's The Eras Tour not choosing Hong Kong and only making Singapore the sole Southeast Asian destination could reflect Hong Kong's lack of attractiveness among event organizers, leading to her decision to "ditch Hong Kong for Singapore".
However, the above views are quite mistaken. In fact, the HKSAR government had not invited Taylor Swift to hold a concert in Hong Kong. According to media reports, Taylor Swift's camp agreed to make Singapore the only Southeast Asian stop mainly because the local government invested at least $2-3 million in subsidies, and also saw the potential of the National Stadium which can accommodate 55,000 audience for outdoor performances.
Currently Hong Kong does not have an outdoor venue that can match the National Stadium in Singapore. Considering the HKSAR government's prudent fiscal stance, it would not follow Singapore's example of spending huge sums subsidizing events. While the government has support measures like the "M+ Programme" and "Arts and Culture Events Fund" to support cultural, arts and sports events in Hong Kong, I believe Hong Kong's past market-driven approach of facilitating events is correct, and the government need not take on all responsibilities. Moreover, it's prudent not to lavishly subsidize star concerts with tens of millions of public funding, given five consecutive annual deficits.
Taylor Swift not holding a concert here is understandably regrettable, but it does not mean Hong Kong lacks ability to host major events. In fact, different international events are held in Hong Kong every year, which will be detailed in the next article.
旅遊業、貿易及物流業、金融服務業、工商業支援和專業服務業並列香港經濟的四大支柱產業，一直是香港經濟增長的主要原動力之一。疫情前的2018年，旅遊業佔本地生產總值約4%，僱用約25 萬人，佔整體就業人口約6%。由於旅遊業入行條件相對寬鬆，能為社會創造大量就業職位，特區政府一直致力推動旅遊業的發展。
但新冠疫情對旅遊業界造成了重大打擊。旅遊發展局（旅發局）資料顯示，旅遊業在2021 年佔本地生產總值跌至0.1%，就業人數亦減至只有約兩萬。雖然香港已於去年2 月全面恢復與其他地方的正常人員往來，但訪港旅客人數尚未恢復至疫情前的水平。旅發局上月公布的最新數據顯示，2023 年全年初步訪港旅客人次約有3400 萬。與疫情前相比，旅客人次只恢復至2017 至2018 年度平均數的55%。
同時，愈來愈多港人選擇北上消費，進一步窒礙本地消費市道的復蘇。《星島日報》早前一篇文章指出，港人北上的熱潮帶旺了深圳的消費市道。文章引用深圳市統計局數據指，2023 年深圳社會消費品零售總額超過一萬億元人民幣，與去年同期相比，增長7.8%。其中，商品零售增長7%，餐飲收入增長15.2%，增幅相當驚人。
訪港旅客人數減少加上消費外流，導致香港經濟復蘇遜於預期。據悉，現時政府正積極「諗計」吸引遊客來港，以刺激消費、帶旺市道。財政司長昨日發表的《財政預算案》提出透過推動舉辦不同範疇的盛事活動和主題式年會，打造香港作為營商及旅遊首選目的地的品牌。我相當支持有關做法。
香港向來是全球公認最佳的會展以及商務旅遊城市之一，2020 年更獲Smart Travel Asia Awards 評選為亞洲「最佳會議城市」。我認為特區政府應進一步鞏固和提升香港作為國際會展樞紐的地位，以吸引商務旅客來港，帶動其他行業發展，為本地經濟注入活力。
Tourism Past, Present and Future in Hong Kong
Tourism, trade and logistics, financial services, and professional and commercial services have long been the four main pillars of Hong Kong's economy, and one of the primary drivers of economic growth. In 2018 before the pandemic, tourism accounted for approximately 4% of GDP and employed around 250,000 people, accounting for about 6% of the total workforce. As the entry requirements for the tourism industry are relatively loose, it has continuously created a large number of jobs for society. The HKSAR government has been committed to promoting the development of the tourism industry.
However, the COVID-19 epidemic has dealt a major blow to the tourism industry. Data from the Hong Kong Tourism Board (HKTB) showed that in 2021, tourism accounted for only 0.1% of GDP and employment fell to only about 20,000. Although Hong Kong fully resumed normal travel between other places last February, the number of visitors has yet to return to pre-epidemic levels. The latest data released by HKTB last month showed that the estimated annual visitor arrivals in 2023 were about 34 million. Compared to pre-epidemic, visitor arrivals only recovered to 55% of the average from 2017 to 2018.
At the same time, increasingly many Hong Kong people choose to spend northward, further hampering the recovery of the local consumption market. An earlier article in Sing Tao Daily pointed out that the boom in Hong Kong people traveling north has driven up consumption in Shenzhen. The article cited data from the Shenzhen Municipal Statistics Bureau that Shenzhen's total retail sales of consumer goods exceeded 1 trillion yuan in 2023, up 7.8% year-on-year. Among them, commodity retail sales grew 7% and catering revenue grew 15.2%, an extremely impressive increase.
The decline in visiting tourists coupled with consumption outflows has led to Hong Kong's economic recovery lagging expectations. It is understood that the government is currently actively "thinking of plans" to attract tourists to boost consumption and revitalize the market. Yesterday's Budget Speech by the Financial Secretary proposed promoting different types of events and thematic annual meetings to build Hong Kong's brand as a preferred destination for business and tourism. I fully support such measures.
Hong Kong has long been recognized as one of the best convention and business tourism cities globally, and was voted Asia's "Best Meeting City" by Smart Travel Asia Awards in 2020. I believe the HKSAR government should further consolidate and enhance Hong Kong's status as an international convention hub to attract business travelers and drive the development of other industries, injecting vitality into the local economy.
Financial Secretary Paul Mo-po Chan had few palatable options before him when he drew up the 2024-25 budget.
The government has been running a fiscal deficit almost every financial year since 2019, and the forecast deficit for 2023-24 would have widened to HK$173 billion (US$22.1 million) but for a bond issue of HK$72.5 billion. Measures to balance the budget, whether cutting back on welfare expenditure or raising taxes, are sure to generate a substantial backlash from a public accustomed to low taxation and generous handouts.
To raise revenue, the government had toyed with the idea of introducing new taxes, but backed off given the adverse market reaction. Even after Chan ruled out introducing a capital gains tax on January 17, the Hang Seng Index still experienced a steep decline that day as his clarification was seen as being not categorical enough.
Raising government fees and charges on a “user-pays” basis had also been floated. Water and sewage charges, and more, are indeed long overdue for an increase. But any such increase is bound to hit the grass roots hardest, and raise business costs at a time when the economic recovery is fragile.
Chan trod extremely carefully and he confined tax increases to limited items – a modest increase in business registration fees by HK$200, a 1 per cent increase in salary tax for an estimated 12,000 taxpayers whose net income exceeds HK$5 million, a progressive rating system for domestic premises from the fourth quarter of 2024-25, and resumed collection of the hotel accommodation tax, at a rate of 3 per cent, effective next year.
Altogether they are estimated to generate no more than HK$3.16 billion in the coming year, a pittance compared to the forecast deficit of HK$143 billion before bond issuance. Chan cannot be faulted for reckless tax hikes that could rock the boat.
Chan’s hands are tied when it comes to boosting the economy, given that most of the negative factors weighing on the economy – high interest rates, the strong US dollar, ongoing geopolitical tensions – are out of his control. Despite these constraints, Chan got one key policy right: the scrapping of all “demand management” property transaction stamp duties that had been introduced since 2010 to rein in skyrocketing home prices.
The debate over these stamp duties – Special Stamp Duty to curb speculation, Buyer’s Stamp Duty to dampen external demand, and the New Residential Stamp Duty to counter market exuberance – tells a poignant story about how the government battled rising angst about runaway home prices through fiscal intervention. The stamp duties brought the government a windfall of land revenue, and the buoyant property market led many to believe that the sun would never set on the property sector.
To address deep-rooted discontent about the concentration of wealth among homeowners and young people’s inability to own their own homes, the government doubled down on its efforts to step up land and housing supply.
As the result of the government’s determined efforts, Chan was able to announce in the budget that it had identified land for meeting the supply target of 308,000 public housing units in the next decade, and would be able to achieve completion of 19,000 private residential units in the next five years, a 15 per cent increase over the annual average of the past five years.
The unexpected economic downturn resulting from the pandemic, the rapid ratcheting up of interest rates and abundant supply coming on stream sent the property market into a nosedive. Louis Chan Wing-kit, vice-chairman of Centaline, one of Hong Kong’s largest property agencies, said last month that compared to the market peak in September 2021, second-hand home prices had plunged nearly 24 per cent in less than two-and-a-half years. Chan estimated that the value of Hong Kong’s property market had dropped below HK$10 trillion, representing an evaporation of wealth equivalent to HK$2.6 trillion.
The negative wealth effect of such a sharp fall in property values sent ripples across the economy, depressing consumption and investment, creating drags on the economy that the financial secretary had to address. With the property sector having been a key driver of Hong Kong’s growth for decades, the government had no choice but to eliminate the stamp duties. Otherwise, continuing pessimism could have led to a collapse of confidence.
Soon after the announcement, there were reports of homeowners asking for higher prices, and brisker transactions returned. With weak growth, it is unlikely that there will be a surge in demand in the near future, but the abolition of the stamp duties will ensure property prices don’t end up in a free fall.
The government is determined to broaden Hong Kong’s economic structure by making a belated move to promote “high-quality growth” through scientific innovation and technology. In recent years, the government has poured billions into building the infrastructure for technological development, making land available for tech parks and funds for tech investment.
Substantially enlarged science parks in the planned Northern Metropolis at the border with Shenzhen are intended to be flagship developments that will jump-start Hong Kong’s tech-based industries. Hong Kong started late, and it will be a while before investments generate the desired returns.
In the absence of near-term gains from its tech investments, the property sector and tourism remain Hong Kong’s chief engines of growth. It is to Chan’s credit that he managed to steer clear of controversies that would raise the political decibel levels at a time when the government’s top priority is to ensure the passing of national security legislation in accordance with Hong Kong’s constitutional obligation under Article 23 of the Basic Law. There is no promise of immediate economic turnaround, but Chan’s cautious navigation should ensure a soft landing.
Hong Kong financial secretary’s hands were tied – but he got at least one thing right
財政司司長陳茂波擬訂2024-25年財政預算時，面臨的可取之策非常少。
香港政府自2019年財政年度起，幾乎每年都錄得赤字。2023-24年財政赤字，若非發債725億元，赤字將會擴大至1,730億港元。不管是削減福利開支，抑或增加稅項，政府的任何平衡預算措施，都很可能引發低稅高福利的市民強烈不滿。
為增加收入，政府考慮引入新稅項，但鑒於市場反應不佳而收回。盡管陳茂波1月17日表明不會增設資本增值稅，恆生指數當天仍急挫，表明其說法未能令人信服。
提高各種政府收費也經考慮，但「用者自付」原則下增加水費、排污費等久遠未改的費用，必定重挫基層，且在經濟復蘇時期增加企業成本。
陳茂波在增加稅項上非常小心，他擬定2024-25年財政預算時，在增加稅項方面非常謹慎。他只對少數項目作有限增長，如商業登記費略加200港元;預計1.2萬納稅人裡年收入超過500萬港元者，薪金稅率提高1個百分點;從2024-25財年第四季開始實施房產分階梯征收模式;並從明年恢復酒店住宿稅，稅率定為3%。
這些措施估計明年僅可增加收入31.6億港元，對預期1,730億元赤字來說相當微不足道。陳茂波沒有亂增稅項干擾市場，這一點無法責難。
至於振興經濟，陳茂波之手也難為情，因為利率高企、美元強勢及地緣政治張力等負面因素，均非他能控制。盡管面臨限制，但陳茂波有一項關鍵政策判斷正確，即廢除自2010年實施以來所有“需求管理”房地產印花稅，以遏抑房價飆升。
這些建議稅引發熱議，反映政府如何通過財政干預應對房價上漲引發的民怨。但房地產市場繁榮，也使人相信牛市會延續。
為應對房東財富集中和年輕人買不起房的深層次不滿，政府加大力度增加土地和房屋供應。
由於政府的堅定行動，陳茂波在財政預算案中宣布，已確定可滿足未來十年30.8萬套公屋供應目標的土地，並且將在未來五年內完成1.9萬套私人住宅，比過去五年每年平均漲幅15%。
新冠疫情帶來的經濟下行、利率持續飆升以及房地產供應傾瀉，令房地產市場急劇下挫。中原地產亞太區副主席兼住宅部總裁陳永傑上月表示，相比2021年9月樓市高峰，全港房價在不足兩年半時間內已縮水近24%。他估算香港房地產市值跌破十萬億港元，相當於流失的財富為26,000億港元。
房產價格這樣劇烈下跌所造成的負面財富效應，給整體經濟造成衝擊，壓抑消費和投資，增加了財政司必須應對的經濟阻力。鑒於房地產多年來一直是推動香港增長的關鍵驅動力，政府別無選擇只能取消印花稅。否則，悲觀情緒持續可能會導致信心崩潰。
政策宣布後，市場隨即有賣家提高賣價的報導，交易量也回升。但在經濟增長疲弱的情況下，短期內難見需求大漲，但廢除印花稅將確保房價免於失控下跌。
政府決意通過推動延遲但重視的“高質量增長”，將香港經濟結構拓寬，以科技創新為重。近年，政府已投入數以億計的資源，建設科技發展基礎設施，提供科技園地和科技投資基金。位於深圳邊境的北部都會規劃中大幅擴建的科技園，旨在帶動香港科技產業起飛。但香港起步較遲，投入需時間帶來預期回報。
在短期內未能從科技投資獲得回報的情況下，房地產業和旅遊業依舊是香港經濟增長的主要動力。財政司司長陳茂波成功避免了涉及爭議性事件，從而避免在政府首要任務是根據基本法第二十三條通過國家安全立法時增加政治爭議程度。短期內難實現經濟迅速轉好，但陳茂波慎重地指導應能保證經濟軟著陸。
在科技投資未能帶來近期利好的情況下，房地產業和旅遊業仍然是香港主要的經濟增長動力。值得稱贊的是，在政府首要任務是按基本法第二十三條通過國家安全立法的這一重要時期，陳茂波成功地避免涉及爭議的事件，從而不會增加政治爭議的聲量。雖然短期內經濟難迅速轉好，但陳茂波之慎重工作風格，應該可以保證經濟軟著陸。
上文提到，特區政府時隔多年再次重啟《基本法》第23條本地立法的公眾諮詢，諮詢文件的內容旋即吸引社會各界的關注。其中，不少傳媒界朋友都關注諮詢文件內有關竊取國家秘密罪的建議。他們憂慮法例通過後，日常採訪工作會不小心觸犯法律。其實仔細閱讀諮詢文件，不難發現文件對國家秘密的定義頗為嚴謹，且擬議罪行的入罪門檻極高。
諮詢文件第5章有關竊取國家機密及間諜行為的修訂主要有幾點，首先是名稱上的修訂。現行的《官方機密條例》並未有採用「國家秘密」這一字眼，而特區政府於2003年嘗試進行第23條本地立法時，也只沿用《基本法》所載的「國家機密」的表述。但中央政府在2010年通過的《保守國家秘密法》中，對何為國家秘密進行了詳細的定義和分級；而《港區國安法》亦有採用「國家秘密」的表述。考慮到香港特區有義務防止任何國家秘密遭泄露，特區政府決定跟隨《保守國家秘密法》及《港區國安法》，統一採用「國家秘密」這一字眼。
現時，特區政府沿用英國的《官方機密條例》已列出6項官方機密，未經合法授權的情况下披露可能構成非法披露罪。在參考過國家法律及香港的實際情况後，諮詢文件第5.8段建議將7類在未經合法授權下披露，便相當可能會危害國家安全的敏感資料列為國家秘密，兩者的概念十分相似。
正如上文提到，社會大眾理論上沒有機會接觸到被視為國家秘密的敏感資料；加上，諮詢文件明確指出，7類敏感資料只有在滿足「在未經合法授權下披露，便相當可能會危害國家安全」這一先決條件，才會被視為國家秘密。因此，香港市民毋須擔心法例通過後容易墮入法網。
Proposed Amendments to Theft of State Secrets
As mentioned earlier, the HKSAR government has relaunched public consultation on local legislation for Article 23 of the Basic Law, drawing keen attention to the contents of the consultation document. Many friends in the media have expressed concern about the proposed offence relating to theft of state secrets. They worry normal newsgathering work could inadvertently violate the law after it is enacted. However, upon careful reading of the document, it is not difficult to see the definition of state secrets proposed is quite rigorous, and the threshold for criminal liability under the proposed offence is extremely high.
Chapter 5 of the consultation document proposes mainly name and scope of amendments regarding theft of state secrets and espionage activities. Firstly, a name change - neither the current Official Secrets Ordinance nor the 2003 attempt at local Article 23 legislation adopted the term "state secrets", instead using "official secrets" as in the Basic Law. However, China's law on safeguarding national secrets passed in 2010 classified national secrets as different grades; the Hong Kong national security law also uses "state secrets". Considering HKSAR's obligation to prevent leakage of any state secrets, the term "state secrets" will be adopted in line with national laws.
Currently, 6 categories of official secrets are listed in the Ordinance, with unauthorized disclosure possibly constituting an unlawful disclosure offence. After considering national laws and Hong Kong’s circumstances, Paragraph 5.8 recommends classifying 7 types of sensitive information, disclosure of which would likely endanger national security without authorization, as state secrets - a concept quite similar.
As mentioned, the general public theoretically has no access to information classified as state secrets. Moreover, it is explicitly stated the 7 types only constitute state secrets if disclosure would "likely endanger national security" - a high threshold. Therefore, there is no need for the public to worry about inadvertently violating the law.
The relaunch of legislation to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law to prohibit national security offenses, after a pause of more than 21 years, has sparked remarkably few controversies in the local community. In the light of the political upheaval in 2019, and evidence of dangerous activities emerging from cases currently on trial, the general public appears to have accepted the need for legislation to safeguard national security.
Yet there remain nagging doubts on whether offenses relating to "official secrets", "sedition" and "foreign interference" would curtail freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. Such concerns are understandable. To maintain Hong Kong's competitiveness as a premier global financial, trading and business hub, it is of paramount importance to maintain Hong Kong's openness to the world and its web of international connections. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's value as China's gateway to the world and key intermediary will be greatly reduced if the new national security law resulted in a diminution of Hong Kong's freedoms.
Scrutiny of the proposals in the HKSAR government's consultation document published on Jan 30 will show such concerns to be overblown. For example, take offenses relating to "official secrets". Laws prohibiting unlawful disclosure of official secrets are nothing new. Such legislation, inherited from the British, has been in force for many years.
The Official Secrets Ordinance, which is a localized version of the United Kingdom's Official Secrets Act, requires six categories of official information to be protected. These six categories are information relating to security and intelligence; defense; international relations; commission of offenses and criminal investigation; information entrusted in confidence; and information relating to territories, states or international organizations. Under this ordinance, unlawful disclosure of such information is a criminal offense punishable on indictment to a fine of HK$500,000 ($63,900) and two years' imprisonment.
In my almost half-century of public service, I am not aware of any member of the public having been prosecuted for unauthorized disclosure of official information. The reason is very simple: The six categories of information protected under the Official Secrets Ordinance are not information that an ordinary member of the public would easily have access to in the normal course of his or her life.
A common concern raised by the media is that they might fall foul of the law if they report on certain sensitive information, say information relating to technological development, which is regarded as a State secret under proposals in the consultation document. The short answer is if journalists report on something that is already in the public arena, such information is, by definition, no longer secret, and they cannot possibly be guilty of unauthorized disclosure. It is a different story if journalists obtained protected information to which they have no authorized access and they did so by unlawful means.
One of the changes proposed to the existing law on official secrets is a terminological one. Although the term jimi is used in the Basic Law, the government proposes to adopt the same terminology as in the nation's law on safeguarding national secrets, in which the term mimi is used.
The government also proposes to align the categories of official secrets with those listed in the nation's law safeguarding national secrets. The seven categories are listed in paragraph 5.8 of the consultation document. Concerns have also been raised that some of the categories of State secret proposed in the consultation document may be too broad. A frequently cited example is "secrets concerning the economic and social development of our country or the HKSAR". It is hard to think of any such "secret", but the threshold for prosecution is high. All national security offense prosecutions must be authorized by the secretary for justice. In the case of prosecution of unauthorized disclosure of State secrets, the secretary for justice must be able to prove that the secret was disclosed "without lawful authority", and that the disclosure "would likely endanger national security". These ingredients, together with the common law requirement of mens rea, that is, the criminal intention element of an offense, must be present for a prosecution to proceed.
Complaints have also frequently been raised about definitions of national security offenses being too broad or vague. The truth is that Hong Kong laws, whether existing provisions or improved versions proposed in the consultation document, are not broader or vaguer than similar provisions in many common law jurisdictions.
The National Security Act 2023 enacted by the UK Parliament last July is a good example. It makes frequent references to actions "prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom". The UK authorities have never defined or explained in detail what "the safety or interests of the United Kingdom" entail. The wording is deliberately broad, so that the law is flexible enough to deal with any eventuality which might "prejudice the safety or interest" of the country. Ultimately it will be for the courts to determine whether any alleged criminal actions do indeed "prejudice the interests or security" of the country, depending on a mixture of law and facts.
Article 23 legislation will ensure stability (Authored by Regina Ip, posted on China Daily)
中譯本：《基本法》二十三條立法將保障香港穩定
特區政府重啟《基本法》第二十三條立法工作，旨在禁止危害國家安全的行為。上次嘗試已經過去21年。本地社會對此次立法重啟反應平靜，較少爭議。鑒於2019年政治動蕩和當前案件審理內容表明有危險行為，大眾似乎已接受立法以保障國家安全的需要。
然而，當中還有一些疑慮。例如有關「官方機密」、「煽動」和「境外干預」的行為定罪,是否會限制表現自由和其他基本自由。這類疑慮是可以理解的。要保持香港作為國際主要金融、貿易和商業中心的競爭力，至關重要的是維持香港向外開放和網絡式國際聯系的條件。如果新國安法實施後港府自由受限，香港特區作為中國對外開放的窗口和橋梁角色將會大減。
但是，查閱1月30日特區政府公開的咨詢文件內容後，這些疑慮有過分誇大之嫌。例如有關「官方機密」定罪，禁止未經授權披露官方機密是舊有法例，繼承英國時期已有多年實施的規定。
《官方秘密條例》是根據英國的《官方秘密法》在香港本地化實施的。它將六類官方信息納入保護範圍，包括有關安全與情報、國防、國際關系、犯罪與刑事調查、秘密委托和國際組織等信息。根據這條例，未經授權披露這類信息會構成刑事罪行，最高可處港幣五十萬元罰款及兩年監禁。
在我近半個世紀的公職生涯中，從未聽說有普通市民因未經授權披露官方信息而被控告。原因很簡單，《官方秘密條例》保護的六類信息，普通市民在日常生活中很難接觸到。
傳媒普遍擔心，如果報道咨詢文件將視為國家秘密的某些敏感信息(如科技發展)可能觸犯法律。實際上如果信息已經公開，自然就不再屬於秘密，傳媒報道也不會構成未經授權披露。僅當傳媒以非法手段獲取未公開的保護信息，才可能觸犯法例。
擬議修改現有官方秘密立法的一個重點是用語。《基本法》使用「機密」一詞,惟政府建議采用國家保護國家秘密法規用的「秘密」，以統一用語。
政府亦建議香港官方秘密分類與國家保密法例列明的七類秘密一致。這七類秘密詳列於咨詢文件第5.8段。有關評論亦擔心文件提出的某些國家秘密分類可能過於寬泛,例如「關乎本港或國家經濟和社會發展的秘密」。難以想像會有什麼如此「秘密」，但入罪門檻高。所有國安案件都必須由律政司授權提出檢控。在未經授權披露國家秘密案件中，律政司須能證實秘密是「無授權下披露」，且「可能危害國家安全」。此外，還須符合普通法罪行原則，即必須有「犯罪意圖」。只有符合所有要素，方可提出檢控。
此外也有聲音常常抱怨，國安罪行的定義過於寬澤或模糊。事實是無論是香港現行法律條文，還是咨詢文件提出的改進版本，其定義並不比其他普通法制國家相應法定區域更為寬闊或模糊。
以英國議會於去年7月通過的《國家安全法2023》為例。法例多次提到可能「損害英國安全或利益」的行為。英國當局從未明確界定或詳細解釋「英國安全或利益」具體含義。用詞故意設計地寬闊，法律得以靈活應對任何可能「損害國安或利益」的情況。最終需要法院依據法律和事實，判斷某項指控罪行是否確實「損害國安或利益」。
《英國國家安全法2023》對「保護信息」做出了定義，即出於保護英國安全或利益的目的，任何以任何方式限制獲取訪問的信息、文件或其他物品，或者合理預期其獲取訪問會受到限制的信息，都屬於“保護信息”。對於普通民眾來說,這個定義似乎表達得過於複雜，但是從保護國家安全的角度看，這個定義必然需要設定得較為廣泛。這個定義引起了注意，因為它展示了國家安全法規對信息定義的寬泛性，這與許多國家的做法是一致的。這樣廣泛的定義有利於完整和有效地保護國家安全，但是從另一個角度看，也可能被質疑定罰範圍過於寬闊。
事實上，許多普通法國家的國家安全法律都含有很多類似規定，這些規定也可被指責為定義過於寬闊或模糊。不過，至今沒有任何一個國家因制定侵犯基本權利的「粗暴」國安法被美國或其盟國譴責或制裁。香港特區政府提出的國安立法建議，重點是在充分兼顧國際人權公約義務的同時，進一步加強香港國家安全保護能力。這樣制定的立法方案理應以開放和公正的眼光予以評價，而不應付之負面觀點。
承接上篇，何俊賢議員在經濟發展事務委員會會議上建議，將香港發展海洋經濟事宜納入委員會今年的待議事項。
在制定擬議議程的工作會議上，我向商務及經濟發展局（商經局）局長、運輸及物流局（運流局）局長詢問有關政策的負責部門。兩位局長指出，發展海洋經濟的政策工作現時由創新科技及工業局（創科局）主導，主要負責與內地科考船合作科研考察。但我認為，將有關工作全部交由創科局負責並不恰當。
有關海洋經濟的概念，一般泛指所有開發海洋資源和依賴海洋空間的生產活動，以及直接或間接開發海洋資源及空間的相關產業活動。沿海地區藉着水陸兩路貫通，交通暢達，便利航運貿易及人民往來的優勢，往往能在經濟發展上取得先機。歷史上，不少沿海國家都是靠着自身的地理優勢而發展起來。例如，大航海時期的西班牙、葡萄牙及英國都是盛極一時的海上霸主。
一直以來，海洋經濟產業都是香港經濟的重要組成部分。開埠初期，香港地瘠山多，水源缺乏，本地經濟活動以漁業為主，唯一的天然資產就是群山作屏障的優良港口，這也是吸引英國人殖民的主要原因。1940 年代，英國人留居香港，維多利亞港成為東亞貿易通道的要衝並成為與中國轉口貿易的樞紐。
時至今日，海運業對香港的經濟貢獻仍不可忽視。根據運流局去年12 月發表的《海運及港口發展策略行動綱領》，海運及港口業的經濟貢獻佔本地生產總值的4.1% 及總就業人數的2.1%。
正如上篇所述，海洋經濟所涵蓋的範圍十分廣闊，除科研考察外，亦牽涉漁業、航運及貿易等領域。既然香港有地理上的優勢，加上本身已有一個成熟的海洋經濟產業。我認為，政府如有意進一步發展海洋產業，應在鞏固自身固有優勢上，穩步開拓新的經濟增長領域。因此，發展海洋經濟的責任不應推到創科局上。我建議政府可考慮讓政府經濟師或特首政策組進行策略研究並制訂一份長遠的策略藍圖，促進香港海洋經濟的可持續發展。
特區政府就《基本法》第23 條立法展開的公眾諮詢轉眼即將完結。諮詢期內，公眾以及傳媒所關注的其中一個焦點是特區政府在諮詢文件內有關「國家秘密」的建議。
有記者擔心法例實施後，可能會誤墮法網。我早前就第23 條立法出席香港外國記者會舉辦的午餐研討會時，同場的香港記者協會主席陳朗昇就舉例，假若記者轉載在內地較為敏感的消息（例如有關醫療衛生方面的資訊），會否觸犯披露國家秘密的罪行；也有外國記者詢問，假若在報道中提前披露了即將發表的《財政預算案》資料會否觸犯有關罪行；亦有立法會議員及社會人士擔心，為避免犯法，條例通過後願做「吹哨人」的人士將減少。提問者的擔憂可以理解，但要觸犯有關竊取式披露國家秘密的罪行其實難度不小。
國家秘密的概念對香港而言，並不算是新事物。現時，《官方機密條例》（《條例》）中列載了保安及情報、防務、國際關係、犯罪及刑事調查、未經授權所得的資料以及因諜報活動所得的資料6 種官方機密，若在未經合法授權下披露有關資料，即屬違法。在《條例》於1997 年6 月獲臨時立法會通過前，政府機密一直受英國的《1911 至1989 年官方機密法令》（Official Secret Acts ） 保護， 但過去150 多年間，未曾聽聞有人因觸犯有關法例而遭到檢控。箇中原因在於，一般社會人士根本沒有渠道去接觸被定義為官方機密的資料；而傳媒轉載已獲披露的資料（例如內地政府就防疫而制定的管控政策），已不再屬於官方機密的性質，因此，觸犯《條例》所載罪行的門檻相當高。當然，假若傳媒透過例如入侵電腦或以金錢購買等不當手法獲取政府資料則屬違法。
同理，擬議法例所提及的國家秘密非普羅大眾或傳媒能輕易接觸，相信一般人觸犯有關罪行的機會較微，不需要杞人憂天。
新年伊始，敬祝各位讀者新春快樂。2024 年會期開始後，立法會的18個事務委員會的委員名單按慣例重新「洗牌」及選出新一年的正、副主席，以便督導事務委員會的工作並與有關的政策局長會晤，商討及擬定事務委員會的工作時間表及會議議程。
我很幸運地透過抽籤，成功加入經濟發展事務委員會，且獲得一眾議員同事支持，擔任本年度的委員會主席。經濟事務委員會負責監察和研究政府政策以及公眾關注的經濟基礎建設和服務，牽涉的政策範疇十分廣闊，包括：海空交通設施及服務、郵政服務、保障消費者權益、競爭政策及旅遊等。
由於香港疫後的經濟表現仍然疲弱，議員紛紛出謀獻策，就振興本地經濟提出自己的見解。有議員建議政府推動盛事經濟，透過舉辦演唱會等大型活動吸引旅客來港，協助旅遊業發展；亦有議員建議發展銀髮經濟並完善相關產業鏈。何俊賢議員則希望委員會能撥出時間，討論香港發展海洋經濟的可能性。
我和商務及經濟發展局長以及運輸及物流局長在農曆新年前召開了預備會議，討論本年度經濟事務委員會的工作時間表及會議議程。我詢問兩位局長，哪個政策局負責統籌海洋經濟的政策工作？兩位局長的回答出乎我的意料，他倆異口同聲地說：是由創新科技及工業局（創科局）負責。
我對局長的答案感到詫異，會議結束後隨即向創科局查詢有關講法是否屬實。創科局代表回覆指，特區政府在2022 年12 月發表的《香港創新科技發展藍圖》中提出，在政府、大學、科研機構、企業、研究人員等不同層面，與內地不同省市加強創科合作。眾多合作項目中，就包括與內地科考船一同進行聯合考察。因此，有關政策工作亦交予創科局牽頭。
但我認為，海洋經濟所涵蓋的範疇並不限於科研考察領域，只是由創科局負責亦不恰當。下期將展開詳述。
Who Takes the Lead in Maritime economy Policy?
As the new year begins, I wish all readers a happy Chinese New Year. After the legislative session starts in 2024, the membership list of the 18 committees of the Legislative Council will be "reshuffled" as usual and new chairpersons and vice-chairpersons elected for the coming year to oversee committee work and meet with relevant policy bureau directors to discuss and formulate the committees' work schedules and agendas.
I was fortunate to join the Economic Development Committee through a ballot draw, and gained the support of my legislative colleagues to serve as committee chair this year. The Economic Committee oversees and studies government policies and public concerns regarding economic infrastructure and services, covering a broad range of policy areas including sea-air transportation facilities and services, postal services, consumer protection, competition policy and tourism.
As Hong Kong's post-epidemic economic performance remains weak, legislators put forward their views on revitalizing the local economy. Some proposed event-driven growth through large concerts and activities to attract visitors and help tourism; others suggested developing a silver economy and improving related industrial chains. Legislator Ho Chun-yin hoped the committee could discuss Hong Kong's potential to develop a Maritime economy.
Before the Chinese New Year, I held a preparatory meeting with the Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development and the Secretary for Transport and Logistics to discuss this year's Economic Committee work schedule and agenda. I asked which policy bureau was responsible for coordinating Maritime economy policy. Surprisingly, both secretaries said it was the Innovation and Technology Bureau (ITIB).
I was puzzled by their response. Upon inquiring further with ITIB, they said the HKSAR government's 2022 "Hong Kong Innovation and Technology Blueprint" proposed strengthening cooperation in various sectors including government, universities, research institutions, enterprises and researchers. Joint survey projects with mainland research vessels were included. Hence related policy work was assigned to ITIB.
However, I believe the scope of Maritime economy extends beyond research surveys, and allocating responsibility solely to ITIB is also inappropriate. More details to follow next time.