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新聞稿，焦點
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新民黨第六屆青年委員會選舉順利舉行 周卓然當選青委會主席
新民黨第六屆青年委員會選舉順利舉行 周卓然當選青委會主席
日期︰2023 年 4 月 18 日
新民黨青年委員會（下稱「青委會」），昨天（17日）舉行第六屆選舉，邀請了中央委員羅卓堅先生監票。七位青年黨員當選為新一屆青委會委員，新民黨社區發展主任周卓然當選為青委會主席，黃雨程、張柏源、崔添偉、謝慶綿、王志成及吳澤銓，將擔任青委會副主席。
新一屆青委會主席周卓然表示，未來會吸引更多年輕人加入新民黨，也計劃聯繫本港與內地青年組織與專業團體，組織交流活動，讓香港青年更認識國家，增加年輕人發揮的機會。
第六屆新民黨青委會全體當選名單如下：
| 姓名 | 職業 | | 周卓然 | 新民黨社區發展主任
銀行高級經理 | | 黃雨程 | 新民黨社區發展主任 | | 張柏源 | 新民黨社區發展主任
公司東主 | | 崔添偉 | 新民黨社區發展主任
證券公司高級技術專員 | | 謝慶綿 | 律師行合夥人
高級律師 | | 王志成 | 銀行主管 | | 吳澤銓 | 醫學美容公司醫學總監 |
當選新一屆青委會主席的周卓然感謝各位投票的中委與青年黨友支持，他表示：「新民黨孕育了我們這一群青年人，我們將會貢獻自己的力量，使青委會發展得更好、更遠。我很榮幸當選成為新一屆主席，未來將全力以赴，在任內多做一些聯繫年青人的工作，吸納更多年輕人，讓他們加入新民黨的大家庭。」
周卓然又稱：「完成上一屆青委會任期，到這次當選成為主席，我與上一屆青委會另外四位委員也順利連任，我們的選舉政綱提出七大目標，包括吸引更多青年人加入成為新民黨青年黨員，也會多些聯繫大學、中學，與不同的專業組織，讓更多年輕人認識及加入新民黨。另外我們也會聯繫黨內現有黨員，定期舉行聯誼活動等。未來也計劃訪問不同地方的青年組織與政黨等，組織青年到大灣區進行交流與旅行，讓青年多認識國家，了解國家各城市發展。」
新民黨青委會於2011年8月成立，每兩年一屆，經由選舉產生。青委會成立目的是為年輕人提供議政平台，培養更多有志投身政治的年輕人及推動青年工作。
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中美學界的斷交危機 / The Crisis of Severing Ties between Chinese and American Academia
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自中美兩國於1979年建立外交關係，兩國之間的學術交流合作愈趨頻繁。過往10年，前往美國就學的中國留學生數目由2011/12學年約20萬急升至2019/20學年約37萬；而前往中國留學的美國學生數目高峰時亦有約1.5萬。
但隨着在特朗普2016年上台，美國的對華立場出現重大改變，中美關係轉趨緊張。特朗普在任期間，以保護美國學界的研究成果為由，推出一系列政策窒礙中美學界的正常交流，包括限制「與軍方有聯繫」的研究生及訪問學者入境；要求辦學機構公開與孔子學院或孔子課堂的任何合約、合作關係或資金往來。單是2020年的幾個月內，美方就撤銷了約1000個中國公民的簽證。
特朗普下台後，拜登政府延續強硬的對華政策，繼續維持對中國留學生及訪問學者的入境限制。《華盛頓郵報》上月一篇報道指出，近年有不少中國留學生在入境美國時遇到非常嚴厲的審查。有不少學生指出，美方管制人員輕則會盤問他們、搜查他們的隨身物品，重則會拘留他們，甚至把他們即時驅逐出境。美國學術界受政治壓力驅使，主動減少與中國學界的聯繫。多所美國大學主動終止在內地的課程計劃，或將計劃改在台灣舉辦，所有受當地政府資助的孔子學院亦縮減了中國語文課程的規模。
美方各種不友善舉措大大打擊中國留學生前往深造的意欲。美國國務院轄下教育及文化事務局（Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs）的數據顯示，中國留學生的數目已由2019/20學年高峰的372,532跌至2022/23學年的289,526；而2021/22學年前往中國的美國留學生更只剩下211人！
長遠而言，中美學術交流的斷絕會進一步窒礙兩國的正常交流，對雙方都是弊多於利。下期將展開詳述。
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in 1979, academic exchanges and cooperation between the two countries have become increasingly frequent. In the past decade, the number of Chinese students studying in the United States increased sharply from about 200,000 in the 2011/12 academic year to about 370,000 in the 2019/20 academic year; while the peak number of American students studying in China was also around 15,000.
However, with the significant change in the US's policy toward China since Trump took office in 2016, relations between China and the US have become more strained. During Trump's term, under the pretext of protecting US academic achievements, a series of policies were introduced to hamper normal exchanges between Chinese and American academia, including restrictions on graduate students and visiting scholars related to the military from entering the country; requiring educational institutions to publicly disclose any contracts, cooperative relationships or financial dealings with Confucius Institutes or Confucius Classrooms. Just in 2020, the US revoked visas of about 1,000 Chinese citizens.
After Trump left office, the Biden administration continued the hardline policy toward China and maintained restrictions on Chinese international students and visiting scholars entering the country. A Washington Post report last month pointed out that in recent years, many Chinese students have encountered very strict inspections when entering the US. Many students said US immigration officials would interrogate them, search their personal belongings, detain them, or even deport them immediately. Under political pressure, the US academic circle proactively reduced contacts with Chinese academia. Many US universities unilaterally terminated courses in China or moved programs to Taiwan. All Confucius Institutes subsidized by the local government also downsized Chinese language courses.
The unfriendly moves by the US greatly dampened Chinese students' willingness to pursue advanced studies abroad. Data from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs under the US State Department shows that the number of Chinese students has dropped from a peak of 372,532 in the 2019/20 academic year to 289,526 in the 2022/23 academic year; while in the 2021/22 academic year, there were only 211 American students studying in China!
In the long run, the severing of academic exchanges between China and the US will further hinder normal communication between the two countries, which is detrimental to both sides. More details will be discussed in the next issue.
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Hong Kong must turn Greater Bay Area integration challenges into opportunities / 香港必須將粵港澳大灣區一體化的挑戰轉化為機遇
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The tireless efforts the government is making to reboot Hong Kong’s economy will be futile if the city’s leaders fail to grasp the challenge of integration within the Greater Bay Area and come up with strategies to turn the challenges into opportunities.
A framework agreement for deepening cooperation between Guangdong province, Hong Kong and Macau was signed on July 1, 2017. Almost seven years on, development in the bay area plan is bringing about profound changes to Hongkongers’ lifestyle and the economy.
Soon after the reopening of mainland China early last year, Hongkongers discovered that cities in the Greater Bay Area have made giant strides in urban planning and the service economy. As a result, they have been flocking to the bay area to spend their consumption dollars.
Between March 28 and April 8, which includes the extended Easter weekend and Ching Ming Festival, a staggering 3.6 million Hong Kong residents went north via land control points, compared to about 860,000 mainland residents who visited Hong Kong.
Other cities in the Greater Bay Area have become Hongkongers’ go-to playground in the same way that mainland residents poured into Hong Kong after the Individual Visit Scheme was launched 21 years ago.
The economic impact of this reversed travel pattern being felt across the Greater Bay Area. Last year, Shenzhen authorities announced that “social consumption and retail spending” rose by 7.8 per cent while its gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6 per cent, exceeding Hong Kong’s and other first-tier cities on the mainland.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
The northbound trend is set to increase as more convenient transport links with the mainland develop as part of the Northern Metropolis project, an ambitious plan to develop Hong Kong’s northern districts into a technology hub that will accommodate 2.5 million people. As that happens, more Hongkongers may well choose to live on the mainland, and commute daily to work in Hong Kong, or simply work in other mainland cities.
A fundamental problem with Greater Bay Area development is that it is far from being a single market, even though integration is one of the objectives of the 2017 framework agreement.
Under the “one country, two systems” arrangement, there is no free movement of people, goods, services and data between the mainland and Hong Kong. As separate custom and immigration areas, both sides have instituted controls that make market integration a slow and difficult process.
In the short term, Hong Kong needs to overcome the asymmetry of movement and spending by urging the central authorities to allow residents of more remote mainland cities to visit, as well as approve multiple-visit permits and increase the duty-free allowance for mainland residents returning from Hong Kong.
In the long term, the government must develop a strategy for mainland cities and Hong Kong to complement each other. Officials must work out how to make use of the abundant resources mainland cities have to offer to remedy our shortages.
As more Hongkongers choose to live in nearby mainland cities, why can’t we build our residential care homes in those cities? Cross-border transport is now far more convenient. After all, our residential care homes depend heavily on the import of workers from Guangdong and Guangxi.
Instead of spending billions to reclaim a small area of land, why don’t we buy good-quality housing that’s readily available in nearby mainland cities, to provide more options for those who live in the northern districts? Now is a good time to buy on the cheap.
We should also take more vigorous measures to phase out hindrances for mainland professionals to work in Hong Kong, bring in more talent and import more mainland labour.
Only by leveraging the mainland’s resources, and combining our strengths with theirs, can we turn the process of Greater Bay Area integration into a win-win formula. The government ought to remould Hong Kong into a metropolis like London or New York, with some of its population dispersing into nearby suburbs.
The Hong Kong diaspora on the mainland will make Hong Kong more influential while relieving the pressure of the cost of living in this city. The government needs to think outside the box and move fast.
如果特區政府未能抓住粵港澳大灣區一體化的機遇制定相關策略，即使政府不斷為重振香港經濟而作出努力，將會是徒勞的。
2017年7月1日，廣東省、香港和澳門簽署了深化合作框架協議。快將七年過去，粵港澳大灣區規劃帶來深遠影響，不僅改變了香港人的生活方式，也改變了經濟環境。
去年年初內地開關不久，香港人就發現粵港澳大灣區內城市，無論在城市規劃和服務業方面已迅速進展。結果，香港人踴往大灣區消費了。
今年3月28日至4月8日期間，包括復活節及清明節長假期周末，有多達360萬香港居民通過陸路口岸北上，來香港的內地居民約有86萬人。
這充分反映香港人越來越喜歡離港到鄰近城市消費購物，享受當地便利的生活設施。香港或已無法滿足消費需求，內地城市的競爭力正不斷增強，吸引香港市民。
特區政府和企業如果不想失去這批消費客源，就必須積極參與和引導粵港澳一體化，做好產業對接，協同發展香港與內地市場。
其他粵港澳大灣區城市已經成為香港人新的休閑場所，就像21年前開放個人遊後內地居民湧進香港一樣。
這種反向旅遊模式帶來的經濟影響正蔓延整個大灣區。去年，深圳官方表示“社會消費和零售開支”增長7.8%，GDP增長6%，超過了香港及其他一線內地城市。
相比之下，來港旅遊人數未能恢復疫情前水平，消費力也較弱，加上香港消費流向內地「漏走」，導致我們的經濟復蘇僅從2022年低位爬升到去年的3.2%。如果香港不想失去這批消費客，必須主動參與大灣區一體化，與內地城市合作開拓市場，推動相關產業發展。否則經濟難實現真正復蘇。
餐館與商店的關閉迫使政府發起「香港夜繽紛」活動來刺激本地消費。但這一下滑趨勢很可能會持續，除非香港餐飲與零售服務能達到粵港澳大灣區的質量標准。
如果將所有責任歸咎於我們的服務供應商，值得說的是宏觀經濟力量在這個下滑趨勢中也起到很大作用。香港幣與美元掛鉤，使香港物價對日本、韓國和內地旅客來說極為昂貴。
我們需要借此機會，檢討自身的服務水平與競爭力，並主動學習粵港澳區域內其他城市在人才培訓、科技應用等領域的優良經驗，跟上時代步伐。只有這樣，香港的旅遊業和經濟才有望持續健康發展。
鑒於港幣實力強勁，香港理應貶值。但薪資水平受勞工短缺影響較通貨膨脹更甚的「粘滯性」，使香港很難實現通縮。盡管商業房租有所下降，但香港高薪和房地產成本使其在價格上競爭力近乎無限。
隨著北部都會區計劃落實，香港北區極其宜居的交通網絡將日益完善，這一規劃將該地區打造成可容納250萬人的科技中心。這使更多香港人可能選擇定居內地，每日通勤至港工作，或直接在內地其他城市工作。北上的趨勢將進一步增強。
粵港澳大灣區發展的一個核心問題是，一體化是2017框架協議的目標之一，但區域內市場分化仍很明顯，遠未真正形成單一市場。
根據「一國兩制」，內地與香港在人員、貨物、服務和數據並沒有自由流動。作為單獨的海關和出入境管理區，雙方設立了管理，使市場一體化變成緩慢艱難的過程。
短期來看，香港需要解決來往和消費不對等問題。這可以建議中央允許更多內地較遙遠城市的居民來港，批出更多「一簽多行」通行證，提高港人赴內消費免稅額度。
長遠來看，政府必須制定內地城市與香港互補發展的戰略，官員應研究如何充分利用內地城市豐富資源彌補香港短板。只有內地與香港在人員、貨物與資金流通等各個層面進行全面聯通，粵港澳大灣區市場一體化才能真正實現，使香港經濟獲得更大活力。
隨著香港人選擇定居鄰近內地城市人數增多，我們為什麼不可以在那些城市建設養老院？跨境交通比以往方便得多，而養老院目前已高度依賴從廣東和廣西輸入護理員。
相比花費數千億進行小範圍的填海造地，不如利用鄰近內地城市豐富的高質量房產資源，提供更多選擇給居住在北區的人，現在正是內地房價低廉的好機會。如此一來不僅可以最大限度優化資源配置，還可以緊密結合大灣區內人才與服務資源。離港的年長香港人也可以享受更優質的安老環境，政府值得重視這個可行性高的優化方案。
我們也應采取更積極的措施，逐步消除內地專業人士來港工作的障礙，吸引更多人才，增加從內地輸入勞工。
唯有利用內地資源，結合我們各自的優勢，才能將粵港澳大灣區一體化進程變成雙贏的局面。政府應該把香港打造成類似倫敦或紐約這樣的都會，部分人口分布在周邊郊區。內地的香港人口會使香港的影響力更大，同時緩解生活成本在本地的壓力，政府需要脫離舊式思維，迅速行動。
如果及早把握大灣區機遇，香港定能在新的發展格局中繼續發揮重要作用。
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美國對《維護國家安全條例》的反應 / Reactions from the US to the National Security Law for Hong Kong
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自《維護國家安全條例》於3月19日獲立法會全票通過後，社會上不少人士都關注美國政府會否採取大規模制裁措施，制裁有關官員及議員。
就目前情况而言，美國當局的反應遠較想像中克制。除國務卿布林肯於3月22日發表聲明，對香港的高度自治、民主體制和自由權利表示關注外，華府僅宣布對數名港府官員實施簽證限制，措施力度遠輕於美國2020年就《香港國安法》實施後的制裁。
全國人大常委會2020年6月30日通過《香港國安法》後，美國迅速於7月14日通過《香港自治法》授權美國聯邦政府廣泛制裁實施《香港國安法》的中華人民共和國與香港特別行政區政府官員。時任總統特朗普即時簽署行政命令，引述包括《香港人權與民主法》及《香港自治法》在內的多項法例，宣布制裁多名中央及港府官員。
我認為，華府是次應對如此克制的主要原因是不希望再次損害暫趨穩定的中美關係。去年11月，國家主席習近平與拜登在三藩市會面時達成多項共識，包括兩軍高層恢復恆常溝通及合作加強打擊毒品販運。加上美國近日將有多名內閣級官員訪華，相信華府當局並不樂見兩國關係在此刻因香港問題再生枝節。《維護國家安全條例》是經香港本地自行立法，符合普通法程序，加上內容參考了不少西方國家的國安法例，有理有節，並不存在所謂對公民社會、媒體及異見聲音的壓抑。
最重要的是，與2019年黑暴動亂時相比，香港在美國媒體及政界的關注度已下降。由於黑暴打破了外界對香港社會和平有序的印象，因此受到國際媒體的廣泛關注及報道。受此影響，當時有不少美國國會議員都爭相走訪香港，與暴徒合照，表示支持香港的「民主運動」。但現在西方媒體對香港的報道篇幅已不及從前，《維護國家安全條例》的通過亦未在美國國內引起太大迴響。
除此以外，美國國會現時內部一片混亂，我相信國會議員此刻尚未能分神對香港採取制裁行動。
Since the passage of the National Security Law for Hong Kong by the Legislative Council with unanimous consent on March 19, many in society have been concerned about whether the US government will impose large-scale sanctions or penalties against relevant officials and legislators.
So far, the US response has been much more restrained than imagined. In addition to Secretary of State Blinken's statement on March 22 expressing concerns about Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, democratic system and freedoms, Washington only announced visa restrictions on a few Hong Kong government officials, with measures far lighter than US sanctions after implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law in 2020.
After the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress passed the Hong Kong National Security Law on June 30, 2020, the US swiftly passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act on July 14, authorizing wide-ranging sanctions by the US federal government against officials of the People's Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government who implemented the Hong Kong National Security Law. Then-President Trump immediately signed an executive order citing multiple laws including the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act to announce sanctions against several central and Hong Kong government officials.
I believe the key reason for Washington's restraint this time is not wanting to further damage Sino-US relations which have regained some stability. In November last year, President Xi Jinping and Biden reached multiple consensuses in San Francisco, including resumption of regular communication and cooperation between military leaders as well as strengthening joint efforts against drug trafficking. Coupled with upcoming visits to China by several senior US Cabinet officials, it's believed Washington does not welcome further complications in bilateral relations over the Hong Kong issue at this time. The National Security Law for Hong Kong was legislated locally through Hong Kong's own processes according to common law procedures, drawing on many Western countries' national security laws, with sound logic and reason and devoid of so-called suppression of civil society, media and dissenting voices.
Most importantly, Hong Kong now attracts less attention from the US media and political circles compared to the black riots in 2019. The black riots shattered the international impression of Hong Kong as a society of peace and order, receiving widespread international media coverage and reports. Influenced by this, many US Congress members at the time competed to visit Hong Kong and pose for photos with rioters expressing support for Hong Kong's "democratic movement." But now Western media coverage of Hong Kong is less than before, and the passage of the National Security Law for Hong Kong did not stir up major reverberations domestically in the US.
Additionally, the US Congress is currently in disarray, and I believe Congress members do not have the bandwidth at this time to take sanctions action against Hong Kong.
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自中美兩國於1979年建立外交關係，兩國之間的學術交流合作愈趨頻繁。過往10年，前往美國就學的中國留學生數目由2011/12學年約20萬急升至2019/20學年約37萬；而前往中國留學的美國學生數目高峰時亦有約1.5萬。
但隨着在特朗普2016年上台，美國的對華立場出現重大改變，中美關係轉趨緊張。特朗普在任期間，以保護美國學界的研究成果為由，推出一系列政策窒礙中美學界的正常交流，包括限制「與軍方有聯繫」的研究生及訪問學者入境；要求辦學機構公開與孔子學院或孔子課堂的任何合約、合作關係或資金往來。單是2020年的幾個月內，美方就撤銷了約1000個中國公民的簽證。
特朗普下台後，拜登政府延續強硬的對華政策，繼續維持對中國留學生及訪問學者的入境限制。《華盛頓郵報》上月一篇報道指出，近年有不少中國留學生在入境美國時遇到非常嚴厲的審查。有不少學生指出，美方管制人員輕則會盤問他們、搜查他們的隨身物品，重則會拘留他們，甚至把他們即時驅逐出境。美國學術界受政治壓力驅使，主動減少與中國學界的聯繫。多所美國大學主動終止在內地的課程計劃，或將計劃改在台灣舉辦，所有受當地政府資助的孔子學院亦縮減了中國語文課程的規模。
美方各種不友善舉措大大打擊中國留學生前往深造的意欲。美國國務院轄下教育及文化事務局（Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs）的數據顯示，中國留學生的數目已由2019/20學年高峰的372,532跌至2022/23學年的289,526；而2021/22學年前往中國的美國留學生更只剩下211人！
長遠而言，中美學術交流的斷絕會進一步窒礙兩國的正常交流，對雙方都是弊多於利。下期將展開詳述。
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States in 1979, academic exchanges and cooperation between the two countries have become increasingly frequent. In the past decade, the number of Chinese students studying in the United States increased sharply from about 200,000 in the 2011/12 academic year to about 370,000 in the 2019/20 academic year; while the peak number of American students studying in China was also around 15,000.
However, with the significant change in the US's policy toward China since Trump took office in 2016, relations between China and the US have become more strained. During Trump's term, under the pretext of protecting US academic achievements, a series of policies were introduced to hamper normal exchanges between Chinese and American academia, including restrictions on graduate students and visiting scholars related to the military from entering the country; requiring educational institutions to publicly disclose any contracts, cooperative relationships or financial dealings with Confucius Institutes or Confucius Classrooms. Just in 2020, the US revoked visas of about 1,000 Chinese citizens.
After Trump left office, the Biden administration continued the hardline policy toward China and maintained restrictions on Chinese international students and visiting scholars entering the country. A Washington Post report last month pointed out that in recent years, many Chinese students have encountered very strict inspections when entering the US. Many students said US immigration officials would interrogate them, search their personal belongings, detain them, or even deport them immediately. Under political pressure, the US academic circle proactively reduced contacts with Chinese academia. Many US universities unilaterally terminated courses in China or moved programs to Taiwan. All Confucius Institutes subsidized by the local government also downsized Chinese language courses.
The unfriendly moves by the US greatly dampened Chinese students' willingness to pursue advanced studies abroad. Data from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs under the US State Department shows that the number of Chinese students has dropped from a peak of 372,532 in the 2019/20 academic year to 289,526 in the 2022/23 academic year; while in the 2021/22 academic year, there were only 211 American students studying in China!
In the long run, the severing of academic exchanges between China and the US will further hinder normal communication between the two countries, which is detrimental to both sides. More details will be discussed in the next issue.
The tireless efforts the government is making to reboot Hong Kong’s economy will be futile if the city’s leaders fail to grasp the challenge of integration within the Greater Bay Area and come up with strategies to turn the challenges into opportunities.
A framework agreement for deepening cooperation between Guangdong province, Hong Kong and Macau was signed on July 1, 2017. Almost seven years on, development in the bay area plan is bringing about profound changes to Hongkongers’ lifestyle and the economy.
Soon after the reopening of mainland China early last year, Hongkongers discovered that cities in the Greater Bay Area have made giant strides in urban planning and the service economy. As a result, they have been flocking to the bay area to spend their consumption dollars.
Between March 28 and April 8, which includes the extended Easter weekend and Ching Ming Festival, a staggering 3.6 million Hong Kong residents went north via land control points, compared to about 860,000 mainland residents who visited Hong Kong.
Other cities in the Greater Bay Area have become Hongkongers’ go-to playground in the same way that mainland residents poured into Hong Kong after the Individual Visit Scheme was launched 21 years ago.
The economic impact of this reversed travel pattern being felt across the Greater Bay Area. Last year, Shenzhen authorities announced that “social consumption and retail spending” rose by 7.8 per cent while its gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6 per cent, exceeding Hong Kong’s and other first-tier cities on the mainland.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
In comparison, tourist arrivals from the mainland that have failed to reach pre-pandemic levels, plus weaker spending, as well as the “leakage” of our consumption dollars to the mainland, means our economic recovery crawled to an anaemic 3.2 per cent last year, from a low base in 2022.
The northbound trend is set to increase as more convenient transport links with the mainland develop as part of the Northern Metropolis project, an ambitious plan to develop Hong Kong’s northern districts into a technology hub that will accommodate 2.5 million people. As that happens, more Hongkongers may well choose to live on the mainland, and commute daily to work in Hong Kong, or simply work in other mainland cities.
A fundamental problem with Greater Bay Area development is that it is far from being a single market, even though integration is one of the objectives of the 2017 framework agreement.
Under the “one country, two systems” arrangement, there is no free movement of people, goods, services and data between the mainland and Hong Kong. As separate custom and immigration areas, both sides have instituted controls that make market integration a slow and difficult process.
In the short term, Hong Kong needs to overcome the asymmetry of movement and spending by urging the central authorities to allow residents of more remote mainland cities to visit, as well as approve multiple-visit permits and increase the duty-free allowance for mainland residents returning from Hong Kong.
In the long term, the government must develop a strategy for mainland cities and Hong Kong to complement each other. Officials must work out how to make use of the abundant resources mainland cities have to offer to remedy our shortages.
As more Hongkongers choose to live in nearby mainland cities, why can’t we build our residential care homes in those cities? Cross-border transport is now far more convenient. After all, our residential care homes depend heavily on the import of workers from Guangdong and Guangxi.
Instead of spending billions to reclaim a small area of land, why don’t we buy good-quality housing that’s readily available in nearby mainland cities, to provide more options for those who live in the northern districts? Now is a good time to buy on the cheap.
We should also take more vigorous measures to phase out hindrances for mainland professionals to work in Hong Kong, bring in more talent and import more mainland labour.
Only by leveraging the mainland’s resources, and combining our strengths with theirs, can we turn the process of Greater Bay Area integration into a win-win formula. The government ought to remould Hong Kong into a metropolis like London or New York, with some of its population dispersing into nearby suburbs.
The Hong Kong diaspora on the mainland will make Hong Kong more influential while relieving the pressure of the cost of living in this city. The government needs to think outside the box and move fast.
如果特區政府未能抓住粵港澳大灣區一體化的機遇制定相關策略，即使政府不斷為重振香港經濟而作出努力，將會是徒勞的。
2017年7月1日，廣東省、香港和澳門簽署了深化合作框架協議。快將七年過去，粵港澳大灣區規劃帶來深遠影響，不僅改變了香港人的生活方式，也改變了經濟環境。
去年年初內地開關不久，香港人就發現粵港澳大灣區內城市，無論在城市規劃和服務業方面已迅速進展。結果，香港人踴往大灣區消費了。
今年3月28日至4月8日期間，包括復活節及清明節長假期周末，有多達360萬香港居民通過陸路口岸北上，來香港的內地居民約有86萬人。
這充分反映香港人越來越喜歡離港到鄰近城市消費購物，享受當地便利的生活設施。香港或已無法滿足消費需求，內地城市的競爭力正不斷增強，吸引香港市民。
特區政府和企業如果不想失去這批消費客源，就必須積極參與和引導粵港澳一體化，做好產業對接，協同發展香港與內地市場。
其他粵港澳大灣區城市已經成為香港人新的休閑場所，就像21年前開放個人遊後內地居民湧進香港一樣。
這種反向旅遊模式帶來的經濟影響正蔓延整個大灣區。去年，深圳官方表示“社會消費和零售開支”增長7.8%，GDP增長6%，超過了香港及其他一線內地城市。
相比之下，來港旅遊人數未能恢復疫情前水平，消費力也較弱，加上香港消費流向內地「漏走」，導致我們的經濟復蘇僅從2022年低位爬升到去年的3.2%。如果香港不想失去這批消費客，必須主動參與大灣區一體化，與內地城市合作開拓市場，推動相關產業發展。否則經濟難實現真正復蘇。
餐館與商店的關閉迫使政府發起「香港夜繽紛」活動來刺激本地消費。但這一下滑趨勢很可能會持續，除非香港餐飲與零售服務能達到粵港澳大灣區的質量標准。
如果將所有責任歸咎於我們的服務供應商，值得說的是宏觀經濟力量在這個下滑趨勢中也起到很大作用。香港幣與美元掛鉤，使香港物價對日本、韓國和內地旅客來說極為昂貴。
我們需要借此機會，檢討自身的服務水平與競爭力，並主動學習粵港澳區域內其他城市在人才培訓、科技應用等領域的優良經驗，跟上時代步伐。只有這樣，香港的旅遊業和經濟才有望持續健康發展。
鑒於港幣實力強勁，香港理應貶值。但薪資水平受勞工短缺影響較通貨膨脹更甚的「粘滯性」，使香港很難實現通縮。盡管商業房租有所下降，但香港高薪和房地產成本使其在價格上競爭力近乎無限。
隨著北部都會區計劃落實，香港北區極其宜居的交通網絡將日益完善，這一規劃將該地區打造成可容納250萬人的科技中心。這使更多香港人可能選擇定居內地，每日通勤至港工作，或直接在內地其他城市工作。北上的趨勢將進一步增強。
粵港澳大灣區發展的一個核心問題是，一體化是2017框架協議的目標之一，但區域內市場分化仍很明顯，遠未真正形成單一市場。
根據「一國兩制」，內地與香港在人員、貨物、服務和數據並沒有自由流動。作為單獨的海關和出入境管理區，雙方設立了管理，使市場一體化變成緩慢艱難的過程。
短期來看，香港需要解決來往和消費不對等問題。這可以建議中央允許更多內地較遙遠城市的居民來港，批出更多「一簽多行」通行證，提高港人赴內消費免稅額度。
長遠來看，政府必須制定內地城市與香港互補發展的戰略，官員應研究如何充分利用內地城市豐富資源彌補香港短板。只有內地與香港在人員、貨物與資金流通等各個層面進行全面聯通，粵港澳大灣區市場一體化才能真正實現，使香港經濟獲得更大活力。
隨著香港人選擇定居鄰近內地城市人數增多，我們為什麼不可以在那些城市建設養老院？跨境交通比以往方便得多，而養老院目前已高度依賴從廣東和廣西輸入護理員。
相比花費數千億進行小範圍的填海造地，不如利用鄰近內地城市豐富的高質量房產資源，提供更多選擇給居住在北區的人，現在正是內地房價低廉的好機會。如此一來不僅可以最大限度優化資源配置，還可以緊密結合大灣區內人才與服務資源。離港的年長香港人也可以享受更優質的安老環境，政府值得重視這個可行性高的優化方案。
我們也應采取更積極的措施，逐步消除內地專業人士來港工作的障礙，吸引更多人才，增加從內地輸入勞工。
唯有利用內地資源，結合我們各自的優勢，才能將粵港澳大灣區一體化進程變成雙贏的局面。政府應該把香港打造成類似倫敦或紐約這樣的都會，部分人口分布在周邊郊區。內地的香港人口會使香港的影響力更大，同時緩解生活成本在本地的壓力，政府需要脫離舊式思維，迅速行動。
如果及早把握大灣區機遇，香港定能在新的發展格局中繼續發揮重要作用。
自《維護國家安全條例》於3月19日獲立法會全票通過後，社會上不少人士都關注美國政府會否採取大規模制裁措施，制裁有關官員及議員。
就目前情况而言，美國當局的反應遠較想像中克制。除國務卿布林肯於3月22日發表聲明，對香港的高度自治、民主體制和自由權利表示關注外，華府僅宣布對數名港府官員實施簽證限制，措施力度遠輕於美國2020年就《香港國安法》實施後的制裁。
全國人大常委會2020年6月30日通過《香港國安法》後，美國迅速於7月14日通過《香港自治法》授權美國聯邦政府廣泛制裁實施《香港國安法》的中華人民共和國與香港特別行政區政府官員。時任總統特朗普即時簽署行政命令，引述包括《香港人權與民主法》及《香港自治法》在內的多項法例，宣布制裁多名中央及港府官員。
我認為，華府是次應對如此克制的主要原因是不希望再次損害暫趨穩定的中美關係。去年11月，國家主席習近平與拜登在三藩市會面時達成多項共識，包括兩軍高層恢復恆常溝通及合作加強打擊毒品販運。加上美國近日將有多名內閣級官員訪華，相信華府當局並不樂見兩國關係在此刻因香港問題再生枝節。《維護國家安全條例》是經香港本地自行立法，符合普通法程序，加上內容參考了不少西方國家的國安法例，有理有節，並不存在所謂對公民社會、媒體及異見聲音的壓抑。
最重要的是，與2019年黑暴動亂時相比，香港在美國媒體及政界的關注度已下降。由於黑暴打破了外界對香港社會和平有序的印象，因此受到國際媒體的廣泛關注及報道。受此影響，當時有不少美國國會議員都爭相走訪香港，與暴徒合照，表示支持香港的「民主運動」。但現在西方媒體對香港的報道篇幅已不及從前，《維護國家安全條例》的通過亦未在美國國內引起太大迴響。
除此以外，美國國會現時內部一片混亂，我相信國會議員此刻尚未能分神對香港採取制裁行動。
Since the passage of the National Security Law for Hong Kong by the Legislative Council with unanimous consent on March 19, many in society have been concerned about whether the US government will impose large-scale sanctions or penalties against relevant officials and legislators.
So far, the US response has been much more restrained than imagined. In addition to Secretary of State Blinken's statement on March 22 expressing concerns about Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, democratic system and freedoms, Washington only announced visa restrictions on a few Hong Kong government officials, with measures far lighter than US sanctions after implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law in 2020.
After the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress passed the Hong Kong National Security Law on June 30, 2020, the US swiftly passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act on July 14, authorizing wide-ranging sanctions by the US federal government against officials of the People's Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government who implemented the Hong Kong National Security Law. Then-President Trump immediately signed an executive order citing multiple laws including the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act to announce sanctions against several central and Hong Kong government officials.
I believe the key reason for Washington's restraint this time is not wanting to further damage Sino-US relations which have regained some stability. In November last year, President Xi Jinping and Biden reached multiple consensuses in San Francisco, including resumption of regular communication and cooperation between military leaders as well as strengthening joint efforts against drug trafficking. Coupled with upcoming visits to China by several senior US Cabinet officials, it's believed Washington does not welcome further complications in bilateral relations over the Hong Kong issue at this time. The National Security Law for Hong Kong was legislated locally through Hong Kong's own processes according to common law procedures, drawing on many Western countries' national security laws, with sound logic and reason and devoid of so-called suppression of civil society, media and dissenting voices.
Most importantly, Hong Kong now attracts less attention from the US media and political circles compared to the black riots in 2019. The black riots shattered the international impression of Hong Kong as a society of peace and order, receiving widespread international media coverage and reports. Influenced by this, many US Congress members at the time competed to visit Hong Kong and pose for photos with rioters expressing support for Hong Kong's "democratic movement." But now Western media coverage of Hong Kong is less than before, and the passage of the National Security Law for Hong Kong did not stir up major reverberations domestically in the US.
Additionally, the US Congress is currently in disarray, and I believe Congress members do not have the bandwidth at this time to take sanctions action against Hong Kong.