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Article 23: after the victory lap, what’s next for Hong Kong? / 《基本法》第二十三條:成功立法之後,香港將何去何從?
文章
2024 年 3 月 25 日
Article 23 of the Basic Law, a law made by China’s National People’s Congress which sets out the constitutional arrangements for Hong Kong, requires the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to enact laws on its own to prohibit seven offences which threaten national security.
Despite the best intentions of the officials in charge, the first campaign to implement Article 23 ended in mass protests in mid-2003, and the national security bill was aborted after the Liberal Party, which held eight votes in the Legislative Council then, withdrew its support. The bill lapsed at the end of the first term of Tung Chee-hwa’s administration.
National security legislation became a political taboo that successive chief executives were reluctant to touch.
To avoid controversy and get on the right side of the then powerful “pro-democracy” bloc in Legco, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, who succeeded Tung in 2005, prioritised democratic reform instead of national security.
He succeeded in securing legislative approval for a constitutional reform package in 2010. The reform created five “super seats” in the legislature, in effect five at-large constituencies spanning the city.
Tsang was replaced by Leung Chun-ying, an avowed patriot, in 2012. Shortly after Leung took over, his agenda was thrown off course by popular protests against the government’s plan to implement national education in schools.
The new subject and the funding for its implementation had been approved by Legco, but with Legco elections coming up that September, the pro-democracy camp smeared national education as “brainwashing” to appeal to voters. After thousands of protesters laid siege to the government headquarters for 10 days, Leung withdrew the subject.
The pushback against national education alarmed Beijing. A greater shock to the system came in the autumn of 2014, when protesters laid siege to Central, Admiralty, Causeway Bay and Mong Kok to put pressure on Beijing to relax the criteria for selecting the chief executive by universal suffrage. After 79 days of illegal occupation which paralysed large swathes of Hong Kong, the demonstrators ran out of public support and were peacefully dispersed.
But by 2015, to Beijing’s even greater alarm, a Hong Kong independence movement appeared to be sprouting. In his policy address on January 14, 2015, Leung chided Undergrad, a time-honoured publication of the students of the University of Hong Kong, for spreading the idea of self-determination in a book titled Hong Kong Nationalism.
A group of students who took part in the 2014 Occupy protests set up a Hong Kong National Party in 2016. It was eventually prohibited by the secretary for security on national security grounds under the Societies Ordinance in September 2018.
Challenges to Beijing’s authority continued in 2016, when a group of newly elected legislators deliberately defied Beijing by taking their oath of allegiance in an insulting way. Thereafter, following the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s interpretation of Article 104 of the Basic Law governing the oath-taking requirement, those six legislators were disqualified.
In 2017, Leung was replaced by Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, a career civil servant, who appeared to have more popular support and was on better terms with the pro-democracy bloc in the legislature, which had solidified into a highly potent opposition for filibustering and blocking the government’s agenda.
Lam assumed office in mid-2017 without putting forward any timetable for implementing Article 23 legislation. By the end of 2018, voices from Beijing urging Hong Kong to fulfil its constitutional duty – such as former senior officials in charge of Hong Kong and Macau affairs Chen Zuo’er and Wang Guangya and then director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Zhang Xiaoming – were getting louder and louder.
Yet Lam chose instead to prioritise legislation on fugitive offenders, to enable Hong Kong to send fugitives hiding in the city to mainland China, Taiwan and Macau.
This piece of legislation proved even more controversial than the national security bill of 2003. It triggered mass protests, which became more violent over months, with stronger anti-China overtones and whiffs of Hong Kong independence.
The riots stopped after Beijing enacted a law to safeguard national security in Hong Kong.
Although China’s national security legislation achieved immediate success in quelling the rebellion, Hong Kong had yet to fulfil its constitutional, legal and moral duty to safeguard national security, an obligation which had been outstanding for almost 27 years.
Offences like treason, sedition, espionage and theft of state secrets have been on our statute books for decades. But many provisions are ineffective and outdated.
For both constitutional and practical reasons, Hong Kong needs to update existing laws, and introduce new offences in accordance with the holistic view of national security introduced by President Xi Jinping on April 15, 2014 and international trends.
The current international trend is to guard against external interference which does not necessarily adopt forceful means, but can include political infiltration, electoral interference, open lobbying or other more subtle means. Australia, Singapore and the United Kingdom have all enacted new laws to pre-empt improper external interference.
Hong Kong has now introduced a similar offence of external interference endangering national security. Given that it is a new offence, concerns have understandably been raised by academia, professional bodies, business chambers and think tanks which thrive on external liaison.
In passing the national security bill, Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu and his administration have pulled off a historic feat which none of their predecessors could; 6.53pm on March 19 will go down in Hong Kong’s history as a milestone. But, after the victory lap, much explanation and clarification are needed to assuage concerns. Let the campaign to tell the real story about Hong Kong’s national security law begin.
中譯本 :《基本法》第二十三條:成功立法之後,香港將何去何從?
《基本法》二十三條是中國全國人民代表大會通過的一條法例,決定香港的憲制安排。《基本法》二十三條要求香港特別行政區自行立法,禁止七項危害國家安全的罪行。盡管主管官員有良好意願,但2003年中實施第一輪第二十三條立法的過程,最終還是引發了大規模抗議活動,《維護國家安全條例草案》在當時擁有立法會八個席位的自由黨撤回支持後被逼中止,該法案在董建華政府第一屆任期結束時失效。
國家安全立法從此成為各任特首經常觸碰的政治禁區,幾任特首都不願再提起這個敏感議題。
2005年繼任的曾蔭權選擇有異於董建華的做法,為避免爭議並得到當時立法會泛民勢力的支持,他選擇優先推動民主制度改革,而非國家安全立法。他成功在2010年使立法會通過一個憲制改革方案,該改革在立法會設立五個“超級選區”,實質上為全香港範圍的五個選區。
2012年,曾蔭權被旗幟鮮明的愛國者梁振英接替。不過,梁剛繼承特首職務,其改革議程就被學生對政府推行國民教育計劃的大規模抗議帶離正軌。盡管立法會已通過了國民教育課程和撥款,但隨著9月將到來的立法會選舉,泛民陣營宣傳國民教育是「洗腦」以爭取選民支持。數千名抗議者連續包圍政府總部長達10天後,梁振英終撤回該課程。對國民教育的反對震驚了北京。2014年秋天,抗議者包圍中環、金鐘、銅鑼灣和旺角,向北京施加壓力要求推動普選,改變行政長官選舉辦法,這一次衝擊更大。79天非法占領及堵路香港大片地區,但抗議活動最後因失去公眾支持得以和平結束。
到了2015年,北京的憂慮更甚,香港獨立運動顯然開始萌芽。同年1月14日的施政報告中,梁振英批評香港大學學生報《學苑》通過一本名為《香港民族論》的書本傳播自決想法。參與2014年占領運動的學生於2016年成立了香港民族黨。2018年9月,這組織最終因「危害國家安全」被保安局局長根據社團條例取締。2016年,一些新當選的立法會議員故意以冒犯性方式宣誓,繼續挑戰北京權威。此後,根據全國人大常委會對《基本法》第104條有關宣誓規定的解釋,這六名議員被取消資格。2017年,梁振英被公務員林鄭月娥取代。林鄭似乎獲得更多民意支持,與立法會泛民勢力也處於較和睦狀態。此時立法會反對派已經壯大為阻撓政府施政的龐大力量。林鄭於2017年中任職而未提出實施《基本法》二十三條的時間表。2018年底,來自北京的聲音不斷擴大,包括曾負責港澳事務的陳佐洱和王光亞,以及國務院港澳事務辦公室主任張曉明都在督促香港履行憲制責任。
然而,林鄭選擇優先推動通過移交逃犯條例,以便香港能將藏匿的逃犯送往內地、台灣和澳門。
這次立法引發比2003年《維護國家安全條例草案》更大爭議。它觸發了持續近半年的大規模抗議活動,部分活動帶有更強烈的反中色彩和推動港獨味道,暴力事件在《香港國安法》出台後才停止。盡管北京立《國安法》成功遏制動亂,但香港在憲制和道義責任上,尤其是確保國家安全這一即將滿27年仍未履行的義務方面,仍需努力。香港法律包括叛國罪、煽顛罪、間諜罪和竊取國家秘密罪等法律條款已經存在多年,但其實不少條文經已過時及實效不足。
無論從憲法原則還是實際操作,香港都需要更新現有法律,並根據國家主席習近平2014年4月15日提出的總體國家安全觀和國際趨勢,引入新的罪行條款。當前國際趨勢下,要防範不必然采取武力但可能包括政治滲透、選舉干預、公開游說或其他更隱蔽方式的外部干預。澳州、新加坡和英國都制定了新的立法以預防外部干預。
因此香港需要引入新的國家安全罪行。例如有組織引導他人從事危害國家安全活動、在外國機構控制或指揮下從事危害國家安全活動等。這將有利於香港彌補長期以來在國家安全立法方面的不足,切實履行基本法賦予的責任。香港現時引入了類似的「外部干預危害國家安全罪」。由於這是新設立的罪行,學術界、專業團體、商會以及依賴外部聯絡的智庫都理所當然地提出了一些擔憂。
通過《維護國家安全條例草案》,時任行政長官李家超和政府實現了前任無法完成的歷史使命。2019年3月19日下午6點53分將載入香港史冊。但成功立法後,還需要更多解釋和澄清以釋除外界疑慮,向公眾解釋《香港國安法》真正意義的工作,現在才正式開始。
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