公務員應宣誓效忠香港特別行政區
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作者︰葉劉淑儀 | 來源︰:經濟通 | 日期︰2020 年 6 月 16 日 |
公務員團隊一直是香港繁榮穩定的基石,特區政府各個政策局、上上下下各部門,都是依靠十九萬公務員,執行政府政策,為市民提供優質服務,這點無容置疑。然而,在目前高度政治化的社會環境下,公務員體系及理念也難免受政治化的氣氛衝擊。
有公務員高調參與去年的反修例抗爭集會甚至被捕,強調政治理念的新公務員工會成立,讓「公務員是否政治中立」、公務員操守等等問題引起廣泛爭議。最近,新上任的公務員事務局局長聶德權指「公務員是香港特區政府的公務人員,同樣是中國香港特區政府的公務員,執行職務時要考慮此兩重身份」,更加引起軒然大波。
香港特別行政區本身就是國家不可分離的一部分,在「一國兩制」下,公務員沒有身份問題,反而公務員操守、是否效忠特區政府,更值得社會關注。
《公務員守則》清楚界定
《公務員守則》第3.7條對「政治中立」有清楚解釋:「不論本身的政治信念為何,公務員必須對在任的行政長官及政府完全忠誠,並須竭盡所能地履行職務。在履行公職時(包括提供意見、作出決定或採取行動),他們不得受本身的黨派政治聯繫或黨派政治信念所支配或影響。公務員不得以公職身分參與黨派的政治活動,亦不得把公共資源運用於黨派的政治目的上,例如進行助選活動或為政黨籌款。」
事實上,早於2004年6月9日,時任公務員事務局局長王永平到立法會回答議員質詢,當時他便指出:「公務員政治中立,包括以下主要元素:(一)公務員的政治中立,建基於效忠政府的責任;(二)所有公務員應對在任的行政長官和主要官員盡忠;(三)公務員必須衡量各項政策方案的影響,在政策制訂過程中坦誠而清晰地提出意見;(四)在政府作出決定後,不論個人立場如何,公務員應全力支持,把決定付諸實行,並且不應公開發表個人意見;以及(五)公務員應協助主要官員解釋政策,爭取立法會和市民大眾的支持。」
四類工種性質特殊
同時,我認同公務員工會聯合會總幹事梁籌庭所指,特區政府列出四類職位,基於工作性質,回歸前後也不容許有個人政治主張:
(一)首長級官員,負責制訂政策
(二)政務主任,負責制訂政策
(三)新聞主任,負責推銷政策
(四)警務人員,負責維持治安及社會安全
記得回歸前,時任港督彭定康推動政改方案,要在立法會爭取足夠票數通過,當時我在工商科工作,所有高級官員及政務主任都收到指令,要全力幫港督拉票,游說不同業界支持政改方案(包括增加直選議席,以及新增九個功能組別,以個人票取代團體票,只要屬該組別的從業員,便可自動成為有關功能組別的選民)。可見首長級官員及政務主任,由於負責制訂及推銷政策,必須堅定支持政府政策,沒有政治中立可言。
我擔任保安局局長時,時任天主教香港教區主教陳日君,曾公開批評公務員支持時任特首董建華,是違反政治中立。我出席活動時亦被問及這問題,當時我已指出,政治中立適用於「技術型」公務員,例如運輸、科學及環保主任等,他們的工作性質以專業、技術及科學為主,不牽涉政治,自然需奉行《公務員守則》政治中立、忠誠執行政策等原則。
此外,我認為所有公務員必須做到以下幾點:
(一)要專業地、具操守地做好工作
(二)不可因為其個人政治立場而在工作時偏離其專業
(三)擁護《基本法》、效忠香港特別行政區
(四)支持政府政策
公務員應宣誓 議案獲通過
我早於2019年11月4日,便於立法會「公務員及資助機構員工事務委員會」提出動議,促請行政長官根據《基本法》第48條第4款發出行政指令,要求所有公務員(包括新入職的公務員)宣誓擁護《基本法》,以及效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區,以確保公務員上下一致、同心同德,維護「一國兩制」。當日,我的議案獲大比數通過,雖然議案沒有法律約束力,但我認為特區政府應該落實。特區政府作為僱主,應該對僱員有要求,公務員既然在政府工作,便應該擁護《基本法》,效忠香港特別行政區。
11月27日的立法會上,黨友容海恩議員替我向公務員事務局提出質詢,追問特區政府會否制訂相關政策及發布行政命令。可是時任公務員事務局局長羅智光一直迴避問題,沒有正面回答。
宣誓一小步 未來一大步
半年後,現任公務員事務局局長聶德權終於上周公開表示,特區政府正研究公務員是否需要宣誓效忠特區政府、宣誓形式、以及違反誓言將有何後果等等,並且將於本屆立法會休會前匯報研究進度。我認為特區政府願意踏出這一小步,例如公務員分階段或分批宣誓,為公務員操守嚴格把關,對將來的影響會是一大步。
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香港:灣區明珠
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2017年7月,香港特別行政區與澳門特別行政區和廣東省簽署了深化合作框架協議,自此,融入粵港澳大灣區便成為特區政府的首要任務。
現在,香港特區政府正在快馬加鞭、全力以赴提升香港吸引力。然而,特區政府在應對日常施政之余,還應靜下心來,好好從戰略的高度思考一下融入大灣區的重大意義,尤應認真思考三個問題:大灣區一體化會為香港帶來哪些轉變?一體化的過程會給香港帶來哪些挑戰和機遇?如何才能把融入大灣區的優勢發揮得淋漓盡致?
融入大灣區無疑將給香港帶來巨變,影響深遠。根據《北部都會區發展策略》,特區政府將再興建三條鐵路,進一步鏈接北區與內地,“北部都會區”落成後,預計容納250萬居民居住。屆時,相信絕大部份居民會覺得北上內地甚至比南下港島市區更為方便快捷。隨著大灣區城市化日趨完善,越來越多香港居民有意北遷,內地安家,香港上班,即日往返勢為常態。
為此,有人擔心香港會出現“空心化”趨勢。然而,港人移居內地卻並非壞事。港人花費巨資卻住屋狹小,相較而言,深圳等姊妹城市居住條件寬敞優越。然而,一直以來,由於人為區隔,港人難以北上安居。如今交通網絡覆蓋完善,大灣區城市醫療完備、教育優良,勢必將有更多港人遷居內地、享受更為優渥的生活。
所以,擁抱大灣區意味著特區政府全盤審視人口政策、城市規劃和社會福利的分配。私營部門也須調整發展策略,以適應新格局下的生活和消費模式。
另一方面,香港還需要研究如何沖破限制,以便利用大灣區城市的豐富資源。大灣區擁有8600萬人口,區內生產總值達2兆美元,有望成為全球最活躍的地區。然而,目前香港獨立關稅和入境管制阻礙了貨物、服務、人才、資本和數據自由流動。突破限制雖非易事,但特區政府已經有了解決方案,實現雙贏。
例如,香港缺乏土地興建安老院舍,若能讓更多銀齡港人遷居大灣區,必然多方獲益。為了讓更多領取綜援的長者在廣東、福建安享晚年,特區政府放寬了兩地退休養老計劃的居港年期規定。而且,特區政府還將更進一步,把同時在香港和內地開辦安老院的機構列入“廣東院舍照顧服務計劃”的“認可服務機構”。
上個月,又有兩間分別位於佛山和深圳的安老院被納入特區政府認可服務機構,讓這類機構數量一舉提升至四間。特區政府還計劃將內地企業營運的安老院也一並納入該服務計劃。而且,隨著越來越多退役紀律部隊成員和公務員選擇在大灣區養老,特區政府應研究在大灣區城市購置土地或物業為那些移居內地的退休公務員提供住所。
此外,香港多個行業人手嚴重短缺,特區政府為紓解業界困境,特意放寬輸入外勞計劃,讓機管局、運輸業和建造業可以聘請內地勞工。大灣區城市可以派遣科技人才、工程師和科技企業來港發展,他們既可利用香港發展國際業務,也可協助北部都會區構建創科中心。而這些科技巨頭亦可以借助香港頂尖學府的醫學、科研等方面提升自身競爭力。
總之,要想充分釋放大灣區的潛力,關鍵在發展戰略上要實現彼此互補。香港可協助大灣區城市加快發展經濟,特別是金融、商貿和其他專業領域。深圳市政府在1月發表報告,指出去年社會消費品零售總額比前年增長7.8%,已突破1萬億元。著名學者方舟表示,港人北上消費趨之若鶩,深圳零售隨之興旺發達。
由此可見,只要香港、深圳和其他大灣區城市協同發展,就能取長補短,整合優勢,成為國家經濟增長新引擎。
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Public disorder is unacceptable to any authority
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The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, recently published a report on the state of autonomy in Hong Kong. The report ended with a mildly positive hope that Hong Kong's "spots of resilience", meaning its relative openness and inclusivity, might be preserved through the United States' adoption of "strategic engagement" with Hong Kong. The premises for coming to this conclusion have much that needs to be challenged.
The report dwelled at length on the political change and the intense focus on national security, which have come about after Beijing enacted the National Security Law for Hong Kong in June 2020. In enumerating the alleged "diminution of freedom" in various spheres of activity, the report turned a complete blind eye to the sufferings of the people of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region during the prolonged violence in 2019 and 2020, and the attacks on government institutions, which would not be tolerated by any competent authority.
Events that unfolded in the US after that — the severity with which the US authorities went after "election deniers" who stormed the Capitol Hill on Jan 6, 2021, and the speed with which police forcibly cleared US campuses of pro-Palestinian protesters — drive home the reality that public disorder that challenges the rule of law, let alone attempts at subversion and secession, is unacceptable to any authority. It would have been irresponsible of Beijing to sit idle and allow Hong Kong to be engulfed by seemingly unending circles of hatred and intimidation.
The second reality, which the report overlooked, in discussing the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong, is the fact that Beijing has always intended Hong Kong to be, according to Article 12 of the Basic Law, "a local administration of the People's Republic of China, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the Central People's Government".
People who have a smattering of knowledge of China's history and political tradition would know that the nation has always been an administrative state. It has been highly centralized since the rule of Qin Shi Huang, or the First Emperor of the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC). China's administrative structure today — comprising 23 provinces, five autonomous regions, four "direct-administered municipalities" and two special administrative regions — reflects the historical developments over time, but is in essence not dissimilar to the administrative structure of China upon unification by Qin Shi Huang, also the first emperor in the Chinese history.
At the time of Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong in the early 1980s, electoral democracy was unknown in China and alien to its political tradition. It is unimaginable that Beijing would have agreed to grant popular democracy to Hong Kong after 1997. No agreement on political reform in Hong Kong after 1997 was reached, as evidenced by the lack of any reference to the introduction of "democracy" in the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong.
The Sino-British Joint Declaration has become the favorite weapon of US and British authorities to clobber China for alleged breach of its "treaty obligations" to Hong Kong. In fact, the joint declaration, comprising no more than 1,183 words, three annexes and an exchange of memorandums on nationality, is literally a pair of linked statements by which China declared it would recover Hong Kong and "resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997", followed by a terse statement by Britain that "it will restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997".
In the third statement, China declared its basic policies toward Hong Kong. In subparagraph 4 of this statement, China made clear that "the chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally". This statement papered over a rift over constitutional development in Hong Kong after 1997, which was never resolved by the end of the Sino-British negotiations.
Those who blame China for not honoring its alleged promise of democracy to Hong Kong should bear in mind that it was Britain which put democratic development on hold on two occasions. The first occasion was after World War II, which is well documented in the book Democracy Shelved by British scholar Steve Tsang Yui-sang. The second instance was in the late 1960s, after riots in Kowloon prompted a review of the need for greater popular participation in governance. The British leaders decided that Hong Kong would be better served by rational, nonpartisan technocrats than irresponsible demagogues.
It was Beijing which agreed to vastly expand the electoral element in the legislature after 1997.Unfortunately, the democratic experiment proved to be a disastrous impediment to effective governance and eventually a hotbed for anti-China movement.
Many rely on the reference to Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy except in "foreign and defense affairs" to substantiate their allegation that Hong Kong's autonomy has been whittled down by Beijing. They ignore the fact that China has declared from the outset, in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law, that upholding national unity and territorial integrity is the prime objective of China's resumption of exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.
Under the Basic Law, Beijing wields decisive powers over a wide range of constitutional arrangements, such as the appointment of principal officials, the power to apply national laws in Hong Kong, a power which has been exercised sparingly, and the power of interpretation of provisions of the Basic Law.
Lest there be any undue pessimism about the "high degree of autonomy" enjoyed by Hong Kong, it should also be noted that Article 4 of the Basic Law provides clearly that the rights and freedoms of the residents of the Hong Kong SAR and of other people in the region shall be safeguarded in accordance with the law. This commitment is reiterated in Article 4 of the National Security Law for Hong Kong, and in section 2(b) of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance enacted by Hong Kong on March 19. The commitment to maintaining the capitalist systems practiced in Hong Kong is equally ironclad.
As the scholars in the US think tank observed, Hong Kong remains "the freest part of China" where the flow of information and ideas is relatively uninhibited, and international business is well protected by law. It is a city where Westerners can live happily, do business and raise their families, and many have done so and chosen to stay. The US should accept Hong Kong as it is, a special administrative region under the direct authority of the central government, with adequate rights and freedoms preserved, and not an imagined community with more rights than granted by its sovereign power.
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新界東北發展多災多難 / Northeast New Territories Development beset by Calamity after Calamity
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特區政府早前就古洞北新發展區及粉嶺北新發展區第二階段地盤平整和基礎設施工程向立法會工務小組委員會提交撥款申請。
逾301 億元撥款除用作土地平整外,亦會用於改善道路及建造排水排污系統等必要的基礎設施。根據政府的估算,新發展區落成後將可提供約8.6 萬個房屋單位,以容納約22 萬新增人口。
古洞北及粉嶺北新發展區原是新界東北發展計劃的一部分。港英政府早於1990 年代就有意將新界東北發展成新市鎮並就此做好前期規劃研究。回歸後,特區政府曾於1998 年提出要在新界東北發展「無煙環保城」,奈何當時香港經濟下行,特區政府不得不擱置計劃。直到2007 年,時任行政長官曾蔭權再次就發展計劃作規劃及工程研究。
當時各大地產商都在新界東北囤積大量土地,有保育派指控特區政府是借發展計劃為名,向地產商收購土地再拍賣,或利用公私營合作模式,與地產商閉門商議土地契約、修改條款及補地價金額、原址換地,有官商勾結和利益輸送之嫌。
2014 年6 月13 日,立法會財務委員會審議古洞北及粉嶺北新發展區前期地盤平整和基礎設施工程的撥款申請,其間有示威者衝擊立法會大樓。示威者漠視公共秩序,強行推倒立法會外的鐵馬,撬開大樓的玻璃門,會議需提前結束。會議終止後,有關撥款申請直至2019 年才再次提交立法會審議。
時隔多年,當我看見撥款申請再次出現在委員會議程上時,不禁想起這項發展計劃歷盡多年艱辛,終於得以順利推展,心裏百感交集。
Northeast New Territories Development beset by Calamity after Calamity
Recently the HKSAR government submitted a funding application to the Public Works Subcommittee of the Legislative Council for phase two earthworks and basic infrastructure works for the Hung Shui Kiu North and Fanling North New Development Areas.
The over $30.1 billion in funding requested will be used not just for land levelopment, but also improving roads and constructing necessary infrastructure like drainage and sewage systems. According to government estimates, the completed new development areas can provide around 86,000 housing units accommodating some 220,000 additional population.
Hung Shui Kiu North and Fanling North were originally part of the Northeast New Territories Development Project. As early as the 1990s the Hong Kong government intended to develop Northeast New Territories into a new town and conducted advance planning studies. After the handover, the HKSAR government proposed developing a “smokeless eco-green city” in NET in 1998, but had to shelve the plan as Hong Kong entered an economic downturn. It was not until 2007 under then CE Donald Tsang that planning and engineering studies for the development plan resumed.
At the time major developers amassed huge tracts of land in NET, with conservation groups accusing the government of using the development plan as a pretext to purchase land from developers which would then be auctioned, or through public-private partnerships to privately negotiate land leases, terms and premium amounts, or original site swaps with developers - implying official-business collusion and rent-seeking.
In June 2014 funding application for phase one earthworks and infrastructure for Hung Shui Kiu North and Fanling North was being examined by the Finance Committee, protesters stormed the Legco building. Disregarding public order, demonstrators forcibly toppled barricades outside Legco and pried open the glass entrance doors, forcing early end of the meeting. The funding application would not be resubmitted for Legco scrutiny until 2019 after meeting termination.
Years later seeing the funding request again on the panel agenda, I couldn't help but recall the long struggle of this development plan and its eventual smooth advancement, with mixed feelings.
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